United Nations Security Council's Strategies in Contemporary Conflict Management

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***Abstract**: This article x-rayed the United Nations Security Council strategies in contemporary conflict management. It involvements in recent conflicts seems to have attracted complicated responses. The article drew from the Boutros Ghalli's celebrated report entitled 'An Agenda for Peace" in 1992. His strategies were based Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, Peace-building, Peacekeeping, and Peace enforcement which till date define the framework and tools through which the Security Council manage international conflicts. Contemporary doctrine of Responsibility to Protect was also analysed. Specifically, the article examined the interest underpinning the application of these strategies in Libyan and Syrian conflicts. Given the outcome of the Security Council involvement in these conflicts, the article concludes that the Security Council interventions has-been counterproductive and has become an accelerator of conflicts in recent times. The Security Council must therefore take an impressionable responsibility and must be sincere while employing any strategy in independent states and must pursue the global interest of peace and less of selfish interest.*

Keywords - United Nations, United Nations Security Council, Conflict Management, Contemporary

1. Introduction

There is a sense in which the resolution of international conflict within the framework of the United Nations Security Council is perceived in contemporary times. The protracted Libyan and Syrian conflicts added volume to this ongoing debate (Ojo, 2012:4). The opinion of scholars differs with regards to the involvement of the Security Council in both conflicts

While preponderance of the Pro-interventionist scholars justifies the increasing, decisive and active role of the Security Council in fulfilling its core mandate of maintaining international peace and security, Anti-interventionists criticised the Western powers within the Security Council for manipulating the Security Council mandates as the basis for enacting regime change from one state to another in pursuance of their selfish interest. The studies by Gowans (2013), Stafan, (2011), Chomsky (2011), Fermor (2011) amongst others are recent scholars championed this perspective.

In responding to the Libyan conflict, the Security Council adopted two important tools or strategies. Sanctions (economic and military) authorized by the UNSCR 1970 and military intervention under Responsibly to Protect (R2P) and authorized by UNSCR 1973. The UNSCR 1973 (2011) categorically demanded the following;

Immediate cease-fire and a complete end of violence or attacks against the civilians; impose a no-fly zone over Libya and increase the strength of the arms embargo, authorized member-states to take "all necessary measures in protecting civilians (civilian populated areas) under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of the territory.

The swift responses by the Security Council in authorising the above resolution in Libya was perceived by pro-interventionist scholars as genuine and a multilateral desire to implement the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Complications arose the moment some member of the Security Council (America, Britain and France) conspired with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and included regime change which was not part of the original resolution. Despite public outcry on NATO excesses, the Security Council did to stop them. Their military and political capital helped the Libyan rebels overthrow the Gaddafi regime, but failed to support Libyan Post-conflict peace-building and recovery processes. The problem continued to the extent that Libya condition almost deteriorated into a failed state.

In Syria, the Security Council has been very active in organising different Multilateral Peace Initiatives (MPI), evident in Security Council-led Geneva Rounds of Peace Talks. However, the Syrian mediation strategy was driven by two ideologies of America and Russia; both states have strong interests at stake in Syria, and these interests overlap in part, but not completely. Both states desire peace in Syria, but they disagree on how to achieve it. This disagreement seems to have relationship with the strategy employed in Libya. It is against the stated problem that the article analyses the Security Council conflict management in contemporary conflicts

2. The Security Council's Strategies in Conflict Management

The Security Council (SC) is conferred with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. This authority is enshrined in Article (23) of the UN Charter. The Charter states it is saddled with the responsibility to determine the existence of any threat or breach of peace, or act of aggression and permits it to authorise necessary tools, including, diplomatic measures, economic and military sanctions, peacekeeping and the use of coercive measure to maintain or restore peace (UN Charter, 1945). However, when inter or intra states conflicts arise, the Council's first action is usually to recommend to the parties to reach agreement by peaceful means while other options are being considered as the situation unfolds.

