

“The Great Game” in foreign historiography

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Abstract: *The second half of the nineteenth century was a critical period in British foreign policy for competition around the world, especially in Central Asia, and a significant turning point in the development of the confrontation between Britain and Russia in the region. The Crimean War of 1854-1856 and the Indian Uprising of 1857-1858 had a profound effect on the state of international relations in the region, and the role of British authors in India's British Empire, Anglo-Russian rivalry, and the study of the aims and objectives of the British Empire in Central Asia. undadi. XIX The second half of the twentieth century was a period of formation of the "Big Game" political process in the context of growing competition between the two great powers Russia and Great Britain, which influenced the creation of political and historical works of British authors.*

Keywords: “Great game”, India, Russia, England, Ost-India, The Russo-Indian Question, Afghanistan

I. Introduction.

In 1857, the Great Sepoy Revolt against the British Empire began in India. It can be said that this revolt posed a serious threat to the continuation of British rule in India. As a result, the British government was forced to carry out a series of reforms in India. In particular, the East India Company was liquidated and the post of Governor-General of Calcutta was abolished. Queen Victoria of England was proclaimed Queen of India, and all current power was concentrated in the hands of the Viceroy. These processes in India led to a growing focus on British colonial policy issues in the East. By this time, the British had accepted India as a key element of the British Empire. For example, “The Indian Empire (the property of the British in India) is expanding as it was during the Roman Empire, and today it can easily be included in the list of European countries [1]”.

The Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia also had an impact on the development of historical science throughout Europe, particularly British historiography. The science of history was dominated by the liberal or Victorian history tradition by this time. In line with this trend, the gradual expansion of civilization, democracy and individual freedom in the process of differentiation and struggle between the old and new types of society and the state began to be recognized as a step towards new development.

It was within this concept that the theory of the “white man's obligation” was developed, which promoted the idea that the promotion of modern civilization and cultural achievements of the peoples of Europe among the peoples of Asia was the spiritual and enlightenment task of the peoples of Europe. This notion was more or less reflected in the historiography of that period. In addition, in the second half of the XIX century, the formation and development of specialized research institutions dealing with the problems of foreign and colonial policy continued. By this time, scholars from the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge began to study British policy issues in Central Asia.

In the first half of the XIX century in the new history departments of these universities there was a shortage of staff dealing with the history of the East, and in the second half of the XIX century, these

organizations began to study the history of the East and publish works of orientalists. In terms of the importance of British colonial policy in the East, the Department of Colonial History was established at Oxford University, and the Center for Oriental Studies was established at the University of London. [2].

Colonial issues began to be studied in depth in research centers such as the Royal Geography and Asian Societies. By the 1860s, new oriental scientific societies and centers were being established in India. In 1868, the Royal Colonial Institute was founded in Great Britain at the initiative of the Prince of Wales. The institute became a center for the promotion of colonial ideas, with a large library in its collection, the staff of the institute visited different parts of the empire, gave lectures on colonialism, and funded colonial and intelligence expeditions. In 1886, the Royal Colonial Institute was renamed the Imperial Institute. In the 1860s, the East India Association was established in British India [3]. The activities of this organization mainly analyzed the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Afghanistan and Iran.

In the 1960s and 1980s, Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia was largely studied by the Royal Geographical Society. The head of this organization is the orientalist G. Roulinson, as well as the first researchers of the “Big Game” policy R. Murchison, J. Wood, D. Buldjer, Dj. Malleson, S.D. Littledale, F.E. Yanghasbend conducted scientific research [4].

These individuals are scholars who have served in the East India Company for a long time and have studied the history, geography, language, and customs of the Orient for many years. In turn, the British government in India actively encouraged this research and began to play a role as the organizer of scientific research expeditions to Central Asia.

In the 50s and 60s of the 19th century, English historiography, dedicated to the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia, first emerged and flourished against the backdrop of the confrontation between supporters of the two schools (“skillful inaction” and “aggressive politics”). Well-known military and political figures, diplomats, colonial administration officials, travelers, historians and publicists took part in the creation of these concepts. The discussion of

the Big Game policy in Central Asia and its priorities has become not only an academic debate, but also a political struggle. [5].

