

Foreign Interests and Armed Conflict in Yemen

Ameen Mohammed Ali Alabsi¹, Abeera Odetha Katuramu², Moreen Twikirize³

1. Postgraduate student, Kampala International University

2. Senior Lecturer of International relations & Diplomacy, Department of Political and Administrative studies, Kampala International University

3. Graduate student, Kampala International University (Masters in International Relations and Diplomatic Studies)

Abstract: *This paper aimed at examining the impact of foreign interests in the armed conflict in Yemen. Descriptive correlational research design was used where it employed both quantitative and qualitative approaches to aid in collection of quality data. The target population of the paper was 120 individuals and it comprised of 11 Officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yemen, 12 Iranian delegates in Yemen, 10 Saudi Arabian delegates in Yemen, 5 UAE delegates in Yemen, 30 Political analysts in Yemen and 52 Peasants representatives in Yemen (Conflict Hit areas). The sample size of the paper consists of 92 of target population as calculated by Slovene's formula (1978) and was determined through purposive and random sampling methods. The paper found a strong and positive significant relationship between Government Forces backed by Saudi-led coalition and Yemen Armed Conflict. There is strong and positive significant relationship with a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.686 and its significance stood at 0.000. This shows that it rejects hypothesis and thus indicating a strong and positive significant relationship between Houthi Armed Groups backed by Iran and Yemen Armed Conflict. The conclusion that Saudi Arabia's interest in Yemen began in the early 1920s with attempts to control Yemen's myriad tribes and secure its outer borders was drawn. In 1948, Saudi Arabia provided aid to Imam Ahmed fearing the "constitutional" republicans' revolts uprising in Yemen and in 1994 Saudi provided support to the southern separates to divide again the country after the unification in 1990. It further concludes that the UAE has been a dominant partner in the coalition Saudi Arabia assembled following an official request by Yemen's internationally recognized government to help it avoid a Houthi takeover, but UAE plays a forceful role on the ground and its allies in the south of Yemen. Finally the paper recommends that, more channels of communication must be opened with newly emergent actors and those traditionally marginalized by Yemen's political establishment. It also recommends that there should also be a focus on preserving what remains of state institutions.*

Keywords: Armed Conflict, Yemen Unification, Exploitation, Legitimacy, Consolidate, Evade, Revolt, Grass-root organizations, interim government, Resign, Secession, Fragmentation, Anarchy, Refugees.

INTRODUCTION

This paper was carried from Yemen. The area was chosen because of the humanitarian crisis in the country that has been ignored for some time despite the existence of foreign interests in Yemeni Conflict, further still the research area was chosen because the researcher was familiar with the background of the country. Yemen is located at the South-West corner of Arabian Peninsula in Western Asia. It is the second-largest Arab sovereign state in the peninsula. The coastline stretches about 2,000 kilometers. It is bordered by Saudi Arabia to the north, the Red Sea to the west, the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea to the south and Oman to the east. Yemen's territory includes more than 20 islands. Yemen is a member of Arab League, United Nations, Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

The paper focused on the impact of Government Forces backed by Saudi-led coalition in the armed conflict in Yemen, impact of Southern Separates backed by U.A.E in the armed conflict in Yemen and impact of Houthi Armed Groups backed by Iran in the armed conflict in Yemen.

The paper covered information from 2011-2018. This timeframe was chosen because it was the most severe armed conflict period because of foreign actor's direct negative involvement particularly Saudi Arabia, UAE and Iran.

The history, culture, economy and population of Yemen have all been influenced by the country's strategic location at south-west entrance of Arabian Peninsula "Red Sea, Arabian Sea and Aden Gulf" as a crossroads of trade and communications routes through controlling over Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Being the location of several ancient kingdoms such Sheba, Hadramout, Qataban, and Ma'in, Yemen was known to the ancient Romans as Arabia Felix (Latin: "Fortunate Arabia") both ancient and modern world powers made hard effort to seek control over Yemen".