Mill (2007) noted that the responses or interventions of the Security Council (SC) in conflicts around the world involve three distinctive phases, which are discussed below;

1. *Primary Response:* This phase tends to examine the nature and the root cause of the conflict, followed by diplomatic pressure (using the Secretary General's office) on the two conflicting states (interstate conflict) or the two fighting groups for (intra state) to settle the conflict peacefully. The General Assembly can make recommendations to the Security Council based on general principles of cooperation for maintaining of international peace and security if the issue has not been discussed in the council.

2. *Secondary Response:* At this stage, the council takes measures like peacekeeping to restore peace and prevent aggression. They often consider that measure as inadequate and often opt for military intervention. Collective support or approval has to be gotten before military intervention would be used.

3. *Tertiary Response:* This is the stage of rebuilding, rehabilitation of victims, reuniting of formal combatants and all activities concerning post conflict peace-building are implemented. Most times it also involves prosecution of those who committed genocide and war crimes during the conflict at the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Apart from the above, Bercovitch and Patrick (2015) argued that over the years, multilateral, political, and economic and security institutions at both regional and sub-regional levels have been collaborating with the Security Council to maintain peace and security globally. They noted that ECOWAS was instrumental in resolving the conflict in Sierra Lone and Liberal; while AU was active in Sudan crisis, NATO in Kosovo and Afghanistan and EU in restoring normalcy in Crimean conflict. It must be noted that such regional support must be implemented with approval of all members of the Council and such mandate must be carried out in fidelity and trust, it must not be manipulated in pursuance of vested interests.

From the forgoing, it is worthy of note that the Security Council, Regional Organisations, UN General Assembly and the Secretary-General plays complementary roles in settling international conflicts. However, during the Cold War, the Council recorded infinitesimal success in its involvement in conflicts due to USA-USSR rivalries. Nevertheless, there are continuous attempts to improve its responsive strategies to various conflicts across the World. Thus, on the 17th of June 1992, the then UN Secretary General, Boutros Ghalli submitted to the Council a report entitled '*An Agenda for Peace:* (Ghalli, 1992). Its base was on Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, Peace-building, Peacekeeping, and Peace enforcement which till date define the framework and tools through which the Security Council manage international conflicts. They are discussed hereunder;

Preventive Diplomacy: This measure represents one of the core aspects of diplomatic instrument of conflict management. In today's world, preventive action extends well beyond traditional preventive diplomacy to involve a broad constellation of United Nations entities working across Secretary-General's 'Good Offices' and various steps taken publicly and in private that draw upon his independence, impartiality and integrity to prevent international disputes from arising, escalating or spreading (Banks, 1994). It includes preventive measures such as fact findings and early-warning system, pre-crisis deployment of United Nations teams equipped with ground or air-based local monitoring technologies intended to improve military transparency between conflicting parties, and also, the crisis deployment of United Nations rapid response teams equipped with a wider range of surveillance technologies able to ascertain regional military dispositions and to gather data in support of potential Security Council actions (Imobighe, 1979). This tool was not adopted with regards to recent conflict in the Middle East. Preventive measures were not adopted in Libyan conflict, It was also not adopted in Syria. The benefit of this tool cannot be overemphasised as it will prevent gross human right violations, serial killings of innocent woman and children, It will also avert refugee crises in a conflict flashpoints. This tool ought to be the most important tool to prevent conflict and thereby avoiding collateral damage and human annihilations

Peacemaking: Peacemaking is a core diplomatic instrument of international conflict management. It is often referred to as pacific settlement or non-coercive measure of conflict resolution. Agbebaku and Azelema (2004) defined peacemaking as actions that are undertaken by a third party directed towards reconciling political and strategic attitudes through mediation, negotiation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication. Mediation is a voluntary intervention by a third party which is informal and non – binding. A mediator seeks to facilitate peace process by managing the process of negotiation without trying to impose a solution

on the parties (Ojiji. 2005:78). Mediators do not exercise coercive power over parties and outcome; they may propose rather than impose a contract (Oviasuyi, 2007).