Proponents of the "skillful inaction" school insisted that Russia was not seeking to occupy India. Because the Russian Empire had neither a real desire nor a resource for this. From this point of view, it was argued that it was not necessary to expand the British frontiers in India through expansion. Proponents of the idea have made it clear to the general public that the UK's influence in Central Asia needs to be strengthened through trade and diplomacy. One of the most prominent representatives of the school of "skillful inaction", the founder of this doctrine, the Viceroy of India Dj. Lawrence, then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Gladston, a well-known historian and publicist, wrote that V.M. Tornbern, F. ; Trench, Ya.A. McGaxan, G.D. Campbell (Duke Argayl), G. Hannah was [6].

They laid the scientific foundations for British foreign policy in Central Asia and developed the basic tenets of the "skillful inaction" approach.

By the second half of the 19th century, Yu. Skayler, P. ; F. Walker, A, G. Forbs, E. Bell, F. ; Fisher, M. Morris, A. Researchers such as Abbott have contributed to the spread and consolidation of the ideas of the School of Skillful Inaction within government and the public. [7].

Opponents of the "aggressive policy" school, Russia's rivals, have argued that all of Russia's actions in Central Asia are aimed at posing a threat to British India. Even the most Russophobic-minded authors were well aware that Russia had no intention of occupying India, believing that the Russians could solve political problems on the European continent because of the pressure exerted on this colonial territory. This was especially the case for the straits and Istanbul (Constantinople), which played an important role in British maritime communications from the Mediterranean to India. Proponents of this idea saw the entry of the Russian Empire into Central Asia as the creation of conditions that would guarantee the success of the campaign to march on India. In particular, in accordance with the agreements with the Central Asian khanates, the full control of the region, the retention of the army and military forces at the expense of local sources, the replenishment of the active army at the expense of the indigenous population, the preparation of the rear fronts of the planned military campaigns. "If the Muscovites are allowed to establish themselves on the borders of India, our political and financial difficulties will increase a hundredfold," he said. [8]."

It was therefore argued that in order to eliminate the "Russian threat", Britain should go to the point of military conflict, even if it uses all its weapons. Proponents of this idea include G. Roulinson, Ch. McGregor, Dj. Malleison, G. Xemli, D. Buldjer, Ch. Marvin, F. Bernabi [9] and G. Belyu, F. Robinson, V. Baker [10] and so on.

II. Discussion.

In British historiography of the "Big Game" in the second half of the XIX century, J. Kay's research was of special importance. His major work is a three-volume

History of the Wars in Afghanistan, dedicated to the First Anglo-Afghan War. The play analyzes Britain's political activities in Afghanistan and Central Asia in the pre-war period, as well as wartime military operations [11].

The peculiarity of this work is that it examines the British foreign policy towards Central Asia, the British colonial policy in India, the British invasion of Afghanistan, the causes and consequences of the defeat of the first expansion. "History of the Wars in Afghanistan" is a book published by British officers who traveled throughout Central Asia, such as A. Connolly, A. Bern, R. Shakespeare, and E. , who led the defense of the city of Herat in 1837-1838. Pottijer's Diaries, A. It was based on very valuable sources, such as Burns memoirs and extensive diplomatic documents and correspondence, such as the Blue Book. Comparing the published official documents with the available sources, J. Kay noted that the "Blue Book" published for members of parliament in 1839 on the eve of the Anglo-Afghan War was falsified. J. Kay described the speech of A. Burns, the British political representative in Kabul, before the Anglo-Indian government, as inconsistent with the fact that the Blue Book did not include the negotiation process between A. Burns and Dost Mohammad Khan.

"I would like to express my deep hatred for the system of official documents by government officials, the corrupt presentation of documents by government officials and diplomats, and the brutal cutting off of the original sources by state censorship," Kay said. [12].” In essence, Kay said, from the point of view of "skillful inaction," Russia is not seeking any war, and that all pre-military processes are fabrications and panic. In general, the diversity of materials used by the author and the depth of analysis mean that J. Kay's work is still worth studying today.

The late 1950s and early 1960s began to take shape as part of the socio-political negotiations within the framework of colonial policy, which began the full formation and development of British historiography. It was from this period that two concepts and schools, such as 'skillful inaction' and 'aggressive politics', were fully formed.

