

Japan's Foreign Policy in the Late Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Centuries

Bozorov Zuhayriddin

Master student of department World History, National University of Uzbekistan
ozodbek.radjabov.94@inbox.ru

Abstract: *The first step in Japan's important role in world politics was to restore trust and reconciliation with the countries of East Asia, for which the greatest apology was made for Japan's actions in the first half of the 20th century. The 1995 statement by Prime Minister Murayama Tomiiti included other measures to address the problems of the historical past. In a statement issued on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Pacific War on August 15, 1995, Prime Minister T. Murayama said: "Japan has been following the wrong political path for several years in the recent past, leading the Japanese people to war with its closest neighbors.*

Keywords: Japan, East Asia, Japanese Council of Ministers, South Korea, Murayama cabinet's

1. INTRODUCTION.

The destruction caused by colonial rule and aggression and caused great destruction and suffering to many countries, especially the peoples of Asia. I would like to express my deepest condolences and sincere apologies. Please allow me to express my condolences to the victims in Japan and in other countries [1]"

It would be appropriate for Murayama's statement to be seen as an expression of the prime minister's personal position in the first place. Because not everyone in the central apparatus of Japanese politics agreed with this view (the visit of a group of ten ministers of the Japanese Council of Ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine in August 1995 may confirm this). Nevertheless, the Prime Minister's above statement was a positive sign for Japan. Following the Prime Minister's statement, the first step in Tokyo's return to an important role in world politics was to restore trust and reconciliation with East and Southeast Asia. The Gulf events of 1990-1991 reaffirmed Japan's role in the international arena. Western allies later criticized Tokyo's involvement in the multinational force operation was in fact limited to cash (Japan allocated \$ 13 billion to the campaign, which accounted for 20 percent of its total value. also provided medical personnel)[2].

In Tokyo, the Allies considered ways to expand Japan's contribution to international peace and security, and in April, for the first time since the end of World War II, disarmed Japan's naval forces. He sent part of the army abroad to clear the Gulf of mines, and in 1992 a law was passed allowing the Self-Defense Forces (NDF) to participate in UN peacekeeping operations.

But at the same time, the Japanese parliament is debating the possibility of sending the NTR abroad. The ambiguous attitude of the East Asian countries to the discussion of this law has led to a protracted process of discussion.

China has criticized Japan's peace co-operation law with the UN as an attempt to "overcome restrictions on sending troops abroad, which is impossible for Japan in forty-five years" and has been criticized for years. "The aggression instigated by the Japanese militarists could be a new sign of war, causing discontent in Japanese society and concerns in neighboring Asian countries[3]"

At that time, a commission was set up under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Miyazaki Kiiti (1991-1993) to set Japan's goals for the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st century. The league needs to address a variety of issues and think about Japan's future in the Asia-Pacific region. [4]"

2. DISCUSSION.

Analyzing this conclusion, I have developed a strategic direction for Japan's reconciliation with Asian countries, which includes Tokyo's recognition of its responsibility for aggression and colonialism. In the first half of the twentieth century, politics, apologies, and other attempts to solve other problems of the historical past began, and Tokyo sought to take its rightful place in the international political arena in line with its economic power.

There are a number of factors that have helped change the Japanese government's approach to the problem, including the end of the Cold War, the democratic process in a number of countries, including South Korea, and various human rights groups, including the Japanese government. the intensification of actions that "required a solution to the problem of women" was the death of Emperor Hirohito[5].

Meanwhile, the controversy surrounding the events of 1982 in Japanese history textbooks and the diplomatic scandal surrounding the official visit of Prime Minister Y. Nakasone to Yasukuni Shinto Shrine on August 15, 1985 have aroused Japanese interest in commenting on the events of the first half of the twentieth century. . The government also needed to define its position more clearly and move

from vague statements about the "unfortunate past" to recognition of aggression and colonialism.

During Prime Minister Miyazawa's official visit to Seoul on January 17, 1992, he apologized for "the unbearable suffering and suffering of the people of the Korean Peninsula" amid a controversy over the issue of "women's welfare.[6]"

The Prime Minister directly pointed out that Japan was an aggressor and that the Republic of Korea was a victim, and that "the younger generations of Japan for these mistakes" should begin to correctly interpret history so that these cases do not happen again. promised. Most importantly, for the first time, K. Miyazawa used the words "aggressor" and "victim" instead of vague formulas previously used, such as "unfortunate past." He also stressed the need for a "correct understanding of history", which later became an important part of Japan's amnesty policy[7].