The fundamental goal of mediation is the achievement of an acceptable settlement through non-violent means between combatants. Negotiation is a process in which parties in conflict systematically engage in dialogue to resolve issues in conflict. Negotiation is done in accordance with pre-established procedure or law and by representatives of the parties in the conflict. According to Jeong, Miall and Miller (2000), negotiation is imperative where communication is achievable because it often prevents escalation and facilitates many other peace processes. Conciliation is a diplomatic measure in which third party intervenes in conflict and the conciliator communicates separately with the parties and seeks to persuade them to work towards peace building. Arbitration is perhaps the oldest way of settling disputes. It requires the consent by all states involved generally in treaties. It is a process of intervention in which the parties' loss controls of the outcome and the situation. In arbitration, the arbiter is the decision making authority. The outcomes of intervention are binding (Ojiji, 2005). Adjudication is another spectrum in conflict handling which involves the use of court Judges are the decision making authority in adjudication. The international court of justice has the jurisdiction to adjudicate on international disputes.

What we can discern from the above is that between the task of preventing conflict and keeping the peace lays the responsibility to bring hostile parties to agreement. It implies that peacemaking is an integral part of a preventive strategy aimed at reducing the intensity of conflict from escalating into war. This is because it provides the forum for debates, negotiation and a channel for quiet diplomacy. In peacemaking, the Secretary General may facilitate the resolution of conflicts. Notable peacemakers may equally be undertaken by United Nations Peace Envoys, Governments, and groups or states, regional bodies or prominent personalities working independently.

Peacemaking arises in a situation where there is a viable condition for pursuing development. On the contrary, if such condition is lacking, the process of peacemaking becomes fruitless. This could explain why most scholars frown at the efficacy of peacemaking option especially in conflicts where there are vested interests of the big powers. Rationalising on the challenges of peacemaking measures in Syria, it was illustratively put by Okon and Dickson, (2013:4) 'Peacemaking measures have repeatedly failed to prevent sovereign States from committing genocide or systematic killings, at a time when intervention is needed the most. Syria had different rounds of peace talks, In pursuance of peace plan in Syria, Koffi Annan organized as Action Group Conference on 30th June 2012, in Geneva christened Geneva 1 commence, this attempt failed, The Geneva II Conference was also held in 2014 on the future of Syria with the aim of ending the Syria conflict, by bringing together the Syrian Government and the Syrian opposition to discuss the clear steps towards a transitional Government for Syria with full executive powers. This also failed giving rise to Geneva III as part of the peace negotiations between the Syrian Government and opposition under the auspices of the UN. Although it formally started on 1st February, it was formally suspended only two days later, on 3rd February 2016. In Syria lack of political support from the powerful states paralysed the efficacy of these peace strategies aimed at implementing the Koffi Annan Peace plan for Syria

Interestingly, the failure of peacemaking tool of a particular state or nation does not mean that it is inadequate or lacks the strength to resolve conflicts. It could be for lack of political will of the parties involved or lack of political support from the key actors in the conflict. Lack of leverage at the disposal of the third party, and the indifference of the international community to the conflict are the key factors that thwart the effort of peacemakers in any international conflict (Nicole, 2005). While the charter recommends peacemaking as one of the first tool to be adopted in resolving conflicts, it has often been relegated in most cases like the case of Libya, there was never an attempt at peacemaking from the pre-conflict, conflict and post conflict stage of the crisis.

Peace-building: The intellectual foundation of contemporary peace-building is rooted in peace research, conflict-resolution literature and the writings of peace theorists. According to Garth (2005), peace building refers to the attempt to overcome the structural, relational and cultural contradictions which lie at the root of conflict. It is the practical implementation of peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction and development. Other writers traced the evolution of contemporary peace-building to the UN Scribe Boutrus-Ghali 1991-2001.