One of the founders of the school of "skillful inaction" was J. Lawrence, who in 1863 became vice-king of India. His term of office, 1863-1869, coincided with a difficult period in which active Russian military action in Central Asia was observed. For the British, the situation caused an unexpected panic. A source at the time said, "Russia attacked and a serious fear of the Russian threat began in London. [13].” This prompted the British Government in India to discuss the foreign policy of the Russian and British Empires, in particular, to reconsider the basic principles of its activities in the north-western parts of India. J. Lawrence relied on valuable sources, classified documents, intelligence materials, as well as Russian-speaking travelers and military reports, using his right as vice-king in creating the above concept.

In the 1867 Memorandum, Lawrence outlined the basic principles of British foreign policy in Central Asia, particularly in Afghanistan. First, he opposed the British invasion of Afghanistan. "Whether we enter Afghanistan as friends or enemies, the result is the same," he said. Afghans don't want to see us there. Our invasion of this country has aroused great fear in the local population. The aftermath of the recent Afghan wars leaves a deep hatred for the British in the hearts of Afghans. Feelings of hatred and bitterness are fueled by local religious scholars and military leaders, who in turn serve to strengthen their power. [14]. Second, it emphasizes that Russia's fundamental interest in India will not last until the invasion. Under such circumstances, J. Lawrence believed that non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan would ensure the security of British rule in India. [15].

In this case, it is necessary to prevent Russia from interfering in the internal affairs of any other country on the border with Afghanistan or India, if similar actions are observed by Russia, which will lead the Russians to the inevitable war with the British [16].

The intensity of Russia's military action in Central Asia began to force the British government to negotiate with the Russians. The main purpose of this was to determine the boundaries of the Russian military campaigns. The British proposed the Amu Darya as a conditional border line between the Emirate of Bukhara and Afghanistan, which in 1868 became a vassal of the Russian Empire. However, difficulties in defining clear boundaries and the lack of clear data on the actual balance of Russian military forces in the region did not allow agreement between the parties [17].

The above principles formed the basis of Lawrence's foreign policy in British India in the 1970s.

When the Second Anglo-Afghan War broke out, Lawrence openly opposed it and united the supporters of the idea of "skillful inaction" into the "Afghan Committee" and said, "We consider this war unfair, its policies are stupid and threaten our sovereignty in India." emphasized [18].

Another proponent of the idea of "skillful inaction" was Count Mayo, who succeeded J. Lawrence in 1869, who wrote that can use its position as a support in the "Eastern Question" in Europe [19].

It was Count Mayo who introduced the concept of "Surround India" to scientific consumption, which meant a union of independent states interested in maintaining warm relations with the British, which included countries such as C Kote d'Ivoire (Balochistan), Afghanistan, Burma, Kashgar and Nepal. Finally, Count Mayo nineteenth century, 30 years lord Palmertston put forward by India to create buffer states around the chain, the idea began to implement [20].

"The Great Game" played an important role in the formation of the British tarixshunosligining dedicated to the policy of "omission" is one of the leading figures of the school of skilled Jor J Douglas Kempbell (Duke Argayl (1823-19) 00 years). Originally of Scottish descent, he began his political career in 1847. He was a member of the House

of Lords and an ardent supporter of the activities of the Liberals.

He served as Minister of Indian Affairs during Gladstone's first term as Prime Minister from 1868-1874. During the administration of Conservative Party leader Beaconsfield Disraeli, George Douglas Kempbell became a critic of the Conservative Party's policies in Central Asia and a prominent representative of the anti-government opposition. He describes the activities of the Russian Empire in Central Asia as follows: "Russia does not seek to occupy India, but if the political situation in any part of Asia escalates, the goal of creating complex areas that cause us problems is likely, in any case. We are convinced that the expansion of Russian power in Central Asia will not reach our borders in India. We must not object to the Russian Empire subjugating the bandit tribes living in the endless deserts to the influence of its own cultural civilization. In this case, Russia will only save British society from disturbance by cultivating vast areas of barbarism." [21].

