

Effectiveness of Policy Implementation in the Nigerian Public Service: A Case Study of Enugu State Agricultural Development Programme (ENADEP) 2010-2018

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Abstract: *In the Nigerian Public service, especially in Enugu State Agricultural Development Programme, (ENADEP), it has been observed that most policies failed to realize their objectives, due, largely to corruption, poor funding of projects, political instability, etc. These failed policies have created sense of disappointment among the citizens who now pass vote of no confidence on the government. We applied the Decision making model of policy analysis by Herbert Simon (1957). We studied the individual decision makers, policy formulation and implementation process, the environmental contributions to policy implementation, etc. We also applied the documentary and questionnaire research designs to be able to get at the relevant information necessary for proper analysis. Research revealed that poor policy implementation strategy - (Top-down approach), attitudes of farmers and refusal of some ENADEP officials to assist some farmers to excel in their agricultural activities led to failures in ENADEP policy implementation. We recommend a Down-Top policy making approach where farmers and other stakeholders participate in policy formulation and implementation. Special education by the Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies should be extended to the farmers and ENADEP officials. The ENADEP officials should be held responsible for any policy implementation failures. Government should fund agricultural production activities adequately to ensure that policies are effective in realizing their objectives.*

Keywords: Policy, Policy Implementation, Nigerian Public Service Implementation, ENADEP,

1. INTRODUCTION

Public policy implementation has been known to be the major cause of public policy failures in the Nigerian public service. Policies are the conveyors of the plans, decisions and intentions of government to the citizenry. Governments do not merely wade into society and begin to provide social amenities to the benefits of the public. Problems associated with agriculture, health, education, economic development, foreign relations, transportation, security etc. are all handled through the instrumentality of policies. These policies when poorly implemented leave the people dissatisfied, frustrated and alienated. In line with the above, Implementation problems in the developing countries are the problems of a widening gap between intentions and results because many policy designers assume that once a policy is adopted by government, it must be implemented and the desired results/goals achieved accordingly (Grindle, 1980).

The idea that policy implementation is a function of the interaction of the people with politics and administration is not considered by most policy designers and implementers. But this interaction when negatively handled can greatly undermine the efforts of policy designers and could lead to policy failures. Implementation is the nemesis of designers, it conjures up images of plans gone awry and of social carpenters and masons who fail to build to

specifications and therefore distort the beautiful blue prints for progress which were handed to them (Honadle, 1970).

Some of the causes of these policy failures include, poor/weak extractive capacity of the state in relation to the economy, corruption, political instability resulting from frequent reshuffling of public officials, executive interference whereby the political chief executive meddle in the affairs of the organization by withholding, diverting or embezzling money meant for public projects. This manifests sometimes when governor appoints, removes as well as directs the affairs of the projects management unit, the organ responsible for the day to day operations of the Enugu State Agriculture Development Programmes (ENADEP).

In the ENADEP, the Top-to-Bottom approach to policy formulation and execution has taken its toll on the management. Poor education of the farmers, unwillingness of some public office holders to implement certain policies for obvious reasons, ranging from political considerations to outright lack of vision, have also led to lack of implementing noble policies in place and abandoning of on-going projects. Poor extension services as well as some decision makers who base their decisions/policies on subject elements than from thorough scientific and analytic methods, all combine to lead to policy implementation failures.

Most of these problems, and more, constitute serious handicaps to proper public policy implementation in the Nigeria public services especially the Enugu State agricultural development programmes. These policy failures have forced some citizens, especially the youths, to seek to survive through self-help like, armed robbery, kidnapping, ritual killings, youth's restiveness and other vices that destroy society. The economy and social environment of the society were negatively affected. Regimes after regimes had made efforts to solve these problems to no avail, hence this research effort.

The policy position of the Enugu State agricultural development programme is to (a) increase the food production and (b) income of the small-scale farmers in the state. To help actualize their objectives, the World Bank intervened to ensure that the people of this country enjoyed good life through agriculture.

For us to find solutions to the policy failures, especially in ENADEP, we shall strive to explain what policy failure, policy implementation and policy implementation effectiveness means. Policy failure means when the purposes of a policy, are not realized/achieved for one reason or the other. Policy implementation is the actual execution of the contents of a policy with the aim of achieving the goals of that policy. A policy implementation effectiveness means the ease with which the purposes or goals of a particular policy are realized through proper implementation strategies. A policy implementation strategy is effective if it facilitates timely realization of the goals of the policy. Some policies can also become failures if the way they were formulated was faulty. We shall look into some making approaches to strive to trace some possible causes of policy implementation failures in the Nigeria public service.

2. POLICY MAKING APPROACHES

There is no fixed or uniformly accepted pattern of policy making. The policy makers, the environment of policy formulation, expected targets of the policy, etc. determine the type of approach to be applied in its formulation. However, these approaches are generally common: -

- i. **The Rational Approach:** The rational policy making model owes its origin to Herbert Simon (1957). Rational policy is one that is conceived to achieve maximum social gain on the basis of a careful cost benefit analysis. The model assumes that in any situation, an administrator ought to ideally examine all possible courses of action open to him, trace through the consequences of each alternative. He should then choose that course of action which is expected to provide the greatest net satisfaction. In

other words, a policy is rational when the difference between the values it achieves and the values it sacrifices is positive and greater than any other alternative, (Dye, 1987). Therefore, to be rational in policy formulation, policy makers should (a) Consciously be rational in ordering their behaviours so that they align with the organizational goals. (b) know the society's value preferences and assign quantitative values/weights to each alternative in a ranking order (c) Have adequate insight of the consequences of each policy alternative and (d) select the most efficient policy alternative (best satisfaction at least costs).

Despite the thoroughness of this approach in tackling public policy issues, Gordon, (1986) has been able to distinguish two broad shortcomings, namely (a) its lack of practical applicability outside the realm of economic theory and (b) that it is less desirable because it lends itself to conflicting signals before the policy maker. For instance, the government may be faced with the problems of controlling inflation and creating employments or even the problem of bringing inflation under check and at the same time boosting the provision of social amenities to the citizens, (Gordon, 1986). The Policy maker cannot achieve this by assignment of qualifiable values (if at all this is possible) without adopting a middle of the road approach, (Eboh, 1999).

- ii. **The Incremental Model:** The incremental model which was developed by Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom was a reaction to the constraints of the rational model (Ikelegbe, 1996). With regards to public policy implementation, incrementalism is a policy mode that view public policy as a continuation of past government activities with only incremental or cumulative modification. The logic here is that it is impracticable for decision makers to always review the whole range of existing and proposed policies, identify societal goals, make a cost benefit consideration of alternative policies and then finally select a specific policy on the basis of all relevant information, (Dye, 1987). Generally, institutions are conservative in nature and owing to constraints of time, money, information, technical competence and political expediency, cannot afford the luxury of rational policy design.

