

Nigerian Government Responses to the Menace of Boko Haram and Nigeria's Status in the Global Security Rankings (2009-2019)

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Abstract: *Could the various responses cum efforts made by Nigerian government in recent years towards tackling her major security challenge (Boko Haram terrorism) be described as diverse hope of trepidation? Providing a logical answer to this fundamental question necessitated the need for this paper. Hinging on the foregoing, the paper examined the various efforts of Nigerian government towards combating Boko Haram menace in three (3) different regimes and the extent to which the responses have improved/shaped the status of Nigeria in the annual global security rankings. The paper is descriptive in typology and qualitative in orientation. Data gathered through documented evidence were solely utilized while Realist theory of International Relations by Hans Morgenthau was employed as a theoretical guide to explicate the link between the two variables. Based on findings, the study established that the various responses cum efforts made by Nigerian government and in conjunction with the International Community towards combating Boko Haram menace which was perceived by the researchers as the major security threat in the reviewed years were to no avail, as none of the responses has significantly improved the status of Nigeria in the global security rankings. It is on this basis that the paper recommended among others, the urgent need for Nigerian government to integrate its resources cum synergize militarily with the bordering countries towards fighting Boko Haram group out of their region rather than chasing them to one another's bordering countries. More so, Nigerian government should securitize and control what goes into the internet concerning the security of the nation as this has become a major signal to the global community that the country is unsafe thereby contributed to its security status disrepute/poor rankings.*

Keywords: Government responses; Boko Haram; Global security; Security Index; International Community.

INTRODUCTION

The year 2009 marked the inception of Nigeria's responses to the menace of Boko Haram when Nigerian government investigated the activities of the group and found out internal arms of the group among its members. However, the Boko Haram group was claimed to have been in existence since 2002 (seven years before the incidence). Following the investigation and response of Nigerian government, numerous members of the group were arrested in Bauchi and the then leader of the group was killed (Muhammed Yusuf). The clash between the group and the Nigerian security agencies resulted to loss of about 700 lives and properties. Consequently, in 2010, the Boko Haram issue became widespread when it carried out its first attack in Borno that claimed live of four persons and also its attacks on Prison Break in Bauchi that freed not less than 700 Boko Haram members (Nossiter, 2009). In 2011, series of attacks were carried out by Boko Haram members. These included the numerous bombings by Boko Haram members immediately after Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (GEJ) was sworn-in as Nigerian President on the 29th of May, 2011. The attack bothered the mind of the researchers like many other Nigerians who might believe that Boko Haram terrorist group is politically sponsored or oriented. In response to this attack, on the 15th of July, the Nigerian government sanctioned the efforts of the military to counter the increasing threats of the group. The federal government embarked on counter-insurgency campaign with the provision of 21 Armoured Brigade and Joint Task Force (JTF) on the 15th of July 2016. Despite this response, the Nigerian Police Headquarters in Abuja was attacked by the group. Series of attacks were later carried out by the Boko Haram group which included the attack on the United Nations (U.N.) building in the Federal Capital Territory (F.C.T.) of Nigeria on 2011 (Akali, 2017).

In the early 2012, Boko Haram group was claimed to have killed about 900 people and kept many hostage. In response to this, on the 8th of March, 2012, the Nigerian Army were sent to rescue them which included the two foreigners (Chris McManus and Franco Lamolinara), but unfortunately, these two hostages were reportedly killed including many others (Nicholas, Richard and Andrea, 2012). In a continuous attempt to improve Nigeria's security status battered by Boko Haram, Nigerian government declared a state of emergency on the 14th of May 2013 in three states of the North-east Nigeria (Borno, Adamawa and Yobe). The offensive launched of state of emergence seems to be the best compared to the initial responses of government as it had initial success. However, the success was short-lived as the Boko Haram members became dispersed rather maintaining one location. In reaction to this government response and to maintain their activities, the Boko Haram slaughtered about forty-two students and among other series of attacks to maintain their activities (Damien, 2013). In 2014, Boko Haram group adopted series of tactics in carrying out their operation. These include abduction, kidnapping, back-to-back blast (a method by which a bomb will explode at a mid-location and another bomb will

explode few moments later) among others. The group was reported to have adopted not less than 275 female students (well known as Chibok girls) from Chibok College in Borno State. This abduction gained public attention in Nigeria and international community and happened to be the first time Nigerians embarked on Public protest popularly known as “Bring Back Our Girls” (BBOG) on Boko Haram menace. Also, the attack attracted the attention of the International Community. The British Royal Air Force (RAF) offered Nigerian military assistance on Boko Haram menace among other countries in the international system. But unfortunately, the Nigerian government turned down the assistance and described it as national issue that needed to be resolved by Nigerian intelligence and Security Services (McQue, 2017).