Official Tokyo's correct approach to history, as well as the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) general defeat for the first time since 1955, led to the coalition government led by Hosokawa Morihiro (1993-1994) coming to power in 1993. it has been.

At the first post-election press conference, in response to a question from reporters, the new prime minister clearly described Japan's actions as an "aggressive war" and expressed "deep regret" in a speech to parliament in September 1993, "through aggression and colonial rule. "Japan has suffered a lot in the past.[8]"

During a visit to South Korea in November 1993, Ms. Hosokawa noted that "the people of the Korean Peninsula were deprived of the opportunity to study in their mother tongue, had to change their surnames to Japanese, and suffered other unbearable hardships and sorrows. He apologized for the inconvenience.

According to the Japanese periodicals, the meeting with South Korean President Kim Yong Sam was held in a cordial atmosphere due to the mutual agreement of history presented by Prime Minister M. Hosokawa in November 1993. The leaders stressed the importance of "looking directly to the past and taking into account the lessons learned" in order to build strong friendly ties between Japan and the Republic of Korea[9].

At his next meeting with M. Hosokawa in Tokyo in March 1994, Kim Yong Sam said, "Although there are aspects of the past that cause embarrassment to both the victim and the oppressed, we need to focus on the future." The two leaders began to put forward the idea that "the past should not allow the future to end."

Judging by the tone of the Japanese media, it can be said that at that time he had a positive view of the future of Japan-

Korea relations. Japan hopes that the historic problems in bilateral relations will be a thing of the past and that Seoul and Tokyo will open a new page in relations. According to sources in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Government of the Republic of Korea, Japanese newspapers have expressed satisfaction with the content of Hosokawa's apologies in South Korea and no longer focus on the problems of the historical past during bilateral relations. At the same time, Japan, realizing that the Republic of Korea has deep roots in trust in Japan, believes that real political steps should be taken by the leaders of the two countries to make political decisions, including mutual understanding and trust between the two peoples[10].

Sensitive exchanges between the two countries have been extremely limited, but as relations have warmed (and North Korea's "nuclear crisis" has intensified), there have been shifts. In April 1994, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Korea visited Japan. Japan and South Korea have agreed to expand security cooperation. Accordingly, in July 1994, it was announced that three training ships of the South Korean Navy had been called in for the first time in the post-war history in the Japanese port of Yokosuka[11].

Hosokawa has failed to achieve a friendly atmosphere in relations with China, such as South Korea. During a visit to the People's Republic of China in March 1994, the Japanese Prime Minister reiterated his views on history, stating that "with deep regret over past events, I want to develop relations with China in the future." . In response, Li Pen, Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, limited himself to saying that "this is the most direct and sincere expression of the attitude to history that I have heard.[12]"

The leader of the Socialist Party of Japan (PCJ), the Prime Minister of Japan from 1994 to 1996, T. Murayama, visited the Republic of Korea in July 1994 and China in May 1995. The prime minister has apologized for Japan's colonial rule in South Korea. He noted that the people of the Korean Peninsula have suffered and suffered as a result of Japan's aggressive actions, and also promised to send proposals to the South Korean side soon to address the issue of "convenience for women". T. Murayama also visited the National Cemetery of the Republic of Korea, where he paid tribute to those killed in the war[13].

In a conversation with Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng and Chinese President Jiang Zemin in May 1995, Murayama said that "aggressive actions and colonial rule in the past have caused unbearable suffering and grief to many people in neighboring Asian countries." 'he brought it,' he pointed out. He promised to work to solve the problem of chemical weapons left in Japan. Japanese media have noted that the Prime Minister missed an apology and the phrase "decided to end the war," which has become commonplace for him. As expected, Murayama chose to soften the language a bit to

avoid criticism in domestic politics. At the time, a parliamentary resolution "against the war" was being discussed in Japan. Beijing did not pay much attention to the statement. In China, they vowed that commemorative events to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II would not be anti-Japanese (their goal was to "learn from the past", step into the future with "wishes for peace" and "in the 21st century". At the same time, Chinese President Jiang Zemin stressed that "there are still people in Japan who have a wrong view of history" and "it is impossible" to move forward together[14].