Incrementalism is essential in preserving the political system by reducing possible issues and areas of conflict. However, it has limited potential for major policy shifts and radical innovations.

iii. The System Model of Policy Making: The systems model of policy making is based on the Eastonian systems framework for the analysis of politic system, and Easton defines a practical system as “that system of interactions in any society through which binding or authoritative allocation are made and implemented (Easton, 1957). The systems theory/model as a policy making approach emphasizes;

that every department or section of an enterprises is a sub system of the entire enterprise and that managers of these organizational units must be responsive to the policies and programmes of their organization units and of the total enterprise. Moreover, people within the enterprise are a part of the social system, and their thinking and attitudes must be taken into consideration whenever a manager makes a decision (Koontz, 1980).

The model sees an organization as a sub-system of the entire macro system that has to function as part of that whole and reacts to it when considering actions of policy since the society has to react/feedback its feeling and perceptions of phrases to the management.

In the Enugu state agricultural development programme, policies are made by the highest organ of the organization-the Agricultural Development Programme Executive Committee (ADPEC). This committee is made up of twelve heads of units and its Chairman is the Governor of the state. The decision they make includes:

- (a) Approval of the annual work plan and budgets of the organization.
- (b) Appointment of senior officers of the organization.
- (c) Major procurements of materials and funds for the running of the organization.
- (d) Approval of contracts sums exceeding USD 25m, etc.

Under this apex organ is the Project Management Unit (PMU) headed by a project manager who runs the day-to-day affairs of the organization. Under this project management unit are the various departments of the organization. They include; Technical, Extension, Commercial, Engineering, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, Human Resources and Development and Finance and Administration.

3. EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Attempts to precisely define and appreciate the concept of ‘Efficiency’ and ‘Effectiveness’ have been the concerns of scholars whether they are of the scientific management, human relations or international persuasions because the concept provides an

explanatory framework for measuring the success of governmental organizations in their movements towards achieving their stated objectives. The Oxford Dictionary defines efficiency as fitness or power to accomplish, or success in accomplishing the purposes intended, adequate power, effectiveness, and efficiency. Effective means, having an effect, able to bring about the result intended, making a striking impression (Speight, 1970).

In order to determine the effectiveness of policy implementation we should understand that a sound policy can be destroyed by the way it is implemented. Implementation, therefore, becomes a major concern to policy designers. The following are the models one can apply in order to determine whether an implementation strategy is effective or not.

- (a) The instrumental model and
- (b) The adaptive or accommodative model
- (a) Instrumental Model: Implantation effectiveness is judged by the degree to which decision of lower order agencies have furthered or inhibited fulfilment of some formal policy (Denhardt, 2009). In line with the above, the instrumental model views policy implementation as a process of production consisting of four variables:
 - (1) An idealized policy
 - (2) The implementation organizations
 - (3) The target group and
 - (4) The environmental factors

This mode views implementation as a way/means of carrying out the directives of higher authorities, so that implementation proceeds from the top and moves down the hierarchy of the organization (top-down approach). To forestall possible breach, like political interference or influence, they argue that policy formulators should programme implementation in such a way that the desired behaviour is specified in detailed form. This is aimed at pressing the “noble” ideals of the formulators of the policy; and at the same time crush intervening variables which they view as “undue interference or distraction”.

In planning for the implementation of a project, schedules and budgets are established for all participants; together with appropriate control systems. Agreement on quality and type of work to be produced are made, fund, demands on central treason are planned and materials schedules arranged and pulmonary orders placed in any of these agreements or schedules, if loosely or inadequately developed will end up as a problem for the implementation manager (Speight, 1970). However, the instrumental model has been criticized for being unrealistic. The model envisages that policies are so properly prepared that all constraints that could arise in the process of implementation had been foreseen and taken care of at the planning stage.

This presupposes that all possible errors or encumbrances that could arise during the process of implementation had been flushed out and steps taken to forestall any distraction or emergency situations that could spring up as implementation strive to execute policy. That they were all taken care of at the formulation stage that the realization of the objective of the policy is a given. These are beyond the rationality of formulators as human beings.

(b) The Adaptive and Accommodate Model: Effective implementation would demand that as policies are being implemented, vague or defective policies are corrected during the implementation process. This is done by adjusting to local conditions which emerge naturally and objectively in the process of policy implementation.

These challenges could have been foreseen at the planning stage. That is “adapting” to the new situation and “accommodating” or taking care of issues (changes in practices perceptions, values that could be political and held or shared by the implementation participants) thrown up by the interaction between the policy, the policy implementers and the political, economic and social environments, or the policy enforcement activities. Implementation effectiveness following the adaptive models is a function of policy standards and objectives; policy resources, communication, enforcement activities, characteristics of the implementation, agency, political environment, economic and social conditions and disposition of the implementers. (Van Meter & Van Han, 2009).

4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

We adopted the institutional approach to our studies here. The institutional approach to policy analysis focuses on formal structures, comprising institutions, offices and procedures established under the law. (Huntington, 1966), Olisen & Peters (1996). The institutional theory focuses on the various government institutions, describing their structures, organization/duties and expected functions (Abdulsalam, 1998). The assumption here is that public policy is often instituted, formed, decided and implemented by government institutions and that institutional analysis centred on arrangement structures, procedures and relationships with other institutions can help in understanding policy formulation and implementation. Government institutions give public policy these distinctive characteristics namely, legitimacy, universality and coercion. It emphasizes the close relationship between public policy and government institutions, adding that public policy is authoritatively determined, implemented and enforced by government institutions (Dye 2004). In line with above, therefore, we felt that the institutional approach is an adequate approach for the understanding and analysis of

public policy making and public policy implementation and their effectiveness.

5. METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH

We adopted the documentary and focus group discussion methods of research design. Relevant records and documents related to the operations of the Enugu State Agricultural Development Programme (ENADEP) were accessed. These include projects completion reports, annual projects evaluation reports, etc. these records supplied us with important information required for our study because whatever projects they did, were duly put them down in documents. In fact, even before projects commencement, they had documented the necessary steps to be taken.

In order to obtain certain information from some farmers, ENADEP officials and other stakeholders were also adopted the focus group discussion. Certain information that could not be obtained from the records were collected through group discussion. Information to farmer's feelings, attitude of farmers to ENADEP policy strategies, etc. could be better sourced through this focus group discussion.

(a) Method of Data Collection: We collected data from two basic sources, the primary sources and the secondary sources. The primary sources include interview of selected officials of ENADEP as well as some farmers. Being a qualitative research, the researcher decided to use purposive sampling technique to select seven out of the eighteen Advisory Services and Inputs Consultants (Asics) and three out of the seven ENADEP zonal officers. These advisory services and inputs consultants were selected in such a way that the three agricultural zones of Enugu state were covered to ensure that whatever information we obtained could reflect the entire ENADEP structure in the state. Moreover, the positions they occupied made it important that we interviewed them. They are the intermediaries between the ENADEP management and the farmers and so have all the information necessary for the operations of the ENADEP activities in the state. Ten cooperative societies out of the two-hundred and two were selected for interviews. The selection was also purposively done to reflect all the agricultural zones of the state. However, out of the ten selected, only six availed themselves for the interview and were subsequently interviewed. These sample sizes were determined also by the time allotted for the research, study objectives and resources available. Meanwhile, being a qualitative research, the researcher made use of his value judgment in aiming at those to be selected bearing in mind that the avoidance of discovery failures is always at the base of the mind of a researcher applying the research approach.