Following the captivity and several attacks placed on many towns in the Northern-Nigeria in December 2014 by Boko Haram, the Nigerian government launched an offensive response with the assistance of bordering countries including Niger, Cameroon and Chad. The response led to the recapturing of many areas that were being controlled by the group. In the late 2014/2015, Boko Haram became a transnational/cross-border terrorist group as their mode of operation cut across borders and extended to the neighboring countries. Subsequent to this, the government of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad reasoned together on the way-out. Based on this, they embarked on military coalition which led to the establishment of Counter-insurgency against Boko Haram in January 2015. This military coalition led to the killing of not less than two-hundred members of the group by the Chadians military. However, there were retaliatory attacks by the members of Boko Haram which killed 13 Chadian military personnel and about 81 civilians in Fatokol town, Cameroon (BBC News, 2015).

Following several series of responses from Nigerian government and neighboring countries, Boko Haram lost control of many towns in the North-East Nigeria which include Gwoza, Bama among others except Sambisa forest that was perceived as a no going-area for the military. On the 28th of March, 2015, Nigerian Presidential election was held with the hope that General Muhammad Buhari administration would deliver Nigerians from the menace of Boko Haram. However, the reverse was the case; this was the exact time the researchers like many other Nigerians who might believe Boko Haram was sponsored to victimize or make the country ungovernable in the previous regime became so confused and started to re-think. Consequently, it was reported in August 2015 that not less than 1000 people were killed within few months of Muhammad Buhari’s administration. In response this, the Nigerian government commanded its military and a number 338 persons were rescued. The success of the attack made Nigerian government (President Muhammad Buhari) believed that Boko Haram had been technically defeated as reported by Brozz (2015). Following series of attacks and government responses in 2016, it was reported that Boko Haram could only boast of few villages around Lake Chad and Sambisa forest. Based on the responses of Nigerian government, Muhammad Buhari said publicly that the group had been chased away from Sambisa Forest (BBC News, 2016). However, this success did not stop the activities of Boko Haram as they were extended and continued carrying out their attacks.

The year 2017 started with series of attacks by Boko Haram members which included the attacks on Nigerian military base in Yobe that reportedly killed about 5 military personnel. This attack made the Nigerian Army responded and killed about 15 members of the group. Following many series of attacks in 2017, the Nigerian military embarked on what they described as final offensive to drive Boko Haram away from their monopoly. This later led to the arrest of not less than 126 Boko Haram members on the May 17, 2017 in Damboa, Borno State (Musa, 2017). The Boko Haram attacks in 2018 included the killing of 4 civilians in Maiduguri on the 26th of April in Borno state. In response, the Nigerian Armed forces placed attacks on the group. Other attacks included the attacks on a military base at Metete in November 18, 2018, Baga village in Borno state in December among others (Joscelyn and Weiss, 2019).

The foregoing is the trend of Boko Haram menace in Nigeria which has been receiving much government responses. The security challenges cum terrorism arising from Boko Haram and other terrorist groups in the global community have attracted the attention of International Community in recent years. The annual global security rankings such as Global Terrorism Index (GTI), Global Peace Index (GPI), Security Threats Index among others; with the aid of globalization have continued to reveal the real security condition/status of every state in the world. In order to manage and redeem her battered international security status, Nigeria has come up with various security policies in different regimes. However, the extent to which the policies have improved/shaped Nigeria’s status in the global security rankings necessitated the need for the paper. Hinging on this, the paper investigated the extent to which the responses of Nigerian government between 2009 and 2019 have improved the status of Nigeria in the annual global security rankings and impediments to the war against Boko Haram menace.

METHODOLOGY

The paper is descriptive in typology and aligns with qualitative orientation. It relied on documented evidence, such as annual global security-based index ranking, journal articles, media publications and textbooks. Data were presented using tabular and textual tools. Content analysis cum logical reasoning served as instruments of analyzing the data while Hans Morgenthau’s realist theory of International Relations was employed as a theoretical guide.