During his visit to China, Murayama became the first Japanese prime minister to visit the Marco Polo Bridge, where the second Sino-Japanese War of 1937 began. According to Murayama, his move is based on Japan's "deep regret for past acts of aggression and colonial rule," and its commitment to building a relationship of trust with neighboring Asian countries. was designed to demonstrate a willingness to continue y-actions. During the visit, Murayama reaffirmed his "firm oath that the people of Japan will never seek to create a military force.[15]"

Murayama tried to correct the assessments, such as the official position of Tokyo. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, the first attempt in his government's postwar history was to pass an "anti-war" resolution in parliament, whose first task was to apologize to countries affected by Japanese aggression and colonialism and reaffirm its commitments. Japan's renunciation of the war was seen as a means of resolving international disputes[16].

3. CONCLUSION.

However, pressure from right-wing conservative politicians has significantly weakened political views. However, no agreement was reached: only 251 out of 502 deputies took part in the vote, of which 230 supported the statement. As a result, the "Renewed Decision for Peace Based on History Lessons" passed by the House of Representatives of the Japanese Parliament on June 9, 1995, brought "sincere condolences to all those who died on the battlefield or fell victim to war or other similar acts." Although he had previously acknowledged the "aggressive behavior" and "colonial domination" of Japan, it was included in a wide range of political realities at the time. The word "forgiveness" was replaced by "deep regret" for the suffering of the peoples of other countries, especially Asia, and the final part "taught history lessons to bridge the gaps in the history of the past war and humbly establish peace in international lessons." failing to achieve the expected results, T. Murayama decided to issue a statement on behalf of the Prime Minister, the aim of which, in his own words, was to "develop a consensus[17].

The statement was issued after it was approved by the Japanese Cabinet on August 15, 1995, and "many countries, especially the peoples of Asia," strongly apologized for Japan's aggression and colonial rule[18].

But Murayama's apology sparked a resurgence and aggression among conservative forces in Japan. In addition to the ten cabinet members demonstrating at Yasukuni Shrine, one of the ministers called the "Nanking Massacre" a fabrication, while the other Japan liberated Asian countries from Western colonialism and justified the need for colonies by defending itself. This, of course, diminished the positive impact of the statement.

China and the Republic of Korea have reacted weakly to Murayama's statement. Beijing welcomed the Japanese Cabinet's signal, noting that "some members of the Japanese public and political circles are currently unable to take the right position," and Seoul called on the Japanese government to "take it seriously[19]"

In Seoul, Murayama's statement was not considered complete because it did not officially recognize Tokyo's responsibility for the outbreak of war and declared that the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 had no legal force. Tokyo's position on the second issue has even derailed political dialogue with Seoul. In response to T. Murayama's statement in the Japanese parliament that the 1910 agreement was not legally binding at the time of its signing, the Republic of Korea reacted sharply to the Japanese Foreign Minister. Kono's scheduled visit to Seoul and Beijing was postponed in November 1995 ahead of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Osaka[20].

Around the same time, South Korean President Kim Jong Un accused Japan of its colonial policy, which led to the division of Korea into two states. Seoul and Beijing later urged Tokyo not to deviate from the position stated in the 1995 statement. Another step in the Murayama cabinet's path of historical reconciliation with the former Japanese colonies and territories was to advance the historical research of that period. In 1994, Murayama announced plans to draw up an "Exchange Plan for Peace and Friendship," including a collection of relevant historical documents and materials[21].

4. References:

1. Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the War's End, August 15, 1995 [Electronic resource] //Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan official website. – Mode of access: – <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508>.
2. Calder Kent. Japan in 1991: Uncertain Quest for a Global Role [Electronic resource] //Asian Survey. –