George Douglas Kempbell also denies the aggressive nature of Russian foreign policy. For example, "On the Asian continent, Russia is not only relatively civilized, but also a unique force that can save millions of people from various levels of atrocities. [22]." He developed and began to promote the idea of an Afghan state in the form of a buffer state. According to him, he proposed to divide the territories of Afghanistan into a small state structure uniting the tribes around Kandahar, the second state uniting the Persian-Iranian tribes centered in Ghazni and the third state centered in Kabul. I am convinced that Duke Argyle says that this British administration will be just and formed in the interests of the local population. [23].

At the same time, Duke Argyle did not completely rule out the possibility of the British Empire going to war with Russia, if the escalation of the Anglo-Russian conflict would lead to war, it would be easier to conduct military operations with an army directed from India to Afghanistan. He believed that this attractive and understandable policy could be costly to the British. "In order to maintain peace and tranquility, we must stay away from projects related to India's borders." [24].

By the end of the 1860s, supporters of the idea of "aggressive politics" began to grow. Their ideological leader was G. Roulinson. While working for the East India Company, he served as the British Government's political representative in Kandahar and Baghdad, and later as Secretary of State for Indian Affairs. He was also elected to parliament and in 1859 was sent as ambassador to Iran. When he returned to London in 1860, he resumed his work in parliament, leading blocs in parliament against the actions of the Russian Empire in Central Asia. In 1868, G. Rawlinson was again appointed Secretary of State for Indian Affairs and remained in that position until the end of his life. He also took an active part in the work of the Royal Geographical Society and later became its director. In the Memorandum of 1868, G. Rawlinson described the "aggressive policy" program. Initially, this document was

adopted as a report in the House of Commons. However, the position outlined in the report did not fit the spirit of the government on foreign policy. G. Rawlinson was not mentioned in this time's speech to parliament. However, the text of the report was printed on paper and distributed to members of parliament.

The memorandum focused on important issues of international relations in Central Asia, the Anglo-Russian rivalry, the policy of Russia and the United Kingdom in Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia. This Memorandum of Great Britain and Russia in 1968's "East" - a collection of articles, with several years 'Quarterly Review' magazine declared him [25].

In his Memorandum, G. Rawlinson said, "In the interests of peace and trade, spiritual and material development, interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs has now become an obligation for us, and the moderate sacrifices expected in the future may be necessary to restore order in Kabul." [26]."

Assessing the Anglo-Russian conflict in Central Asia in the first half of the 19th century, Russia's occupation of Central Asia, the siege of Herat by the Persians, the Russian invasion of Khiva in 1839, and the reception of Jan Vitkevich's mission in Kabul were seen as paving the way for Russia's successful invasion of India. [27].

To reduce Russia's growing influence in Central Asia, Britain has argued that it needs to use Iran in addition to Afghanistan. G. Rawlinson stressed that changing the foreign policy of the Shah of Iran and persuading him to form an alliance with Britain would lead to a strengthening of British policy in the region. "We are," wrote G. Rawlinson: We need to take a strong position in the country and strengthen it to the point where we can withstand Russian pressure. Our officers, like Christie, Lindsay, and Hart (British officers who served as engineers in the Iranian army in the early nineteenth century) must have a leading position in the Persian army and have valuable knowledge. The presence of a well-equipped army and artillery will rekindle our interest in Iran. Persian aristocrats, in turn, prefer to send their sons to study in London. Investment in British banks, railways, mines and other commercial enterprises in Iran with British capital would be easy if the British leadership was recognized in a permanent alliance between the two countries. [28].

According to G. Rawlinson, the British diplomatic mission in Tehran reflects an eastern character more than other European countries. He called for Indian officers to be sent to Iran and Afghanistan, where they would have to hold command positions in the judiciary and the army. Emphasizing that the recruitment of Indian officers to serve in Iran and Afghanistan, introducing them to local customs, language training, and teaching them the need for this service for their careers should be seen as part of colonial policy [29].

Rawlinson stressed that the developments in Central Asia are closely linked to the "Eastern Question", adding that Russia's move towards India and its activities in Kabul

and Herat require us to become more actively involved in Russia's policy in Central Asia. Any defensive measures involving Iran or Afghanistan must be organized in India and carried out from Indian territory [30].

Reflecting on a possible British conflict with Russia, Rawlinson said that Britain's interests and rights were under serious threat in Turkey, Egypt, and Central Asia, and that it would not hesitate to use force if relations deteriorated. [31].