Realism is a school of thought/theory in international relations that became popular by Hans Morgenthau in 1948; the realists believe their theory closely describes the image of world politics as states ultimately count on self-help for guaranteeing their own security rather than depending on the International Community or more powerful states (Antunes and Camisao, 2018). Within this framework, the realists have two key strategies for managing insecurity of states in the international system. The first is the balance of power which relies on strategic and flexible alliances, while the second, deterrence relies on the threat or use of significant force. The applicability of the theory is relevant from the view that Nigerian government is expected to use all military weapons/power within her disposal strategically towards combating Boko Haram group. From the realists' perspective, the balance of power is a prudent strategy to manage an insecure world, this suggests that war is considered the most effective mechanism of counterbalancing the increasing power of terrorism in Nigeria and neutralizing the threats that the Boko Haram Menace has posed on Nigeria's international security image repute thereby affecting her security status in the annual global security rankings. So, while transnational terrorism, such as Boko Haram group has become a threat to some states in the international system, the affected states have to rely on the strategies consistent with realism to deal with the menace.

Timelines of Boko Haram attacks on Nigeria (2009-2019)

Table 1: Some of the Boko Haram attacks on Nigeria (2009-2019).

Date	Attack incident/Figures	Place/Location
July 23-29, 2009	Clashes between Boko Haram and Nigerian soldiers, about 1000 people were reportedly killed	Bauchi, Maiduguri, Yobe and Kano.
September 7, 2010	Bauchi Prison Break; 5 people were killed and 721 prisoners were freed.	Bauchi
December 31, 2010	A bomb outside a barracks killed 4 persons	Abuja
May 11, 2011	15 people were killed during Goodluck Ebele Jonathan swear-in as the new President	Abuja and Bauchi
June 16, 2011	Abuja Police headquarters failed bombing attack; a police officer and perpetrator were killed.	Abuja
August 26, 2011	Attack on United Nations building in Abuja, 21 people were reportedly killed and many others were injured	Abuja
Dec. 22-23, 2011	7 soldiers were killed and many other civilians in clashes between Boko Haram and Nig. Soldiers.	Maiduguri
December 25, 2011	41 people were killed by bomb attacks on churches	Borno
January 5-6, 2012	37 Christians were killed in a church	Borno
January 20, 2012	32 police officers were killed and 150 others	Kano
April 8, 2012	38 people were killed in a church	Kaduna
August 7, 2012	Attack on Deeper life Bible church claimed 19 lives.	Kogi
October 1-2, 2012	Attack on Federal Polytechnic, Mubi claimed lives of 25 students	Mubi, Adamawa
August 8, 2012	Attack on Mosque claimed lives of 3 persons	Not specified
December 28, 2012	15 Christians were killed in a church attacks	Maiduguri
March 18, 2013	Kano bus bombing claimed between 22-65 lives	Kano
April 16, 2013	Massacre attack in Baga claimed 187 lives	Borno
June 9, 2013	9 pupils, 13 students and teachers were killed	Damaturu, Yobe
July 6, 2013	42 persons were killed in Yobe state school shooting	Yobe
August 11, 2013	44 people were killed in Konduga mosque attack while 26 others were injured	Borno state
Sept. 12, 2013	40 soldiers were killed in an ambush	Not specified
Sept. 29, 2013	50 students were killed in Gujba college massacre	Yobe
Jan. 26, 2014	About 138 people were killed in Northern Nigeria attack	Northern states
Feb. 14, 2014	121 Christian villagers were killed in Konduga	Borno State
Feb. 15, 2014	About 90 Christians were killed in Gwoza	Gwoza LGA
Feb. 25, 2014	Attack on Federal government college killed 59 male students	Yobe
March 14, 2014	Boko Haram attacked Giwa military barracks	Maiduguri
April 15, 2014	About 276 female students were kidnapped in Chibok school girls attack	Borno State
May 27, 2014	Buni Yadi attacks, 49 soldiers were killed	Yobe
June 2, 2014	Not less than 200 Christians were killed in villages	Borno
June 20-23, 2014	About 70 people were killed while 91 people were kidnapped	Borno State
Sept. 19, 2014	Mainok market attack killed 30 people	Borno state
January 10, 2015	19 people were killed in suicide bombing	Maiduguri