We adopted the Key Informant Interviews for the research study. Only people who had informed knowledge, opinions and perspectives on the area of ENADEP activities

were interviewed. This Key Informant refers to qualitative, in-depth interviews of people deems important enough to supply worthwhile information. The interviews were not structured in nature to make room for free flow of ideas and information. Questions were spontaneously raised based on the direction of the discussion/interaction. With regards to the secondary sources of data collection, textbooks, journals, newspapers, government publications, ENADEP project completion files/reports as well as internet materials were utilized.

(b) Method of Data Analysis: The data used in this study was analysed and interpreted with major findings using the NVIVO software. This device is a qualitative data analysis (QDA) computer software package designed by QRS International for the analysis of focus groups, surveys, interviews, social media and journal articles, etc. (Kent State University Libraries, 2019).

Hatchery Machines Intervention (2014)

S/N	Implementation	Value Chain	Segment	Type of Intervention	IDA/Project approved	IDA/Project Disbursed	IDA Undisbursed	CIG/Beneficiary Contribution approved	Total Project Cost Approved
	Beneficiaries Name								
1	Animal Health (Enugu East) FMCS	Poultry	Production	Est. 100,000 Capacity Hatchery	9,144,201.00	844,2792,764	2,764,640	12,753,2200	
2	Sunchi Integrated farmers multipurpose cooperative society Ltd	Poultry	Production	Procurement of hatchery equipment and 12,000 paent stocks (day old chicks)	27,507,422.00	23,994550.00	3,512,872.00	38,219,331.00	65,725,753.00
Total					37,496,062.00	33,138,851.00	4,357,151.00	40,983,971.00	78,470,973.00

SOURCE: 2016 Annual Report (Summary)

These hatcheries were supplied and successfully installed.

Another inputs that were procured and supplied to the Farmers were some feeds Mills. Two feeds mills were supplied to poultry farmers in 2015 to reduce the cost of travelling to Ibadan and other distant places to source poultry feeds.

In fact, there are presently two such feeds processing plants in Enugu state. There is the Sunchi Integrated Halley, Emene-Enugu State, established in 2015 with a take-off grant of twenty-six million naira (₦26,000,000) from the World Bank assisted projects. The second mill is at Animal

The sub-programme of ENADEP through which the organization sought to realize her objective were (a) The extension services sub-programme. This is a unit that trained and retrained staff to go to the farming communities to assist farmers in their activities (b) The provision pipe borne water sub-programme. This unit was created to ensure steady water supply to farming communities to ensure all year-round agricultural production. However, between 2010-2018, no signal borehole was put in place throughout the three agricultural zones of Enugu State. The reason was that all the sponsored projects were located where there were sources of water, so water was never an impediment to successful agricultural production within the period under review. (c) Procurement of tractors, mills and hatcheries. Between 2014-2016, even tractors were supplied to farmers that required them and who could provide the 50:50 ratio fund arranged between the World Bank and the farmers.

Health-Ugwu Onu in Nkanu East local government area of Enugu state. A grant of nine million naira (₦9,000,000) was made available to the owner and chief executive officer, Dr. Oguejiofor- a Veterinary Doctor. These mills produced poultry feeds required to grow the sector.

Another two mills covered by the 2015/2016 annual reports (Summary) shows table 2 below -which presented the intervention the agricultural development programme made in the poultry value chain.

(d) Roads infrastructural intervention sub-programme.

FEED MILL INTERVENTION

S/N	IMPLEMENTATION	VALUE CHAIN	SEGMENT	TYPE OF INTERVENTION	IDA/PROJECT APPROVED	IDA/PROJECT DISBURSED	IDA UNDISBURSED	CIG/BENEFICIARY CONTRIBUTION APPROVED	TOTAL PROJECT COST APPROVED
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BENEFICIARIES NAME								
Isaac Lucky Brothers Poultry Farm	Poultry	Production	Installation of 26 tons capacity toll iced mill	296,100=	296,000.20	690,900.00	981,000.00	
Ogbuka feed mills	Poultry	Production	Refurbishment feed mill	974.800	974,800=	00	12,674,200.0	3,649,000.00
Total				1,270,900.0	1,270,900.00	100.00	3,365,100.00	4,636,000.00

2015, 2016 Annual Reports Summary

- (a) Provision of farm Imps: Insecticides, habiader, fertilizer, improved seedlings.

A comprehensive table of all interventions made by the agricultural development programmes in the area of inputs in the three critical areas: Poultry, maize and fruit trees are hereby presented. More than two hundred interventions were recorded between 2010-2016 list the 202 cooperative societies.

A look at the table indicates that there were places not all the approved amounts for some interventions were fully disbursed. The investigations conducted on the facilitators and some of the farmers indicated that projects were scheduled to start and end within a time frame. Some of the farmers could not meet up with the time schedule and, therefore, could not access the funds after their due time. More so, we found out that some farmers diverted part of the approved funds but unfortunately for them, the itinerant supervisors from the donor agencies e.g. the World Bank, caught up with them and confiscated the outstanding funds.

This collusion resulted to some of the projects not achieving the targets of the policies. We also found out that the facilitators who wanted some 'cuts' from the money approved for farmers, "arranged" with the farmers and gave false information to the approving Board with the aim of diverting part of the money to themselves. For instance, some dishonest framers took the already prospering projects of others, e.g. cashew, paw-paw, maize, poultry, etc. and forwarded their photographs to commercial agricultural development project management, claiming to be the actual owners of the project. Huge amounts of money were approved for them as intervention to beef up areas of need. These moneys were 'cornered' by the farmers and the facilitators.

Another major problem that led to the failure of some of the interventions was that some of the farmers, due to poverty or deliberate intentions, did not pay up their

counterpart funds to the projects. To that extent, the policies/projects failed to accomplish stated objectives. A close look at the 2012, 2013 Annual Evaluation Reports indicated some of the farmers who were discovered to be non-farmers but merely came into the programmes to pick some money for other purposes.

These unwholesome practices have, confirmed our third hypothesis that the inconsistencies in the policy implementation practice have significantly affected the effectiveness of ENADP in its goal attainments in Enugu State. There were also instances, according to the Evaluations Reports, where the farmers failed to pay up their counterpart funds yet the projects were successfully completed. The implication of these was that the facilitators and the farmers deliberately presented exaggerated estimates in order to save some money. The planning therefore, was faulty. We had indicated earlier in this work that some of the policies were wrongly prepared leading to their being unsuccessful or un-implementable.

These unsound practices coupled, with the other exaggerations perpetrated by some farmers forced, the Commercial Agricultural Development Projects with the cooperation of the World Bank to introduce the Global Positioning Machines (GPMs) or Global Positioning system (GPSs). This object was programmed to measure the latitude and longitude of every farmer's farm land and the neighbouring features like the trees, houses and hills around the farmland. The purpose of this was to eliminate incidences of falsehood and other malpractices impeding the successful execution of the projects.