The Ottoman Empire had taken control over North Yemen in the 1500-1917, and has been ruling from Sana'a as a capital, thereafter Zaydi Imams were the spiritual rulers of that area particularly from the departure of the Turks in 1917 until 1962, whilst the British sought to gain influence over South Yemen and captured Aden city in 1839-1967. This tension between the British and the Ottomans-Zaydi powers was birth of official division between North and South Yemen" (Brehony, 2011).

The present Republic of Yemen came into being in May 1990, when Yemen Arab Republic YAR (North Yemen) merged with People's Democratic Republic of Yemen PDRY (South Yemen). By stipulation of the unification agreement, Sanaa, formerly the capital of North Yemen functions as the political capital, while Aden, formerly the capital of South Yemen" functions as the Economic Center. Yemen Unification is generally seen as the result of need for agreement on exploitation of new found oil resources, as well as the weakening of the Southern state of Yemen following the collapse of Soviet Union and their growing crisis of legitimacy following a civil war in 1986 (Dingli, 2013). Unification was entered with members of YAR having upper hand, particularly former President Ali Abdallah Saleh who consolidated his power by taking over the presidency of the Republic of Yemen in 1990.

The beginnings of the current armed conflict can be traced to the sparks that lit the smoldering civil war fought between the two Yemeni forces of the Pro-Union Northern and Southern separates Yemeni states and their supporters on May–July 1994. The war resulted in defeat of southern armed forces, reunification of Yemen and the flight into exile of many Yemen Social Party leaders “ former President of PDRY Ali Salem al Beidh was among them and other separatists.

The crackdown of President Saleh's government on the so-called Believing Youth - part of Zaydi-Shiite community and later known as Houthis “ Ansar Allah” (Winter 2011). Their leader, Hussain Al Houthi, evaded arrest and the government crackdown that ensued led to further clashes between government forces and his followers in Sada'a region resulted his death in 2004. Several severe armed clashes broke out between the two sides, and unrest continued to grow, interrupted by periods of unstable peace brokered by Qatar and fueled by Saudi Arabia's involvement in 2009 against Houthi positions along their border with Yemen (Winter, 2011). 2011's events brought an unprecedented wave of revolt and change across the Middle East. After Arab Spring, an opportunity for real reform in Yemen seemed within grasp (Dingli, 2013).

The combination of youth revolts and grassroots organizations calling for change at a time of growing opposition within the government against President , the momentum was growing for this wave of change to put out the fires of unrest in Yemen. This led to President Saleh signing Gulf Cooperation Council's initiative granting him immunity, in exchange for him standing down and establishing an interim government which would restructure military and draft a new government by 2014. However, the potential promise of this wave of change quickly fell flat, with many remarking that this appeared to have been a “change in names and faces, but not in substance” (Dingli, 2013). Furthermore, underdevelopment and lack of governmental control in the North were not resolved” (Lewis, 2013).

Seizure of Sana'a on 21 December 2014, by the Houthis supported by forces allied with former President Saleh, the Houthis significantly extended control over territory in Yemen. Following the Houthi takeover, President Hadi resigned in January 2015. However, he rescinded his resignation after fleeing to Aden in February 2015, He fled the country in March 2015 after the Houthis advanced towards Aden. The day after he fled the country, claiming upon his request, an international coalition led by Saudi Arabia initiated airstrikes against Houthis rebels in Yemen. Since then, Hadi has reportedly been residing in exile in K.S.A.”

“The Houthis have responded to Saudi airstrikes with missile attacks on Saudi infrastructure, territory, including oil tankers, facilities and international airports. The secessionist groups in south Yemen supported by UAE attacked the legitimate government forces based in Aden which further complicated the current armed conflict. Due to crucial crisis in Yemen, the country descended into fragmentation and anarchy, the ongoing conflict has effectively forced many of Yemen's long underlying crises to the surface. The country finds itself riven by sectarian tension, with no single center of control and facing a widespread famine (Browning, 2015). All of this has left the nation on the verge of dissolution”.