April 21, 2015	8 soldiers were killed in an attack	Baga
June 12, 2015	About 37 people were killed in villages	North-East, Nigeria
June 22, 2015	Attack on Maiduguri mosque claimed 30 lives	Maiduguri
August 8, 2015	174 villagers were killed in opened fire attacks by Boko Haram group	Kukuwa-Gari Village
Jan. 27-28, 2016	65 people were killed while many others were injured in Dalori and Maiduguri	Borno
Feb. 9, 2016	60 people were killed and 78 were injured at IDP camp	Dikwa
July 8, 2016	9 people were killed in Damboa Mosque's attack	Borno
Sept 19, 2016	40 soldiers were killed	Malam Fatori
Sept 25, 2016	4 soldiers and JTF members were killed	Kaduna
January 7, 2017	Attack on Nigerian Army military base in Buni Yadi killed five soldiers	Yobe
Jan. 16, 2017	Attack on Nigeria's university on Maiduguri killed 3 students and a Professor.	Maiduguri
January 21, 2017	Attack on south-east Niger killed 2 soldiers	Niger state
Sept. 26, 2017	5 people were killed in a Mosque	Northeast Nigeria
Jan. 23, 2017	8 people were killed	Borno
Jan. 31, 2018	6 persons were killed while 44 others were injured at Konduga and IDP camp at Dalori	IDP camp, Dalori
Feb. 19, 2018	Not less than 110 students were abducted by Boko Haram in Dapchi girls school	Dapchi
April 29, 2018	3 soldiers were killed in Diffa region	Niger
May 1, 2018	86 people were killed and about 58 were injured at a Mosque	Mubi, Adamawa
June 20, 2018	15 soldiers were killed in military barracks attack	Maiduguri
June 17, 2019	30 persons were killed and about 40 were injured at a football viewing centre	Konduga
July 4, 2019	5 soldiers were killed and 14 were injured	Damboa
August 18, 2019	4 soldiers were killed in Gueskerou	Borno

Source: Adapted from various sources; The Guardian (2011), BBC News (2011), Gambrell, J. (2012), BBC News (2012), AlertNet. (2012), Adamu and Faul (2013), Nossiter (2013), The Big Story (2013), BBC News (2013), Aljazeera (2013), Abubakar (2014), Adepegba, Nwogu and Idowu (2014), France24 News (2014), Dorell (2014), The Guardian (2014), BBC News (2014), All Africa News (2014), Morning Star News (2014), Akingbule (2015), Yahoo News (2015), Umar (2015), ABC News (2015), BBC News (2015), Aljazeera (2016), Akinrujumu (2016), The Guardian (2016), Kure and Searcey (2016), Global Terrorism Index (2016), Sahara Reporters (2016), Henrich (2016), Aljazeera (2017), Roy (2017), Marama (2017), PM News (2018), Wikipedia (2018), Aljazeera (2018), The Japan Times (2018), Sahara Reporters (2018), Eyewitness News (2019), The Defense Post (2019) and Adebayo (2019).

The data presented in table 1 showed some of the numerous attacks resulting from Boko Haram menace on Nigeria's political system, particularly on her security, educational, religious (both mosques and churches), government institutions and other public places such as political and market gatherings between 2009 and 2019. One of the major targets of the group is Nigeria's security institution. The institution has encountered much serious havoc due to Boko Haram menace and this showcased to the world that Nigeria's security personnel were being incapable to discharge their constitutional duties efficiently. The frequent attacks resulting from Boko Haram menace have continued to shape the security status of Nigeria globally; the incessant attacks of the group have equally made Nigeria the focus of the international community in global ranking and discussions on insecurity cum terrorism in the international system. As a result of single attack by Boko Haram group that claimed the lives of 174 persons at Kukuwa-Gari village as indicated earlier (see table 1), Nigeria was ranked 7th in the list of 20 most fatal attacks in the world in 2015 (GTI, 2016). This attack and many others served as great disrepute to the security image of Nigeria thereby contributed to her poor ranking.

NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO BOKO HARAM MENACE VERSUS NIGERIA'S ANNUAL GLOBAL SECURITY INDEX RANKINGS

The Solely Military Approach of Late President Yar'Adua's Administration (2009-2010)

Late Umar Musa Yar'Adua's Administration in July 2009 marked the first response of Nigerian government to combat Boko Haram menace following the arrest and extrajudicial killings of Late Muhammad Yusuf (the then leader of group) by the Nigeria Police (Olajide, 2009). In order to improve Nigeria's international security profile following the appointment of new leader of the Boko Haram group (Abubakar Shekau) and their uprising activities in three Northern states of Nigeria (Yobe, Borno and Bauhi), the Yar'Adua's administration established a strong hard military power through kinetic operations (Solomon, 2013). This effort/response was considered by many Nigerians as a total end to Boko Haram menace without knowing there is still fire on the mountain; as a result of this, many Nigerians believed that Boko Haram menace had been completely fought. However, the illness of the late president hindered Nigerian government efforts in improving her international security profile in his administration. Based on this, the effort of

Yar'Adua's administration towards fighting Boko Haram menace cum improving Nigeria's international security profile can be considered as heavy-handed policy of solely military approach that is clumsy, insensitive and overly forceful due to extrajudicial killing of Yusuf Muhammad and many civilians and this presumably made the group to develop into a full-time insurgency.