Between 2013-2014 some funds were not disbursed to farmers in hatchery and mills projects as approved. It was discovered that some facilitators wanted to divert the undisbursed funds but were detected by the supervisors from the Donor Agencies. They were accused of 'Misprocurement' and subsequently reprimanded.

In 2016 alone seven tractors were given to interested farmers who applied for them and were able to complete their counterpart funding worked on 50:50 ratios. The donor agencies delivered the tractors whenever the beneficiary was able to pay up his counterpart fund of 50% of the total cost
Tractor Machines Intervention

of the tractors. These tractors, of course, changed the tempo of agricultural production especially in the area of maize production. Table 3 below shows the farmers’ cooperative societies that benefited at what cost, etc.

S/N	IMPLEMENTATION/BENEFICIARIES NAME	VALUE CHAIN	SEGMENT	TYPE OF INTERVAL	IDA/PROJECTS APPROVED (₦)	IDA/PROJECTS DISBURSED (₦)	IDA UNDISBURSED	CIG/BENEFICIARIES CONSTITUTION APPROVED (₦)	TOTAL PROJECT COST APPROVED (₦)
1	Umunzekwe FMCS	Maize	Production	Tractor Procurement	41,395,000.2	4,377,500	17,500.	4395,000	8,790,000
2	DDL Farms FMCS	Maize	Production	Tractor Procurement	4395,000	4,377,500	17,500.00	4,395.00	8,790,00.00
3	Ifedinma Obinagu	Maize	Production	Tractor Procurement	3,530,000	3,550,000	0.0	3,530,000.00	7,060,00 0.00
4	Unique Famrs Ltd.	Maize	Production	Tractor Procurement	4.395,0 00	3.800.000	595,000	4,395.000	8.790.00 0.00
5	Chibuzor Ibeada FMCS	Maize	Production	Maize production and Tractor Procurement	6,580,4 98	6.455,49 8.7	125,000	6,580,498.0 0	13,160,997.3
6	Nsukka Edem Garde FMCS ltd.	Maize	Production	Maize production and Tractor	5,541,0 00	5.541,000	0.0	5,541,000	11,082,000.00
7	Ogameds FMCS	Maize	Production	Maize Production and Tractor Procurement	5,645,2 50.0	1.047,4 50.0	4,597,800	5,645,250. 0	1 1,290,500.0
	TOTAL				34,487,748.6	29,128,948.7	5,352,800	34,481,748.6	68,963,497.3

SOURCE: 2016 Annual Report (Summary)

The donor agencies availed the cooperative societies of the opportunity of acquiring tractors and other inputs to ensure that farmers did their bests at maize production. The cost of each tractor was shared 50:50 between the beneficiaries and the donor agencies. The non-full disbursement of funds to some farmers’ cooperative societies were due to their attitudes towards projects. Our interview of some of the projects facilitators like Dr. Ochiaka, GE, Asogwa Fabian and Ozugwu Frank showed that the farmers’ groups could not provide their own side of the fund coupled with the facts that they were involved in the diversion of funds provided by the donor agencies. This angered the donor agencies who now stopped further disbursements to the groups. That was one of the reasons why agricultural policies failed in Enugu State Agricultural Development Programme in some cases. Corruption, dishonesty and lack of sense of commitment on the side of farmers thwarted some of the robust policies on agriculture.

INFRASTRUCTURAL INTERVENTION (ROADS I)

Table 4 below shows the infrastructure, especially roads to and from the production areas for easy evacuation of products to areas where they were needed for processing, packaging, storage and marketing. Roads infrastructure constituted one of the major objectives of the agricultural development programme in Nigeria. As earlier mentioned, the agricultural developments programme initially designed to encourage the rural farmers to produce more food and earn more money for themselves, with the aim of making food available for all. It was also envisaged that mass food production and higher standard of living for the rural farmers would trigger national development. In time with the above vision, the C-ADP embarked on integrated rural roads projects as indicated below. The projects so embarked on were divided into phases I and II.

Table 2: ENUGU STATE C-ADP (ROAD PROJECTS PHASE 1)

S/N	NAME OF FARM ACCESS ROADS	LENGTH (KM)	LOCATION L.G.A	NATURE OF ROAD BEFORE INTERVENTION	TYPE OF INTERVENTION	PHONE NUMBERS OF CONTRACTORS	NAME OF CONTRACTOR / COMPANY	CONTRACT SUM (N)	STATUS OF COMPLETION
1	Uzo Mmiri- I Josiah Farm Access road	7.1	Enugu East	Earth Road	Earth Road	08033386757	Wilang Nig. Ltd	71,884,470.00	100%
2	Uzo Mmiri- Josiah Farm Access road	9.5	Udenu	Earth Road	Earth Road	08033097355	Forrotex C.C Ltd	97,404,457.530	100%
3	Uzo Mmiri-Josiah Farm Access road	10	Igbo Etiti	Earth Road	Earth Road		Chez-Aviv Ltd.	91,477,755.00	100%
4	Uzo Mmiri-Josiah Farm Access road	2	Enugu North	Surface Design	Earth Road	0803226 5867	SIMAT C.C Nig. Ltd.	53,970,525.00	100%
5	Uzo Mmiri- Josinli Farm Access road	7.1	Ezeagu	Earth Road	Earth Road	08064201781	Haigaji Nig. Ltd.		100%
6	Uzo Mmiri-Josiah Farm Access road	5.2	Oji River	Earth Road	Earth Road	08033259382	Alukwu and Sons Ltd.	4,195,34.16	100%
	TOTAL	40.9							100%

Source: 2012-2014 Annual Report Project Reports (Summary)

This Phase 1 road projects covered between 2011-2014. Based on this Annual Project Completion Reports, the six designated road projects recorded one hundred percent successes. The reasons for these were not farfetched, the entire funding was done by the World Bank and her agents who doubled as field supervisors and were on ground to direct the road projects. We were made to know, by the facilitators that these external supervisors left nothing to chance because they carried with themselves, gadgets that relayed all that were happening to the data base of the sponsors. We had earlier pointed out that most projects that were sponsored by the World Bank were completed

successfully due to consistent and continuous funding, stability, proper supervision, good planning, sound monitoring and evaluations strategies and lack of corrupt practices. The successes achieved in the Phase encouraged the sponsors to further design Phase II road projects to ensure that the hinterlands were opened up for commercial agricultural activities.