Despite such harsh remarks by G. Rawlinson, the official position of the British and British Indian governments until the mid-1970s was quite restrained. For this reason, there could be no question of open interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries. Count Northbrook, who was appointed viceroy of India in 1872, not only continued his policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, but also banned the conduct of intelligence missions on the north-western border of India.

However, the situation in Central Asia remained tense. In 1873, the Khiva Khanate was occupied by Tsarist Russia. This caused the British to react sharply. "Russia's slow and resolute approach to Afghanistan, its failure to fulfill its obligations under treaties denying the British government's inaction, and its abuse of our border confidence have shown how wrong the British government's calculations are." [32].

In 1874, the government in Britain was changed. Liberals were replaced by conservatives, most of whom were supporters of "aggressive policies." In 1876, Earl Northbrook was replaced by Earl Litton. G. Shelf Litton (1831-1891 tenure) graduated from the University of Bonn, the US, Portugal, France diplomatic institutions responsible positions. During the viceroyalty from 1876 to 1880, he emerged as a staunch supporter of "aggressive politics". In 1876, G. Shelf Litton war "with Russia may very exciting prospects. If that happens, we will have a much better status than we do now. In this part of the world, we have twice as strong defense and offensive capabilities as Russia. We may also provoke revolts against Russian rule in the khanates along the northern borders of India. It is not in our interests to establish a strong and independent state in Afghanistan. Therefore, the establishment of a western Afghan khanate, which includes the regions of Marv, Maymana, Balkh, Kandahar, Herat, and the appointment of its leader by us, should be under our protection and support. If this khanate is established, the fate of our small military base in Kabul will be insignificant. [33]."

G. Shelf Litton openly and in separate parts of Afghanistan is dependent on the British Empire began with a proposal to create a number of countries. In a special memorandum of September 4, 1878, he announced a draft of India's new frontiers from the Pamirs along the Hindu Kush to Herat, with western lines from Afghanistan and Balochistan to the Arabian Sea. [34]. It was during the reign of Count Litton that the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1881) began. Initially, the war was decided in favor of the

British, but when mass uprisings broke out in Kabul and other parts of the country, Britain withdrew its troops from Afghanistan. [35].

III. Conclusion.

The Second Anglo-Afghan War provoked various reactions in British society. After the initial military successes, supporters of the "aggressive policy" celebrated the victory and demanded that it continue in this manner. Prominent historian and proponent of "aggressive politics" D. Bulger called for the occupation of Herat, Balkh, Maymana and Faizabad. He also proposed the consolidation of British military units in Herat, where an auxiliary army of five thousand soldiers, trained by British officers, consisting of representatives of the local population, would be formed. D. Bulger believed that it would be easier to establish contacts with the Central Asian khanates bordering Afghanistan through Herat, turning them to the British side and against Russia. The historian also stressed that Kandahar is an important point. "Kabul, as both a military and a political center, could be the key to Herat." [36].

Bulger argued that the policy of "aggressive attack" should be aimed not only at Afghanistan, but also at Iran. He had predicted that if Britain did not allow the British to enter the Iranian army and turn the emperor and his ministers against Russia's plans, he would lose the only chance we had to rule in Iran. [37]. The occupation of Armenian fortresses and the Gulf of Batumi as a result of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 was assessed as the Russians' approach to the Iranian capital. [38].

One of the most important studies devoted to the historiography of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia in the 1980s was the work of George Bruce Malleon (1825-1898), a British officer, author of many historical and journalistic works. His novels, "The history of Afghanistan," J. Keyning the work of the nineteenth century, 50 years to end the works devoted to the history of the events in India, "Indian history" of the uprising J. Keyning "ushering in the history of the war won" the work of additions. Malleon is also the author of special works on the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia, such as The Russo-Afghan Question and the Indian Invasion, and Herat: The Central Asian Warehouse and Garden. [39]. J. Malleon believed that the occupation of Herat by the British was of great importance to the defense of India. He says he is convinced that several years of British rule in Herat, as seen in the example of India's Bengal province, will lead to the division of Afghanistan. Also, J. Malleon came up with the idea of establishing a separate state in Herat, deploying British spies in every important center of Afghanistan. He also suggested using tribal strife and disagreement within Afghan society in the interests of the British government.

IV. References:

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