The effort (the Solely Military Approach) of the Late President Yar'Adua's administration between 2009-2010 towards combating Boko Haram menace and as well, redeem Nigeria's international security image/profile was to no avail. Nigeria was ranked 11th and 10th by Security Threats Index (STI), in 2009 and 2010 respectively, in the list of the most threatened/least secured countries in the world (TheGlobalEconomy.com). More so, Nigeria was rated 129th out of 144 and 137th out of 149 in the list of peaceful and secured countries in the world in 2009 and 2010 respectively (Global Peace Index; 2009 and 2010). In essence, the efforts of Nigerian government towards combating Boko Haram menace between 2009 and 2010 did not improve the status of Nigeria in the annual global security rankings.

Former President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan's Administration (2010-2015)

Terrorism Preventive Act and the office of national counter-terrorism coordinator

The Goodluck Ebele Jonathan administration came into the persistent menace of Boko Haram from his predecessor (Late Umar Musa Yar'Adua). The Nigeria's security situation continued receiving international condemnation as a result of the video posted by Aljazeera captioned "Nigerian security forces shooting unarmed detainees and civilians during the 2009 uprising", following this, the United States Department of State referenced United Nations Human Fundamental Human Rights abuse by the Nigerian security personnel (Moss, 2018: P. 63).

In order to redeem Nigeria's international security profile and as well, end Boko Haram menace that has continued to gain the attention of the international community, the GEJ administration established Terrorism Preventive Act (TPA) on the 3rd of June, 2011 and the office of national counter-terrorism coordinator (Bhura, 2012). However, in few months ahead of these security measures, Boko Haram attacked the United Nations (U.N) Headquarters' building in Abuja, Nigeria and claimed many lives and properties on the 26th of August, 2011. As a result of this, Nigeria's international security profile and Boko Haram menace largely gained the attention of the international community with diverse response from the United Nations and other countries of the world (Thurston, 2011).

Extensive declaration of State of Emergency in the Northeast States of Nigeria

In an effort to improve Nigeria's international security profile that had received much condemnation by the international community, GEJ administration declared six months state of emergency in Borno, Plateau and Yobe states on the 1st of January 2012 as these areas were considered as the transit routes for the movement of Boko Haram groups (Solomon, 2013). More so, on the 13th of May 2012, another state of emergency was declared by the same administration in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states thereby sent more security forces to the North-east Nigeria in order to redeem Nigeria's international security profile battered by Boko Haram menace (BBC News, 2013).

Extension of Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and Lake Chad Basin Commission in 2012

The extension of the MNJTF and Lake Chad Basin commission to combat Boko Haram menace is one of the unique efforts of Nigerian government partnering with bordering countries to improve her international security profile. The Multi-National Joint Task Force encompasses the combination security forces from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Benin Republic and Niger. Their primary aim was to fight Boko Haram terrorist group in the Lake Chad Basin, particularly, Nigeria. However, the official approval for their operation was not granted until it was authorized by African Union (A.U) in the year 20014 (Assanvo, Abatan and Sawadogo, 2016). Despite this effort, in the late 2012, international community continued to condemn Nigeria's security situation and this was titled by the Human Rights Watch Report as "spiraling violence" (Human Rights Watch, 2012). This continued to shape Nigeria's international security profile and at the end of the year 2012, Nigeria was ranked by the Global Terrorism Index as the 7th most terrorized state in the world.

Implementation of National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) in 2014

The establishment of NACTEST was an effort to improve Nigeria's international security profile by GEJ administration and as well fight the increased Boko Haram menace. It was considered for implementation in April 2014 as a policy framework for counter-terrorism (Eji, 2016). As a security measure, it was systematized into 5 roles. The first is forestall; that is, to prevent people from becoming terrorists, the second is secure which aims at increasing safeguard against terrorist group, the third is Identify aims at preemption through discovery, while Prepare was aimed at reducing the impact of attacks from terrorism and lastly is Implement which serves as a framework for mobilizing a coordinated cross-governmental counter-terrorism efforts (Eji, 2016).

Most of the polices implemented during GEJ administration towards combating Boko Haram menace can be considered as extra-rigid and unyielding military approach. The frequent deployment of Nigeria Police and Military personnel to the affected states in Northeast gave the Boko Haram group more access to ammunitions as the Nigeria's security forces were sometimes overpowered by the group. More so, the frequent declaration of state of emergency by the administration resulted to civilian isolation and vulnerability, and as a result, many schools were shut-down, markets became closed, most of their major roads were blocked, internal displacement of people increased and Boko Haram attacks became almost daily activities. Furthermore, the inability of the GEJ administration to adequately respond Nigeria's security by fighting Boko Haram menace presumably led to the failure of his re-election in 2015.