Notable of them is Kugel, (2009) who posited that the evolution of peace building is linked to the 1992 UN Secretary General's report – *Agenda for Peace*. Peace building was explicitly defined in the report as the 'action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse of conflict. Post conflict peace building covers the various concurrent and integrated actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation. Studies have revealed that peace building emerged as one of the most important tools of the Security Council's conflict management and its functionality led to the establishment of special commission to fulfil these mandates. In Libya, peace building commission were never established. In fact, the post- conflict peace building in Libya was poorly conceived and ill

articulated by the Western states that intervened militarily. That was why after the overthrow of Ghadaffi's regime by the Western states, violence was exacerbated unprecedentedly.

Peacekeeping: Peacekeeping is one of the effective tools used by the Council in conflict management and has attracted the attention of most scholars. Peacekeeping was developed as mechanism for the implementation of coercive measure short of force, force can only apply in strategic level for self-defence and in defence of the mandates. Miller (1999) sees peacekeeping as the action of seeking or to reduce the manifest violence of a conflict through the intervention of lightly armed forces playing an interlocutory role. It is designed as an extension of collective security thinking to cover conflicts that threatens international peace and security especially in regions where the conflicts played out.

The first UN peacekeeping mission popularly known as the '*Blue Helmets'* was established in 1948, during which the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) was deployed to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Since then, UN peacekeeping operations have considerably increased all over the world. Over the years, UN peacekeeping has evolved to meet the demands of different conflicts and also a changing political landscape. Peacekeeping expanded in the 1990s because the end of Cold War created new opportunities to end civil wars through negotiations.

In Syria, there was an attempt at peacekeeping following the establishment of an observer mission under United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2043 of April 21th 2012,This was established for a 90 days period mainly to monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and to monitor and support the full implementation of the Koffi Anna six-point plan. In Libya, there was no attempt at establishing a ground forces because it was rejected by the rebels in Beghazi on the fear of occupation. We can argue that peacekeeping option would have worked effectively in Libya than Syria. This is because the actors in Libya were known and the territoriality of the conflict was defined and demarcated between the Transition National Council (TNC) and Ghaaffi forces. It would have been possible for peacekeepers to initiate and implement ceasefire agreement between the opposing forces before attempting to overthrow Ghadaffi's regime. The case of Syria is more volatile because there are many armed and terrorists' groups like ISIL that are not under the control of any recognised state (Bhardwaj, 2012). Again, the territoriality of the conflict cannot be easily identified or demarcated and situation of that nature will be difficult to curtail through peacekeeping

In a classical submission by Sharon (2012), the UN peacekeeping goals were primarily limited to maintaining ceasefires and stabilising situations on ground, so that efforts could be made at the political level to resolve the conflict by peaceful means. Secondly, peacekeeping act as a buffer or separation between contending parties and to perform other functions necessary for the security and welfare of the populations, thirdly, the UN peacekeeping forces have never been intended to fight in conflict situation or take side in the conflict, they are expected to be neutral and monitor peace process and provide necessary presence to dissuade the conflicting parties from resorting to fight against one another , fourthly, it also serves as a means of dealing with inter-state conflict.

In any case, whether inter or intra state conflicts, military forces remain the backbone of most peacekeeping operations but they expected to apply less force and also be neutral from the beginning of the peace operation to the end. To this end, contemporary peacekeepers undertake a wide variety of tasks, which involve building of sustainable institutions of governance, human rights monitoring, security sector reform, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants. Fabian (2014) observed that recent changes have integrated peace keeping and building into one mutually reinforcing activity.

Peace Enforcement: Most literature used the term peace enforcement and military intervention interchangeably. This is because when diplomatic measures fail, peace enforcement becomes the next option for the Council. Robert and Kenneth (2003) emphasised that Peace enforcement represents one of the core aspects of military intervention. By definition, peace enforcement is armed intervention into the internal affairs of independent state in pursuant of the UN mandate. It does not require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic and international level. It requires explicit authorisation of the Security Council (Kittikhoun &Weiss, 2001). The Council may utilise where appropriate regional organisations or agencies for the enforcement. Article 42of the charter empowers the Security Council to use force against aggressors through deploying of air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

On a critical note, this is one of the most controversial and debated issue within the framework of the United Nation conflict management, especially in the post-cold war era. This is because the Security Council's intervention in internal conflict cut across traditional concepts of state sovereignty and nominally contravenes the charter. However, the charter states that "principle of sovereignty shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII" of the Charter. In practice, whenever the Security Council decides that certain events constitute a threat to international peace and security." This means that its decision to intervene by force, if necessary, cannot be overridden by claims of domestic jurisdiction.