“The conflict in Yemen between the Houthis and the internationally recognized government represents a larger conflict between the regional backers of both sides, namely Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two major rivals in the Middle East region. Although not directly involved, the United States remains in the background of the Yemeni picture, for U.S. President Donald Trump, who withdrew from a Western-Iranian nuclear deal and restored sanctions on Iran, supports Washington's major regional ally Saudi Arabia in its military campaign against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen” (Xinhua, 2018).

Background of the study

A foreign interest is defined as any of the following: - A foreign government, foreign government agency, or representative of a foreign government; - Any form of business enterprise or legal entity organized, chartered or incorporated under the laws of any country (Felicia et al, 2015).

“An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year. In a

growing number of armed conflicts, armed bands, militia or factions engage in criminal activity (e.g., theft, looting, extortion) in order to fund their political/military campaigns, but frequently also for the personal enrichment of the leadership and the general livelihood of the fighting forces(Hatem, 2012).

After years of conflict, Yemen is on the verge of absolute collapse. Institutions across the country are falling apart, while a plethora of armed groups have taken advantage of the power vacuum to claim leadership over key territories, leading to even greater fragmentation of the country (Hatem, 2012). The conflict, and the accompanying Saudi-led intervention, has caused the worst humanitarian crisis in the globe. Yemen is facing a lost generation as millions of Yemeni children grow up without an education or food. Failure has turned Yemen into a hub of globally oriented terror groups and should spurred a new wave of refugees into Europe and other stable countries”(Hatem, 2016).

Europe’s current approach in Yemen’s armed conflict is defined by acquiescence towards belligerent actors or relative non-action (Hatem, 2016). At a moment when the United States is likely to pull back from any meaningful engagement in resolving the conflict, European states need to step up the role in resolving the conflict and there is no state to prevent it. Such deterioration is on the near horizon, and would have troubling implications for both the region, particularly given the possibility of Yemen emerging as a hub for new globally orientated terrorism activities (Hatem, 2016). Iran has been aiding the Houthis political insurgency, for increased power and influence (Mohammed, 2016). Thus, the gravest humanitarian crisis in Yemen worsens as a byproduct of an international battle fought on Yemeni soil. Even though the situation on ground reflects deep-seated tensions between warring groups, conflict severity is greatly augmented by foreign military support. It was in this aspect the researcher aimed at examining the foreign interests and armed conflict in Yemen.

Statement of the Problem

Yemen has been engaged in an internal tension since the Iran-backed Houthi Group, who overthrew internationally recognized President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi and seized by military forces over the most of Yemen provinces in September 2014, including the political capital Sanaa and the economic capital Aden. Whilst K.S.A backed by U.S.A and UK claims to support the legitimate government forces where in fact it supports the terrorist groups along with the head of tribes and some certain military commanders loyal to Saudi and has been playing a crucial role in weakening the Yemeni State for decades through its clear influence in most sovereign decisions in order to prevent Yemen from becoming prosperous or stable. In the other side U.A. E provides military and logistic supports to the southern separates in order to divide the country and guarantee own interests. For more than five years since Saudi-led coalition launched the military operation against Houthi, they failed to restore neither the government nor peace.

Worse enough, the intervotionalists like UAE, Iran and the Saudi Arabia as free opened areas have used Yemen’s territories for regional conflicting interests and ambitions that led to a devastating internal armed conflict that has been escalated into international and regional armed conflict whose settlement is in the hands of concerned external parties rather than Yemen herself. Though the horrors of current situation, there is still hope for peace and stability through the UN’s efforts to bring conflict parties to the negotiation table in order to resolve the current crisis. Nonetheless, violence and destruction in Yemen currently remains entangled in a larger battle of competing foreign interests (Millis, 2015). Namely, Saudi-led coalition supported primarily by U.S.A and U.K have been fighting to restore the legitimacy of the Hadi government, but questions remain as to ulterior motives and objectives in this fight. Hence, this paper seeks to investigate the impact of foreign interests in the armed conflict in Yemen.

Purpose of the paper

The purpose of the paper was to investigate the impact of foreign interests in the armed conflict in Yemen.