In essence, the various efforts made by GEJ administration between 2010 and 2015 towards combating Boko Haram menace cum was to no avail as it did not yield any significant positive result. In 2012, 2014 and 2015, Nigeria was ranked 7th 4th and 3rd respectively in the list of the most terrorized countries in the world by Global Terrorism Index (GTI) (GTI; 2012, 2014 and 2015). More so, Security Threats Index (STI) rated Nigeria 10th, 12th, 11th, 11th, 7th and 5th in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively in the list of the most security threatened countries in the world (TheGlobalEconomy.com). Similarly, Global Peace Index (GPI) rated Nigeria 137th, 142nd, 146th, 148th, 151st and 151st in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively in the ranking of peaceful and secured countries in the world (GPI; 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014 and 2015).

President Muhammad Buhari's Administration

Replacement of the Head of Nigeria's Security Institutions and purchase of military and security technologies

One of the key policy statements of President Muhammad Buhari (PMB) during his campaign towards 2015 presidential election was to strengthen Nigerian security system by eradicating Boko Haram menace which had been a major threat to Nigeria's international security profile in his predecessor (GEJ) administration. As a result of this, PMB administration replaced the head of Nigerian security forces which includes the Nigeria Army, The Nigeria Navy and the Nigeria Air Force and also shifted their command centre from Abuja to Borno State (Maiduguri) few weeks after he was sworn-in as the President in May 2015 (Blanchard, 2014). More so, in the first year of his administration, PMB largely spent a lot on military and security technologies which include drones, Closed-circuit television (CCTV) among others in the major cities in the North-East Nigeria (Moss, 2018).

PMB frequent consultation/security-related visits to the International Community and approval of 1billion USD

In order to combat Boko Haram menace, PMB first visited the bordering countries and member states of the MNJTF coalition between July and August 2015. This effort was considered by other member states as new impetus to the task force (Assanvo et al, 2018). More so, in July 2015, he made an effort to redeem the military relationship between Nigeria and the United States which had been previously battered by Boko Haram menace, therefore he wrote an article in the Washington Post calling the attention of the international community, particularly, the United States to grant and supply military intelligence and training in eradicating Boko Haram menace in Nigeria. PMB equally visited the G7 (United Kingdom, United States, Iran, South Africa, Malta, Ghana and India) towards fighting Boko Haram terrorism (Obayuwana, 2015). The President also travelled to Turkey to encourage her partnership in fighting Boko Haram. In December 2017, the National Economic Council (NEC) granted an approval 1billion USD to PMB administration to fight Boko Haram terrorist group (Etakibueba, 2017).

However, despite all these efforts, Nigeria was ranked 3rd most terrorized state by the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 respectively (GTI; 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018). Consequently, the inability of PMB's administration to adequately fight the menace of Boko Haram as a once military head of state in Nigeria, many Nigerians named the president 'Baba Go Slow'. This means that PMB administrative lacks quick decision making in response to the issues of Boko Haram cum insecurities in the country and this has made some members of some geo-political zones such as Oduduwa, IPOB among others, called for secession.

Approval and establishments of Regional Security Outfits (Operation Amotekun)

In bid to fight terrorism among other many security challenges. Western Nigeria Security Network (WNSN) popularly known as Operation Amotekun was established on January 9, 2020 through Development Agenda for Western Nigeria Commission (DAWN), after many series of controversies between the Federal government of Nigeria and the governors of the South-West states of Nigeria; Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Ondo and Osun State (Ojelu, 2020). Operation Amotekun aimed at protecting South-West region and other Yoruba speaking areas of the country as a result of the high level of insecurity in Nigeria cum incapability of Nigerian government to adequately respond to the insecurity issues in the areas of terrorism, kidnapping, herdsmen/farmers contention, armed robbery among others. However, this effort had been criticized by Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) as duplication of responsibilities and misplaced priorities that may lead to disunity of the country (Aliyu et al, 2020).