Generally, peace enforcement can be authorised in two main situations, first, enforcement for humanitarian purposes, a situation where states fail to respect, protect and fulfil its citizen's most basic human rights, but rather exercise its position of power in a violent manner against its citizens. In this situation, it is often referred to as military/ humanitarian intervention or intervention to implement the Doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as in the case of Libya. Secondly, it can be authorised against an aggressor threatening established international order as in the case of Iran annexation of Kuwait, in this situation; it is referred to as the peace enforcement for collective security

The foregoing facts signifies that force is a recognised tool of international conflicts management and very much a part of international relations, but the problems inherent in the use of force is that most powerful states rely on it as a means of realising their Foreign Policy by manipulating legal principles to justify their actions (Claude,1996). This view was also reinforced by Bailey and Daws (1998). According to their analysis, the event of 1989 brought an end to the cold war but not armed intervention, as subsequent years have been marked by military intervention by outside state or multilateral coalition of states justified by humanitarian purposes as in civil strife in Somalia and Haiti, the Balkan state and central Africa or to fend off hegemonic drive of an aggressor in response to Iraq's armed takeover of Kuwait.

What the above signifies is that there are situations where military intervention is justifiable or legal and not justifiable and is illegal. That was why in an attempt to put the lesson of the World War II to practical effect, the United Nations charter (1945) specified the condition under which force may legally be used, the conditions are stated as follows;
1. Unilaterally in self defense (during peacekeeping)

2. Multilaterally when authorised by the Security Council to maintain and restore international peace and security.

3. Multilaterally by regional collective defense action.

However, while the charter specifically stated the condition for the use of force, recent experiences show that the motives have been open-ended as it is often subject to multiple interpretations and manipulations by powerful states in realising their national interests. This was one of the primary tools employed in Libya. The coalition of Western states under the supervision of the North Atlantic Threat Organisation (NATO) employed air power to neutralises Ghadaffi's security and defence systems and overthrow his regime. This unilateral military action has been heavily criticised as been a smoke screen, counterproductive and accelerator of violence in the post Ghadaffi era. However, attempts to replicate unilateral military intervention in Syria has been grossly frustrated by Russia and China consequent upon the duplicity of the Western states in Libya

Economic and Military Sanctions: Economic sanction is the mobilisation and use of tangible economic resource by a state or coalitions of states to punish another state with the aim of changing the behaviour of the sanctioned state. Economic sanction takes the form of financial blockades, assets freeze, and travel ban. Blockade is a more intense of economic warfare in which warship or ground forces are used physically to prevent commerce from going into or coming out of a country. It also involves boycott against the target state's exports or an embargo or prohibition against selling or commercial activities. The aim is usually to compel the embargoed state to change its policy or comply with the wishes of the states imposing the embargo or to produce in the target country a desired political change.

There has been a lingering debate on the merits of imposing economic or military sanctions on countries violating certain rules governing international behaviour. The crux of the debate is whether it has been an effective tool in conflict management or not. Meanwhile Article 41 of the charter empowered the council to impose economic and military sanctions on any aggressor threatening international order. Because we live in a globalised world, a multilateral embargoes or boycott imposed by a coalition of states tends to be more effective and important tool of manipulating states behaviour because it brings greater collective pressure on one hand and it has direct impact on the citizen of the state on the other hand.