Table 5: (ROAD PROJECTS PHASE II)

S/N	NAME OF FARM ACCESS ROADS	LENGTH (KM)	LOCATION L.G.A	NATURE OF ROAD BEFORE INTERVENTION	TYPE OF INTERVENTION	PHONE NUMBERS OF CONTRACTORS	NAME OF CONTRACTOR / COMPANY	CONTRACT SUM (\$\$)	STATUS OF COMPLETION
1	Mbogodo-Agbani Akpugo Access Road	12.1	Nkanu West	Earth Road	Earth Road	08033097355	Ferrotex C.C Ltd.	90,285,930.52	100%
2	Aria to 11 Mill, New Mkt, Enugu	0.80	Enugu North	Earth Road	Surface Dressing road	08037870141	Swaley Nig. Ltd.	50,621,754.75	100%
3	Enugu State SAN Carles Pineapple Farm Access Road Ihe	4.7	Agwu	Track road used by sand Tipper Drivers	Surface Dressing	08035086734	Zarcus Nig. Ltd.	118,898,740.88	100%
4	Iha-Amu Abor Farms	6.3	Isi-Uzo	Earth Road	Earth Road	08066409630	Baocan and Truss Nig. Ltd	61,772,893.56	100%
5	Okutu-Ibagwa Agu Road	6.7	Nsukka	Earth Road	Earth Road	07032231836	Carsul Nig. Ltd	67,505,058.21	100%
6	Emene Ugwuonu Farms Access Road Ugwuonu	5.1	Enugu East	Earth Road	Earth Road	08033255738	Alukwu and Sons Ltd.	12,565,102.00	100%

TOTAL	35.7						451,709,481.84	100%
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Source: The 2016 Annual Project Report

This 2013- 2014 Annual Project Reports (Summary) indicated that all the road projects were successfully completely (100%) in line with the plan laid down in the policy. As was usually the case, most World Bank sponsored Projects did not fail due to the already enumerated reasons. The Enugu state agricultural development programmes staff were all on ground while the projects lasted, but they were engaged as implementers mainly and monitored as such. The roads constructed or maintained were 100% funded by the World Bank. The present Enugu State government did not do anything by way of encouragement to the programme between 2015-2016 farming seasons.

PROCUREMENT OF FARM INPUTS (2)

- a. Fertilizers
- b. Improved seedlings
- c. Herbicides and
- d. Insecticides

As stated earlier on, the World Bank suspended the funding of agricultural development projects in Nigeria in 1996, which was followed by decline in the activities of agricultural development programmes including the Enugu State agricultural development projects. Consequent upon this, most state governments found it difficult to cope with the size of agricultural development programmes like the workforce, actual infrastructural development as well as the procurement of many essential components of the programmes like improved seedlings, fertilizers, insecticides and herbicides. Between 2010-2018 which also falls within the period of this research, procurement of these farm inputs were handled solely by private sector companies. The activities of these private sectors were more efficient in terms of service delivery, that various agencies and state governments decided to leave the services in their hands. These private sector driven activities reduced or eliminated the syndrome of fertilizer hoarding, diversion, stealing, etc. the project established Bio-Intensive Gardening (BIG) Demonstration plots for vegetables at Oduma, Eha-Amufu and Adani communities. However, three (3) demonstrations were conducted as follows:

- (a) Demonstration of line planting using four (4) different varieties of swamp rice at different locations and the varieties were faro 44, 55,56 and 62
- (b) Demonstration of rice production in flooded area to ascertain its survivability using seven varieties of rice;
- (c) Demonstration on the use of line planting for community seed production.

A close look at the areas reserved for those experienced extension agents of ENADEP showed that the

agents were the actual operatives of the project at the rural level. They were linked to the project through policies.

The report from the field showed that the farmers recorded an average of 3:3 tons of rice per hectare in 2015 production cycle in Enugu state and 3.5 tons per hectare in 2016 as against the projected 3.0 tons per hectare.

That was scoring above the target. These agents were deployed in the six (6) zones to which Enugu state was divided for optimum performance.

The six zones are: -

1. Enugu zone comprising (a) Isi-Uzo (b) Enugu East and (c) Enugu north local government areas.
2. Nsukka zone comprising (a) Nsukka (b) Igbo-Etiti and (c) Uzo-Uwani local government areas.
3. Enugu Ezike zone comprising (a) Udenu (b) Igbo-Eze North and (c) Igbo Eze-South local government areas
4. Agbani zone comprising (a) Enugu south, (b) Nkanu West and (c) Nkanu East local government areas.
5. Awgu zone comprising (a) Awgu (b) Oji river and (c) Aninri local government areas.
6. Udi zone made up of (a) Udi and (b) Ezeagu local government areas.

In all, these areas there were twenty-eight (28) ENADEP field/Extension staff spread across the zones. Because of the fewness of these filed experts, F ADAMA III-AF engaged the services of eighteen (18) Advisory Services and Input Consultants (ASICS) to assist the rural farmers realize the objectives of the project. These consultants included:

1. Dr. Onyema Nwodo
2. Prof Charles N. Mba
3. Prof. Oliver Ngwu
4. Okechukwu G.C.H
5. Nwabueze Michael O.
6. Dr. Peter Ezeaku
7. Dr. Iwueke Odunze
8. Dr. Agatha Atugwu
9. Ede Amos Ej'ikc
10. Chinedu Felix Amujiri
11. Aba Simon DC.
12. Dr. Kevin Ugwoke
13. Dr. Vincent Onyia
14. Dr. Simon Chinedu Eze
15. Dr. Godwin C. Onyishi
16. Dr. Christian Agbo U.
17. Dr. Longinus Aniekwe and
18. Vincent Ede.

The above eighteen (18) professionals in crop production and agronomy were employed as ASICS to help farmers

adopt the best agronomic practices such as use of improved seeds and other inputs, nursery preparations, transplanting with accurate spacing, etc.

Worthy of note was the fact that major successes were recorded only wherever and whenever the projects/programmes were sponsored by the World Bank. That was because the Federal, State and local governments of Nigeria, as a matter of course, failed to pay up their counterpart contribution to the projects. Where they paid at all, they were short of the projected figures. What enhanced the attainment of goals, despite all short comings was that the FADAMA III-AF, did not deal directly with any individual rural farmers. The rural farmers were encouraged to form farmers' co-operative societies of 10-12 persons who were also made to go to the state ministry of commerce and cooperatives for registration before qualifying to participate in the programmes. This narrowed the scope of coverage and aided the faster and deeper permeation of information and input services to the rural farmers.

6. FUNDING OF ENUGU STATE COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

The commercial agricultural development projects in Enugu state have remained pet projects funded by the World Bank, International Donor Agencies, the federal and state governments of Nigeria. In rare cases were the local government councils involved in the funding of projects. The funds from these International Donor Agencies (IDAs) were in the form of grants. The benefiting countries as well as the farmers' co-operative societies were not expected to pay back any moneys released for projects in the host countries. These donor agencies were attracted to fund these projects in developing countries by the pitiable conditions of these countries that were weighed down by poverty, uncontrolled population growth, and hunger. For any farmers' groups to qualify for the funding by the World Bank and other International Development/Donor Agencies, the interested persons would form themselves into farmers' multipurpose co-operative societies (FMCSs) consisting of 10-12 persons. These groups must get themselves registered with the Ministry of Commerce and Co-operatives. Each group was encouraged to elect four members of the group as President, Vice President, Secretary and Treasurer. This group must include some women as members. This group would choose a value chain of their interest and make this known in writing. No group is allowed to engage itself in two value chains. Moreover, a group was made to specialize in a segment of the value chain for optimum performance. For instance, if a group was involved in cassava production, that group could only engage in actual production. Another group engaged in processing of produced cassava while another co-operative society engaged in the marketing of the processed products. The aim was to encourage farmers to grow into

large scale commercial production with specialization to increase food production and income of these farmers. Each farmer's co-operative society that qualified for intervention was encouraged to liaise with Service Providers, who would articulate their interests and forward this to the management of the C-ADP for consideration. It was the co-operative society that decided on what it would be producing. It was Bottom-Top approach to project/policy formulation and execution. Each farmers' co-operative society was also called a Commodity Interest Group (CIG),

The funding ratio was 60% - 40%. 60% of the total cost of executing a value chain was borne by the Donor Agencies while the farmers' co-operative society bore the 40% of the total cost. The aim of involving the farmers themselves in the funding was to secure their commitment and interests in the projects to make them successful.