- 1992 (Vol. 32). – No. 1. – P.33. – Mode of access: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645196>
3. Kuroki M. Nationalism in Japan's Contemporary Foreign Policy: A Consideration of the Cases of China, North Korea, and India: a thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. – London, 2013. – PP. 67-68.
 4. Midford, P. Japan's leadership role in East Asian security multilateralism: the Nakayama proposal and the logic of reassurance // *The Pacific review*. – 2000 (vol. 13). - No. 3. – PP. 375 – 376; Onuma Y. Japanese War Guilt and Postwar Responsibilities of Japan // *Berkeley Journal of International Law*. – 2000 (vol. 20). – P. 600 – 620; Kuroki M. Nationalism in Japan's Contemporary Foreign Policy: A Consideration of the Cases of China, North Korea, and India: a thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. – London, 2013. – P. 50 – 78; Kingston J. Awkward Talisman: War Memory, Reconciliation and Yasukuni // *East Asia*. – 2007 (vol. 24). – No. 3. – PP. 295-318.
 5. アジアの中、世界の中日韓関係=Выступление премьер-министра Японии К.Миядзавы по случаю визита в Республику Корею «Японо-южнокорейские отношения в Азии и мире» [Электронный ресурс] // *東洋文化研究所=сайт Института исследований культуры Азии Токийского университета*. – 17 января 1992. – Режим доступа: – <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/exdpm/19920117.S1J.html>
 6. Yamazaki J.W. Japanese Apologies for World War II: A Rhetorical Study. – London and New York: Routledge. - 2006. – P. 61.
 7. 細川護熙内閣総理大臣第 127 回 (特別会)演説 =Выступление Премьер-министра М.Хосокавы на 127-й чрезвычайной сессии парламента [Электронный ресурс] // *東洋文化研究所=сайт Института исследований культуры Азии Токийского университета*. – 23 августа 1993 г. – Режим доступа:<http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/pm/19930823.SWJ.html> (дата обращения: 10.10.2015).
 8. 小山利信. 日韓首脳会談の要旨=Кояма Т. Краткое содержание встречи лидеров Японии и Республики Корея//*読売新聞=Иомиури симбун*. – 1993. – 7 ноября. – С.2.
 9. 首脳会談の要旨= Краткое содержание встречи лидеров Японии и Республики Корея//*読売新聞=Иомиури симбун*. – 1994. – 25 марта. – С.2.
 10. 河田卓司. 大統領訪日來春、にも=Кавада Т. Визит президента может состояться уже весной следующего года //*読売新聞=Иомиури симбун*. – 1993. – 8 ноября. – С.2.
 11. 日韓新時代になお時間=Для новой эры японо-южнокорейских отношений еще требуется время //*読売新聞=Иомиури симбун*. – 1993. – 8 ноября. – С.2.
 12. 浅野好春. 韓国練習艦、初寄港へ=Асано Ё. Южнокорейский учебный корабль впервые зайдет в японский порт // *Иомиури симбун*. – 1994. – 24 июля. – С.2.
 13. 荒井利明. 細川—李鵬会談の要旨=Араи Т. Краткое содержание встречи М.Хосокавы и Ли Пэна//*読売新聞=Иомиури симбун*. – 1994. – 21 марта. – С.2.
 14. 浅野好春. 日韓首脳会談主なやり取り=Асано Ё. Основные моменты встречи лидеров Японии и Республики Корея// *読売新聞=Иомиури симбун*. – 1994. – 24 июля. - С.3.
 15. 西田睦美. 首相「過去に深い反省」=Нисида М. Премьер-министр выразил глубокое сожаление о прошлом // *日本経済新聞=Нихон Кэйдзай*. – 1995. – 4 мая. – С.1.
 16. 西田睦美. 首相「過去に深い反省」=Нисида М. Премьер-министр выразил глубокое сожаление о прошлом // *日本経済新聞=Нихон Кэйдзай*. – 1995. – 4 мая. – С.1.
 17. 中国訪問の際の内外記者会見における村山総理大臣の冒頭発言 = Вступительное слово Премьер-министра Японии Т.Мураямы на пресс-конференции для японских и иностранных журналистов по случаю визита в КНР [Электронный ресурс] // *東洋文化研究所=сайт Института исследований культуры Азии Токийского университета*. - 4 мая 1995 г. - Режим доступа: – <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPCH/19950504.S1J>.
 18. Kuroki M. Nationalism in Japan's Contemporary Foreign Policy. -P. 69-70.
 19. Dower J.W. Japan Addresses Its War Responsibility [Electronic resource] // *The Journal of the International Institute, University of Michigan*. – 1995. – Vol. 3. – No 1. – Mode of access: <http://quod.lib.umich.edu/j/jii/4750978.0003.103/--japan-addresses-its-war-responsibility?rgn=main;view=fulltext> .

20. Цит. по: Dower, J.W. Japan Addresses Its War Responsibility

21. Yang D. Political Apology in Sino-Japanese Relations: The Murayama Statement and Its Receptions in China // Japan and Reconciliation in

22. Postwar Asia: the Murayama Statement and Its Implication. – Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. – P. 28.