Pape (1997) also noted that sanctions have been inactive and counterproductive in the history of conflict management. They argued that international economic sanctions result in exacerbated nationalism or xenophobic behaviour on the part of the regime on one hand and inflicts hardship and punishment on innocent individuals on the other hand. However, despite the restrictions placed on the state, it may find other compassionate states or allies that are willing to transact with it as a way of pushing its foreign policy objectives in that state. For instance, the multilateral embargoes against South Africa took many years to notice the effect.

Similarly, Portela, (2015) examined the state of the sanction in Syria and concluded that Syria was a deceptive partnership between the Arab League, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the EU. He further argued that the sanctions have pitted the EU against Russia, one of its strategic partners, and have continued to threaten a veto in the UNSCR on Syria. The strategic importance of Syria to Russia does not only emanate from the lucrative weapons deals it secures, but also from being the host of

Russia's only maritime base in the Mediterranean. Losing Syria, Russia's last stronghold in the Middle East would be a major psychological and reputational setback. That was why Russia did everything possible to protect Assad. Sanctions was also melted on Libya following the authorisation of UNSCR 1970 which placed economic and military sanctions on Libya

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P): The term responsibility to protect (R2P) was first presented in a report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in December, 2001. The term 'Responsibility to Protect' abridges the complex idea to an assumed responsibility to protect civilians when their own Government endangers them. This includes the responsibility to prevent, react, and rebuild (Fermor, 2011:4). The UN through its former Secretary, late Mr. Kofi Anan was one of the driving forces that led to the emergence of R2P. He was also responsible for the formation of the "High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change". This panel was mandated to report on how the UN should engage with violations of human rights in the 21st century. In 2005, the UN World Summit included the idea of R2P in its outcome document. According to the World Summit Report (2005), Heads of State and various Governments agreed to the following:

> Each individual State has the primary responsibility to protect its people from genocide, war, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. It is also responsible for preventing these crimes. The international community has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to help protect individuals threatened by these crimes. When a state manifestly fails in its protection responsibilities, and peaceful means are inadequate, the international community must take stronger measures, including collective use of force authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII.

Since 2005 when R2P was instituted as an integral framework of UNSC in conflict management, Libya was the first case of robust R2P authorisation so far. Towards the build up to the intervention in Libya, the United States representative in the UN, Susan Rice stated "… Today, the Council had responded to the Libyan peoples cry for help, the Council's purpose was clear to protect Libyan civilians". Ramesh, (2011:22), also reemphasis this position, according to him, in order to demonstrate genuine commitment towards R2P in Libya, it took one month to mobilise a broad coalition, secure a U.N. mandate, establish and enforce no-fly and no-drive zones, stop Gaddafi's advancing army and prevent a massacre of the innocent citizens in Benghazi. After economic and travel sanctions failed to foster a ceasefire, the Security Council approved U.N. Resolution 1973. Resolution 1973 was one of the broadest authorisations of military action ever enacted by the Security Council. The resolution not only reiterated the responsibility of the Libyan Government to protect its population, but it also provided a legal basis for military intervention. With little hope of reasoning with the Gadhafi regime, the Security Council was poised to intervene to prevent the massive loss of life.

It was on this orientation that Osita and Renner (2015: 6) averred that the Libyan case did not only become a litmus paper to test the Security Council's commitment to R2P in the 21th century, it has broadly shown that R2P had finally come into practice, it also indicated a change in the international perceptions and interpretations of sovereignty with regard to mass atrocity prevention. The Security Council took a historic decision in Libya which confirms clearly and unequivocally the international community's determination to fulfil its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated upon them by their own Government.

However, the implementation of R2P in Libya has been perceived by many studies a smoke screen. For example, Benantar, (2011), argued that attempts by some American and British leaders to justify the Libyan intervention by reference to R2P served only to strengthen suspicion associated with the principle. Gareth, (2012) on his part argued that the 'poorly and inconsistently' humanitarian justification for the War in Libya on the basis of Responsibility to protect almost choked at birth what many were hoping was an emerging new norm of conflict management in recent time. This view was widely held by Williams (2011) who tenaciously argued that the Libyan intervention brought R2P into disrepute. Richard (2012) on his part lamented that the War risked undermining consensus at the UN in future engagements.