Efforts made during President Muhammad Buhari’s Administration (2015-2019) include replacement of the Head of Nigeria’s Security Institutions and purchase of military and security technologies, PMB frequent consultation/security-related visits to the International Community and approval of 1billion USD, approval and establishments of Regional Security Outfits (Operation Amotekun) among others. Nevertheless, all the responses/efforts made by PMB administration were to no avail as Nigeria maintained five (5) consecutive years of terrible security status in the ranking of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) in 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 as the 3rd most terrorized country in the world (GTI; 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019). More so, in 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019, Security Threats Index (STI) ranked Nigeria 5th, 5th, 9th, 15th and 9th respectively in the list of the most security threatened countries cum least secured countries in the world (TheGlobalEconomy.com) while Global Peace Index (GPI) ranked Nigeria 151st, 149th, 149th, 148th and 148th in 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 respectively (GPI; 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019).

In a nutshell, all the foregoing rankings gathered from various annual global security index reports revealed that the efforts of Nigeria government in three (3) different regimes towards combating Boko Haram menace did not improve Nigeria’s status in the annual global security rankings between 2009 and 2019.

Efforts of International Community towards combating Boko Haram cum improving Nigeria’s international security profile

Table 2: Combined efforts of Nigerian government and the International community towards fighting Boko Haram menace.

Countries/International Organization	Efforts in improving Nigeria’s International Security Profile
The United Kingdom (U.K)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.K increased British security forces from 125 to 300 personnel to give military training and also advise Nigeria military in 2015. • Provision of 5million Pounds for the MNJTF in 2016 • Provision of 25million USD as emergence assistance package in 2017
The United States (U.S)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Granted Nigeria 5million USD as a support in fighting Boko Haram in 2015 • Donation of 24 mine-resistant armoured vehicles worth 11million USD in the early 2016
The United Nations (U.N)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.N. ordered her member states to donate 1.5billion USD as humanitarian aids to Nigeria and 3 other countries battling with terrorism • The U.N implemented resolution 2349 that condemned Boko Haram menace and encouraged regional military cooperation in March 2017.
European Union (E.U)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • E.U. approved 58.2 million Euros as humanitarian aid to the countries affected by Boko Haram menace which Nigeria was included in July 2016 • In September 2017, E.U. also donated 50million euros to MNJTF
African Union (A.U.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Endorsement and reactivation of MNJTF by the A.U’s committee on peace and security in 2014 • Formal authorization and deployment of MNJTF for a year and recommendation of about 7,500 security personnel in Lake Chad Basin
France	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provision of military intelligence and support to the Nigeria Army • As at 2015, France had donated about 30million Euros to Lake Chad Basin in fighting Boko Haram and to refugees/IDP camps
Israel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Israel released her counter-terrorism experts to assist Nigeria in locating the abducted Chibok girls by Boko Haram group.

Source: European Commission (2019), European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (2016), Gueguen (2017), Moss (2018), Griffin (2016), MacAskill (2015), Duddridge, and Hurd (2016), Robertson (2017), BBC News (2015), Opejobi (2016), United Nations Security Council (2017) and Goodwill (2014).

The table 2 showed the various efforts of the International Community in conjunction with Nigerian government towards combating Boko Haram menace. The table unveils that Nigerian government has received various aids in terms of money, intelligence supports and military assistance from the international community towards fighting Boko Haram menace. This is an indication that the Nigerian government with the aid of international community has done lots in combating Boko Haram menace; In spite of all these responses, the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria has not manifested in Nigeria’s status in the annual global ranking.

Impediments to war against Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria

The struggle against Boko Haram group may have been subjected to some challenges which have not made the war against the menace, a successful one. Subsequently, many of the literature reviewed have pointed out factors such as corruption, inadequate supply of military weapons cum military personnel internal problems, low military intelligence, violations of human rights, the perception of Boko Haram menace as internal security problem by the Nigerian government, porosity of border among others.

As observed in Congressional Research Service (2020: P. 11), unchecked corruption among other issue of accountability concerns has undermined the response of Nigerian government towards combating Boko Haram terrorism and other security challenges; as noted “decades of unchecked corruption have hollowed out the Nigerian military and security services and rendered them unable to effectively combat Boko Haram or address ethno-religious conflict”. From this assertion, the prevalent corrupt practices in Nigeria have been one of the major factors preventing the efforts of Nigerian government towards combating Boko Haram terrorism.

More so, but beyond the issue of corruption, Munshi (2018) reported shortages of military equipments and low military intelligence as the bane to the success of counter-terrorism operations in Nigeria. As noted in the report, Boko Haram group has looted weapons and materials in repeated raids on military facilities. Similarly, Anyadike (2018) maintained that Nigeria military personnel have being deployed for extended periods without rotation. In view of the scholars, inadequate military weapons have negatively affected the troop morale and discipline, based on this fact; weak military intelligence and lack of sophisticated weapons have been the major challenges confronting Nigeria in the struggle against terrorism.