This noble idea was frustrated by the attitude of these farmers' and the states where these projects were taking place because the states usually failed to redeem their side of the counterpart funding. The cooperative societies also failed in most cases, thereby making the targets of the projects unrealistic. The government of Enugu State under the present governor, His Excellency, Ifeanyichukwu Ugwuanyi did not for once between 2015-2016 of his tenure pay a dime out of the ₦168.m his government was supposed to pay each ear to the C-ADP. Added to this was the non-payment of salaries of the ADP staff for upwards of 23 months. This, inevitably, killed the moral of these workers and this had its effects on their performances. The service providers who should assist the co-operative societies to articulate their Business Plan (BP) went out of their way to collude with some of these farmers to defraud the projects of huge sums of money. Sometimes they worked with the farmers to give false information to the management of the ADPs in order to secure undue approvals for projects that would give them personal gains at the expense of the projects. As service providers, they were supposed to be supplying farm inputs promptly to farmers at any stage such supplies were needed. However, some of these service providers converted some of these inputs into cash and share the cash with the farmers. It was the projects that suffered. Consequently, the IDAs and the World Bank decided to abandon the 60%-40% formula and entered into what they called Commercial Agricultural Development Project (CADP) Phase II in 2014. This phase II was a shift from the former arrangement because this time, the ADP entered into Women and Youth Empowerment Programme. Under the new phase, no counterpart funding was required. The idea was to empower the Youths and Women to become self-sustaining. This programme was for males under 40 years of age and Women of all ages. All Youths and Women must have obtained their School Certificates (WASC OR NECO) ordinary level. This was to ensure that they were literate enough to understand the focus

and details of the new programme. Any interested Youths and Women were required to submit their application letters to be accompanied with their identification letters of origin from their Local Government Councils. The application letter must indicate their value chains of interest. Their two passport photographs and phone numbers were also to be attached. These applicants passed through interview processes empanelled by the state government to include, ADP, World Bank officials or representatives and persons from Ministries of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Rural Development. Successful applicants were divided into three groups and were made to undergo two weeks training at Itigidi in Cross River State, Songhai Farms in Ezeagu Local Government Area of Enugu State and Elechi Farms in Izzi Local Government Area of Ebonyi State. In 2014, 98 farmers were empowered in the first batch. Each successful participant was given the sum of ₦2.5m worth of inputs. These farm inputs were provided by designated service providers attached to the farmers. These inputs included birds, pens, feeds, drugs, etc. for those into poultry farming. However, to qualify for this grant, a poultry farmer should have acquired at least 500 birds on his own. For those

engaging in the production of rice, each starter was given 8 tonnes of rice, barrow, weighing scale, customized bags, etc. These initial inputs were given free of charge and the beneficiaries were encouraged to produce and make money for themselves without any conditions to pay back anything to the donors.

Another package in this Youths and Women empowerment programme which was new was the Aquaculture (fishery). Those interested in this aspect of production were given plastic ponds (collapsible ponds), 3000 fisher lings (small fishes) free of charge. The initial number of farmers in the phase 1 was 98 but at the end of 2014, it was discovered that the USD 2,5m given to Enugu State was not exhausted due to the limited number of participants. This led to the phase II project in 2015 with 602 farmers participating and benefitting accordingly. These 602 beneficiaries were given farm inputs worth ₦3,050,000.00 each (according to 2015 Annual Reports).

The successes of World Bank Sponsored Projects could be partly attributed to the time lines to which the projects were subjected to.

Table 6: Sample of Action Plan

S/No	ACTION	RESPONSIBLE OFFICERS	TIMELINES
1	Empowerment of the 29 IPs in Batch 1 that secured No Objections under women and Youths empowerment across the value chains of Fruit Trees Maize, Poultry Rice and Aquaculture	SPC, PAJPLA, PO, TO MEO, CBDO AND Relevant Fac.	June 2036
2	Implementation of remaining 69 IPs in Batch 1 Women and Youths empowerment under Batch 1 across the value chains of Fruit Trees Maize, Poultry Rice and Aquaculture	SPC, PAJPIA, PO, TO, MEO, CBDO, AND Relevant Fac.	June-July, 2016
3	Training of 839 Women and youths for 2 nd to 3 rd batches to empower 402 of women and youths empowerment .	SPC, PA,PIA, PO MEO, CDBO and Relevant Fac.	June-August 2016
4	Development and implementation of 50 No. IPs for Entrepreneurs and CIGs in Fruit Trees, Maize and Poultry 3 Value chains	SPC, PA,PIA, POTO, MEO, CBDO and Relevant Fac.	August-October 2016
5	Establishment of 4 Post harvest Management centres in four locations of Enugu State.	SPC, PA,PIA, PO,TO, MEO, CBDO and Relevant Fac.	August-September 2016
6	Conduct of surveys; Project Impact Evaluation Survey. farmers' responsiveness to record keeping, profitability Survey etc.	Lesson learnt: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Matching fund disbursement with verifiable outcomes 2. Value chain developments in line with the project development objectives 3. Establishment of milestones is guides in the course of any project implementation 	

ENUGU STATE CADP PROGRESS REPORT (DEC. 2015-MAY. 2016)

4. Making use of result bases framework in project deliverables

5. Ability to achieve the desired results, under pressure

The compress list of project intervention made in the process of empowering youths and women between (2015/2016).
Table 7: SUMMARY OF WOMEN AND TYOITH EMPOWERMENT PROGRAMME (BENEFICIARIES BELOW)

STATUS OF ENUGU STATE C-ADP EMPOWERMENT PROGRAMME OF WOMEN AND YOUTH IN AGRICULTURE BUSINESS AQUACLUTURE, FRUIT TREES, MAIZE, POULTRY AND RICE VALUE CHAINS ACROSS THE THREE SEGMENTS OH PRODUCTION, PROCESSING AND MARKETING					
S/N	VALUE CHAIN	SEGMENT	STATUS	NO. OF BENEFICIARY	AMOUNT (₦)
1	Poultry	(a) Broiler Production	Fully implemented	32	62,771,549.00
			Not Implemented	1	2,252,921.00
		(b) Egg production	Fully implemented	25	58,808,034.00
		(c) Broiler processing implemented	Fully implemented	5	
2	Aquaculture	Catfish Production	Fully implemented		42,334,775.60
3	Rice	(a)Marketing	Fully implemented	4	7,309,375.00
		(b) Processing	Fully implemented	6	9,996,704.00
4	Fruit Trees	(a) Juice Processing	Fully implemented	2	4,530,176.00
		(b) Cashew Nut Processing	On-going	6	19,731,000.00
		TOTAL BENFFICIARY		98	207,732,534.60

Source 2017 Annual Report

	FULLY IMPLEMENTED		97	205,479, 613.60
	NOT IMPLEMENTED		1	2,252,921.00

A good look at the tables shows that between June - October 2016 projects were put on course while some were still ongoing, some being completed. This success was recorded as a result of the “a time lines” to which each project was tied. The ability to achieve result even under pressure was a manifestation of proper planning, implementation monitoring and evaluation, done by their seasoned officers.