Despite these beautiful propositions, the fundamental problem that befalls R2P is its manipulation by powerful states in advancing their interests; the doctrine of Responsibility to protect has become a strategic mistake. According to their analysis, R2P is often abused by powerful States in advancing their national interests. Their study on Russia showed that Russia has abused R2P more likely than other states. Its role in the invasions of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Moldova, Macedonia and other states containing significant Russian Diasporas are good examples.

Drawing from The Libyan experience, Chromsky (2012) argued that the dire consequences of R2P intervention in Libya produced two immediate negative impacts on global politic; first, the breakdown of consensus on R2P intervention initiated by Resolution 1973 (though China and Russia actually did not support the resolution but abstained). Secondly, it has resulted in the return to old style geopolitics. For example, the trend now is that China and Russia have used the abuses and misuses of Resolution

1973 by the Protagonists to paralyze similar resolutions to save Syria from destruction by those who were antithetical to the Assad's regime.

Veto Power as a Fetter on R2P: Veto Power has been perceived as a fundamental element of conflict management within the frame work of the Security Council. And has been used as check and balance politics of conflict management. However, recent studies have shown that veto power has inevitably become a fetter on R2P. Within the framework of the UNSC conflict management procedure in the council Veto Power is used to either support or paralyze any resolution aimed at addressing any conflict situation or it is used to approve R2P. The right to veto was institutionalized in Article 27 (3) of the UN's Charter. Fassbender (1998) defined the 'right of veto' as the inability of the council to adopt a resolution due to the negative vote of one or more permanent members. The negative vote hinders the decision of a draft resolution. A member who wishes to neither vote for or against a proposal may abstain from voting. This is called voluntary abstention (Okhovat, 2000:21).

Despite the introduction of the doctrine of 'Responsibility Not to Veto' (RN2V), this code of conduct only exited on paper, the permanent members of the Security Council have continued to exercise their rights to veto even in worse cases of grave mass atrocities. Between October 2011 to July 2012, Russia and China vetoed five different resolutions sponsored by the protagonists aimed at putting pressure on Assad. Hinnebusch (2012) argued that China-Russia collaboration is aimed at resisting America that prides herself as a superpower, yet does not respect international law. Also, part of Russia and China's motivation are to fend off the hegemonic tendencies of the Western states in Syria and the Middle East. Emphatically, China's veto clearly strengthened its relationship with Russia. This closer Sino-Russian relationship can be described as a potential "Axis of obstruction" in the Security Council, working to ensure that the Western States must not have their way all the time.

3. Conclusion

This article has been able to examine the strategies of the Security Council in resolving contemporary conflicts. While paying undivided attention to the Libyan and Syrian conflicts, the article presented the pro-interventionists and anti- interventionist perspectives in the application of these strategies. In these conflicts, the application of different strategies was influenced by certain interests of the Security Council members. This interest resulted in failure of the Security Council to deliver in its core mandate of preserving and maintaining global peace and security. The failure to employ peacemaking and peacekeeping strategies in Libya was viewed with suspicions. Also the rush in which the coalition of Western states and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisations (NATO) implemented the military intervention leading to the overthrow of the Ghadaffi regime was also perceived as a smoke screen because military intervention in Libya exacerbated the violent crises to the extent that Libya became a failed state. The outcome of the Libya intervention became a fundamental setback in managing contemporary conflicts. Anti-interventionists argued that the primary objective of a unilateral military intervention in Libya was solely to remove Ghadaffi from power and not to find lasting peace in the state. Post conflict peace building in Libya was never implemented as the future of Libya became nasty and brutish. Syria also responded to the Libyan stimuli following the failure which accompanied successive peacemaking strategies adopted by the Security Council. The article recommends that successive conflict management must be devoid of selfish interests and the Security Council and they must show impressionable responsibility while intervening in the internal affairs of independent state. This is important to restore the confidence, predictability and relative collaboration required in resolving contemporary conflicts.

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