Similarly, a report by Zounmenou and Kane (2014) affirmed that Nigeria Army and security forces are facing internal problems which have contributed largely to the Nigerian government’s weak response to Boko Haram menace. In view of the scholars, in some cases, the Boko Haram members’ firepower exceeded that of the Nigerian military thereby making the security forces to run for their lives rather and safety than protecting the territory.

A report by the State Department’s 2019 human rights cited in Congressional Research International (2020) pointed documented accounts of arbitrary killings of civilians by the Nigerian security forces in struggle against Boko Haram menace. Attentions have also centered on human rights abuses exhibited by the militaries during counter-terrorism operations which have manifested in the execution of hundreds of civilians cum arbitrary detained of thousands. From this point of view cum perspective, the extrajudicial killing of the civilians by the Nigerian security forces in their struggle against Boko Haram menace has resulted to violation of United Nations Universal Human Rights, this might have contributed to the withdrawal of military weapons by the foreign government particularly, the United States in the struggle against Boko Haram terrorism as the International Community cum organizations cherish human lives. More so, Maza, Koldas and Aksit (2020: P. 9) observed that low intelligence cum lack of scientific monitoring systems by relevant stakeholders towards monitoring, tracking and preventing the flow of funds of Boko Haram group have all affected the security measure aimed towards combating the group. The scholars equally pointed out the absence of a well-structured counter-terrorism strategy as another factor affecting the struggle of Nigerian government in combating the group. More so, Amnesty International (2018) reported that the military personnel have raped and sexually harassed women and girls who include detainees and internally displaced persons. Consequently, these human rights abuses have discouraged the United States counter-terrorism cooperation with the Nigerian military. Put differently, Zounmenou and Kane (2014) affirmed that for a long time, Nigerian government viewed Boko Haram menace as a domestic problem and insisted that a domestic approach to tackle it. In this view, Nigeria has always believed in herself in dealing with her own internal security problems. From the assertion, it is evident that Nigerian government had for a long time relied on her military capacity alone in dealing Boko Haram menace rather cooperating with the International Community.

The reports by Onuoah (2013) and Ramdeen (2017) pointed out border porosity as a great threat that has been limiting Nigeria’s efforts towards combating Boko Haram menace. In view of the scholars, Boko Haram group has taken the advantage of absence of national, sub-regional and regional policy regarding the control of border and this has consequently created an avenue for Boko Haram group to fund and recruit its members from bordering countries, particularly across the Lake Chad regions. More so, Maza, Koldas and Aksit (2020) while emphasizing the problems facing Nigeria in her struggle against Boko Haram terrorism, pointed out inability cum failure of Nigerian government to identify and tackle the Boko Haram financing source/aid. From the assertions, it is evident that the inability of Nigerian government to figure out the financial sponsors of the group has posed a serious challenge to the struggle against the group in Nigeria. Thus, unless Nigerian elites implement counter-terrorism financial source/aids, the country would not be making any meaningful effort in the fight against Boko Haram menace.

CONCLUSION

The major motivation for the paper is to determine whether the responses of Nigerian government towards combating Boko Haram menace have improved Nigeria’s status in the annual global security index rankings. From the investigation, it is evident that the various responses/efforts of Nigerian government and in conjunction with the International Community towards combating the

menace of Boko Haram had no significant effect on her annual global security index ranking in the reviewed years. Nigeria was ranked 5 years (2015-2019) consecutively as the 3rd most terrorized country in the world (GPI, 2015-2019) among other similar reports. Thus, the efforts of Nigerian government in three (3) different regimes towards combating Boko Haram menace were to no avail as none of the responses has significantly improved Nigeria's status in the global security-based rankings.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on findings, the paper recommended the following:

- ❖ There is an urgent need for Nigerian government to integrate its resources cum synergizes militarily with the bordering countries towards fighting Boko Haram group out of their region rather than chasing them to one another's bordering countries. This will enable them to completely fight out Boko Haram group in their sub-region.
- ❖ Nigerian government should securitize and control what goes into the internet concerning the security of the nation as this has become a major signal to the global community that the country is unsafe thereby contributed to its security status disrepute/poor rankings.
- ❖ The Nigerian legislators should be placed on a part-time job and be directly working from their senatorial districts cum constituent units rather than Federal Capital Territory (Abuja). This will enable them to feel the direct impact of terrorism in the localities (particularly, in the North-east Nigeria), thereby come up with an urgent and immediate solution to the menace.

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