What guided operation of these successful projects sponsored by World Bank and other Donor Agencies were well explained in the ENADEP progress report December 201 5-May, 2016). According to the Report the projects policies formulated with Time Lines and implemented

effectively by seasoned and responsible officers who were versatile in their different areas of specialization. These officers were assisted by relevant facilitators

The guiding principles/policies were:

1. Matching fund disbursement with verifiable outcomes
2. Value chain developments ii line with the project development objective
3. Establishment of milestones as guides in the course of any project implementation.

Key Achievements Toward Project Development Objection (PDO)

According to the Enugu State Commercial Agriculture Development (CADP) progress Report (Dec 2016-May 2017), the project had made appreciable impacts in the lives of Nigerians and economy since inception, 2009. The assessments were made across value chains allocated to Enugu State.

Fruit Tress Value Chain: According to the progress Report, total production per annum has increased from 269.04 mt/yr/277.24 mt/yr (3.06%) achievement within the period under review (Dec. 2016-May 2017) but has increased from 196.20 mt/yr-277.24 mt/yr (41.30%) achievement from project's inception to date. Yield per ha has increased from 42 mt/ha-43.69 mt/ha (3.11%) achievement within the general score sheet of the period under review but has increased from 35mt/ha-43.09 mt/ha (23.11%) achievement from Project inception to date. Volume of sales per annum has increased from 1247.88 mt-255.38 mt/yr (3.09%) within the period under review but has increased from 143.60mt - 255.38 mt (77.84%) achievement from project inception to date.

Maize Value Chain: Total production per annum has increased from 862.37 mt/yr-863.09 (0.12%). Achievement within the period under review but has increased from 578.60mt/yr-86% 69 (49.1%) achievement project from inception to date. Yield per ha has increased from 4.19mt/ha-4.21 mt/ha (Avg) (0.91%) achievement within the period under review but has increased from 2.2mt/ha (Avg) - 4.1 mt/ha (Avg) (91.36%) achievement from inception to date. Volume of sales per annum has increased from 854.81mt-857.02mt. (0.46%) achievement within the period under review but has increased 466.0mt ;83.91%) achievement project inception to date.

Poultry Value Chain: Total production of birds per annum has increased from 7,460,829.0-7,475,479 birds/yr (0.21%) achievement within the period under review (Dec. 2016-May, 2017) but has increased from 4,627,500.0 birds/yr (61.56%) achievement from project inception to date. Productivity has increased from 2.25kg/livebird-2.44kg/live bird (10.56%) achievement within the period under review but has increased from 1.8kg/livebird-2.14kg/his (35.55%) achievement from project inception to date. Volume of sales per annum increased from, 404,708.36 birds/yr 7,420,008 birds/yr (02.21%) achievement within the period under review but has increased from 4,620,5000 birds/Yr-7,420,008 birds (60.60%) achievement from project inception to date.

7. SUMMARY

Policies are the vehicles through which various governments convey their responses/wishes to the needs of the citizens of any country. These policies when properly implemented, translate the governments decisions, plans,

ideas, etc into concrete realities. Governments' therefore provide social amenities like roads, hospitals, industries, pipe borne water, etc, through the instrumentality of policies. However, evidence abound that most of the good intentions of government through policies did not yield expected results due, largely, to the implementation techniques applied by those responsible for policy execution. Some factors that informed most of those poorly implemented policies include; corruption, poorly planned policies, executive interference, poor funding, lack of proper knowledge of what policy implementation entails, lack of willingness on the part of some public office holders to implement certain policies, low institutional readiness to carry out proper policy implementation, etc.

Those failed policies, only left the citizens dissatisfied and frustrated which further led to some youths seeking to survive through self-help. This manifested in the form of armed robberies, kidnapping, youths' restiveness, ritual killings, etc. The economy itself suffered a great deal.

The study set out to realize the objectives of this research which included the examination of the effectiveness or otherwise of policy implementation practices in Nigeria, with particular reference to the Enugu State Agricultural Development Programme (ENADEP). To be able to achieve this, we had to study the objectives of the programme, the institutional structures put in place to aid the realization of its goals, its policy implementation practices as well as the funding arrangements. Efforts were made to find out other variables that constrained proper actualization of the goals of the programme like the attitude of farmers towards the implementation of ENADEP policies/projects as well as other management problems along this line.

To succeed in these efforts, we extensively studied materials like textbooks, journals, seminar papers, ENADEP projects execution reports. The Internet was another veritable source of data for us. We also applied the questionnaire method of information gathering to help us get at certain information not found in documents. After much studies, we discovered that the ENADEP applied wrong approach to policy formulation where the farmers who were the actual beneficiaries of the programme were excluded from the decision-making processes. Decision/policies were made at the Agricultural Development Programme Executive Committee (ADPEC) level where the governor and other executive heads sat and formulated policies and prepared establishment circulars for all others to comply with, without questions. These farmers should have been included while the decisions were being made since that would have offered them the opportunity to know or develop the attitudes and dispositions required for the policies to be well executed. However, this was necessary before the World Bank resumed sponsorship of agricultural programmes in Nigeria, Enugu State in particular because as soon as the World Bank resumed, they came in with their experts as supervisors, managers, facilitators, consultants, monitoring and

evaluation officers and matched every project execution with “Timelines”. That was the major secret behind the overwhelming success recorded by the World Bank in all the projects if funded and executed.

During our research, we also found out that much of the failures in policy implementation recorded each time ENADEP operated alone (without World Bank participants) was to our shock, that the programme facilitators, whose duties it was to prepare business plans for the farmers, the Advisory Services and Inputs Consultants (ASICs) and some of the extension staff devised dubious means through which they thwarted the proper policy implementation of ENADEP projects. The farmers were always supposed to access agricultural loans provided by sponsors of agricultural projects. The loans, when obtained were kept in the bank accounts opened in favour of the farmers. These accounts were not fully operated by the farmers. The reality was that any loan given to any farmer was managed by the facilitators on their behalf. For instance, if a farmer was allowed a loan of say five million naira (₦5M), he would collect fertilizers, insecticides or other drugs, money and any other thing they were required to use to grow their farms. These facilitators would release little cash to the farmers and all other ones were converted to other farm inputs calculated in money value and deducted from their loans. What some of these facilitators were doing in some places was that they would swindle the farmers and suddenly tell them that their money had finished. Some drew the farmers closer and convinced them to part with some “huge” amounts like five hundred thousand (₦500, 000.00) while they, the middle men could part with as much as two million naira (₦2M) or more. They would later tell the management that the farmers misapplied what they were given. To that extent, the goal of that policy failed to be realized. We also discovered that the facilitators and advisers were to be sureties or guarantors to these farmers seeking agricultural loans. In reality, these facilitators and advisers “assessed” the farmers’ cooperative societies before standing as guarantors to them. The ones they felt were credible enough and capable of repaying their loans, they stood in for them as guarantors. The poor ones (in their own assessment) who actually needed these loans were technically denied guarantorship for fear that they could disappoint the banks. These farmers who saw their colleagues operating with loans and which they could not access, became infuriated, their moral fell. To the extent that they could not access the loans, the goal of the policy could not be attained. That confirmed our third hypothesis that the inconsistencies in the implementation practice of ENADEP affected her service delivery and goals attainment.

These malpractices angered the World Bank and they stopped doing projects in partnership with any levels of government. They opted for direct full funding of projects from 2014 starting with woman and youths’ empowerment. We also discovered that there was executive interference by

the state governors in the affairs of ENADEP. This is because of the fact that the State Executive Governor was the chairman of the highest policy-making structure of ENADEP – the Agricultural Development Programme Executive Committee (ADPEC). By the law establishing ENADEP, Edict 1, no. 6 (1992), the Governor was the chairman and his directives must be obeyed without questions by all the members of the committee and other levels such as the Project Management Unit (PMU) responsible for the day-to-day implementation of the policies made by the ADPEC. This executive governor could have become a governor but not as an expert in agricultural activities and now he is the overall chairman. This governor may not even have time for the routine business of ENADEP because of other state engagements in addition to ordinary politics. These things are distractions to the organization. For example, the present Governor of Enugu State, Rt. Hon. (Dr) Ifeanyichukwu Ugwuanyi did not for once between 2015-2016 pay a dime out of the one hundred and sixty-eight million naira (N168m) his government was supposed to pay each year to the ADP. Added to this was the non-payment of salaries of the ENADEP Staff for upwards of twenty-three (23) months. This inevitably, killed the moral of the staff of ENADEP and demoralized even the farmers who were now abandoned by these frustrated staff. Fortunately, agricultural productivity and income of the ENADEP soared. The secret was that from 2014 to date, the World Bank took complete responsibility for funding of her selected agricultural projects. It was no more counterpart funding arrangement whereby the Federal, the state, the farmer and World Bank would have parts to play. But assuming the World Bank would have parts to play. But assuming the World Bank decides to suspend sponsorship today what happens to agricultural production in Enugu State? That confirms our second hypothesis that the institutional structure of ENADEP is not adequately equip to enhance effective implementation of ENADEP agricultural policies in Enugu state. We also observed that the unwholesome negative attitude of some farmers towards ENADEP projects leaves much to be desired. We noted that poverty, illiteracy, lack of exposure as well as strong mental attachment to their old ways of doing agricultural activities contributed to their negative/lukewarm attitudes towards ENADEP projects.

8. CONCLUSION

Public policies are the vehicles through which government deliver social services to the citizens of a country. Policies, no matter how beautifully arranged, cannot make meaning or realize their objectives if their implementers were not properly equipped to carry on with proper implementation. Many policies of the Enugu state agricultural development programme have been adjudged unsuccessful based on the fact that they failed to achieve goals envisaged by the framers of the policies. Some of the

reasons for the poor score sheet have already been mentioned which also included but not limited to poor funding of her projects by the state government; executive interference, unbalanced-policy making method (of excluding the participation of farmers), inadequate number of extension service personal, etc.

The success recorded between 2014 to 2018 beginning with the programme designed for Woman and Youths empowerment (2014), were because of the fact that the World Bank jettisoned the counterpart funding arrangement with Nigerian governments and went ahead to sponsor/fund her selected projects fully.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS

Due to the devastating effects of policy failures on the Nigerian public service, especially the Enugu state agricultural development programme, the strides towards possible solution must be consistent and continuous. In line with the above, therefore, we came up with the following suggestions/solutions to the problems.

- a. In the Enugu state agricultural development programme, the highest policy making structure is the agricultural development programme executive committee. This committee is headed by the state governor who may have emerged the Governor from his background as a contractor or a pastor with no special or residual knowledge about agriculture. This Governor may not be versed in the knowledge of agricultural activities but will sit on the committee as a chief executive. He will naturally exercise that his executive power on agricultural matters. His motives and actions may be political and may derail the objective of the programme. We recommend that the chairman of the agricultural development executive committee should be a professional and on full time appointment to ensure efficient delivery of ENADEP services as he would give the job quality time.
- b. The facilitators and the advisory services and input consultants who are the intermediaries between the ENADEP management, the World Bank and the farmers should be kept in their place. Their services are very necessary because they advise the farmers on funding and actual agricultural activities from nursery to transplanting, weeding, harvesting, storage, processing and marketing of their products. They should be retained but they should be put under serious security monitoring and checks. In this work we mentioned where the World Bank introduced the Global Monitoring System which was configured to monitor everything in the farms from planting stages to harvesting time. Everything

is relayed to the data base where interpretations are done. This idea should be introduced, solely to monitor the activities of these intermediaries. We also recommend that each farmers cooperative society should be covered by an Insurance Scheme so that the facilitators and advisers should not have direct hands on the loans of these farmers. The banks should deal directly with the individual cooperative society to avoid the menace of some of these dubious intermediaries.

- c. The Programme Manager (PM) who is in-charge of the day-to-day administration of the programme, as we said earlier was an appointee of the governor who could remove him wherever issues cropped up between them. This manger should not be an appointee of the governor. He should be appointed from the ranks of the staff of the organization based on seniority and merit. This makes him to enjoy the civil service conditions of neutrality, impartiality, anonymity, fixed tenure of office. This will give the management the autonomy they require to bring out their potentialities and creativity to manage the ENADEP well. This will remove the factor of frequent reshuffling of officers which constituted instability in the administration of public policies.
- d. ENADEP should be given free hand to recruit her own staff for proper control, disciplines and harmony instead of this idea of seconded staff from the ministry of agriculture.
- e. The state should be made to fund ENADEP very well so they can assist in rural development. ENADEP engaged in roads construction as well as constructing boreholes for rural communities. They should be encouraged.
- f. The state government should also be approached through advocacy to stop owing ENADEP staff as was the condition.
- g. The regular trainings, seminars, and incentives formerly given to ENADEP staff should be restored to build their moral high again for more optimum performance.

The specialized education we suggested for the ENADEP staff should be put in place. To ensure that the issue of policy, its implementation, monitoring and evaluation are taken seriously, the Nigerian Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies should be established, at least two in each geopolitical zone of this country. Officers from ENADEP and other public offices in these geopolitical zones should be encouraged or coarsed to pass through these institutes beginning from the ranks of executive officers and above. Officers on grade levels 07-10 should be grouped into one while officers on grade level 12 and above should undergo through another session for management staff. Policies must be understood before they can be implemented to work in the Nigeria public service especially the Enugu

State Agricultural Development Programme (ENADEP). This specialized training will definitely offer the staff the opportunity to understand and appreciate policies and their implementation.

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