Specific Objectives

- i. To investigate the impact of Government Forces backed by Saudi-led coalition in the armed conflict in Yemen.
- ii. To ascertain the impact of Southern separates backed by U.A.E in the armed conflict in Yemen.
- iii. To assess the impact of Houthi Armed Groups backed by Iran in the armed conflict in Yemen.


LITERATURE REVIEW

The paper was based on the World System analysis theory developed by Immanuel Wallenstein beginning in the 1970s, as an approach to world history and social change that suggests there is a global economic-political system in which some countries benefit while others have been exploited, to understand state's behavior we need to know well their circumstances, experiences, and culture”(Osama, 2018).

Wallenstein asserts that on a global scale, some countries will always be dependent on others and that the relationship of dependence has long been established by a cycle of colonization and subsequent recolonization (Pestano, 2016). World systems theory criticizes theories of modernization, which assert a single, positive direction of economic development for all participating nations. By viewing the world as one system, with a small, powerful group of wealthy core nations dominating other nation-states, Wallenstein overcomes some of the criticisms associated with modernization, especially its unwarranted optimism. Foreign interests aim to change in state's existing policy or continuation of its behavior at different times as they serve the domestic and international strategic objectives. (MahendraKumar, "Theoretical Aspects of International Politics")

Conceptual Framework showing independent and dependent variables

The conceptual framework diagrammatically shows the effect of the different variables in the paper. The independent variable is perceived as foreign interests and dependent variable is armed conflict.



Source: Adopted from: Pestano, (2016) and modified by the researcher.

From the above Conceptual framework, it is clear that Foreign interests as an Independent variable (as measured by Government Forces backed by Saudi-led coalition, Southern Separates backed by U.A.E and Houthi Armed Groups backed by Iran) and the dependent variable as the armed conflict (as measured by Armed Conflict, Air Strike, Terror attacks, Insecurity and Insurgency). However, there also moderating factors like international-Regional community and National community participation.

Research gap

There are numerous studies conducted on foreign interests within Yemen armed conflict however none of them clarifies how the conflict can be effectively addressed by highlighting the impacts of foreign interests and involvements in the current armed conflict. For instance, Shaheen (2015) conducted a paper in Yemen and revealed that the Saudi-led military alliance aims to reinstate Hadi as president and to put down the Houthi rebellion. However, after several weeks of air strikes, the military balance remains largely

unchanged. Another paper conducted in Yemen was by Millis, (2015) discovered that the links between the extremist groups and the political parties needs to be further researched, as this is important in any political settlement to the conflict. The research carried out by the Hatem, (2016) is very important for gauging the population's perception on a number of issues. However, from the researchers view, they do not assess the population's perception on positive contributions by the extremist groups, which is important in order to counter the rise of extremism in Yemen (Snyder, 2016). Lastly, there is limited research on successful or unsuccessful Counter Violent Extremism programs in Yemen and more research is necessary to identify potential areas for success, as well as to identify past mistakes.

METHODOLOGY

The paper used a descriptive correlational research design. That's it employed both quantitative and qualitative approaches to aid in collection of quality data. This paper design approach was used because it brings out clearly the effect of the two variables. The paper was specifically non-experimental because the researcher wanted to describe and make observations of what the real results would be for purposes of making decisions based on the facts to improve the situation.

Paper population

The target population was 120 and it comprised of 11 Officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yemen, 12 Iranian delegates in Yemen, 10 Saudi Arabian delegates in Yemen, 5 UAE delegates in Yemen, 30 Political analysts in Yemen and 52 local residents in Yemen (Conflict Hit areas). The rationale was that all the above are stakeholders. Target population refers to the cumulative elements of paper from an environment in which information was gathered from.

Data analysis

The data involved information from the questionnaires only. Data from the field was too raw for proper interpretation. It was therefore vital to put it into order and structure it, so as to drive meaning and information from it. The raw data obtained from questionnaires were sorted and coded. The coded data was entered into the Computer, checked and statistically analyzed using the statistical package for social scientists (SPSS) software package to generate descriptive and inferential statistics. Descriptive analysis was applied to describe the primary variable and associated indicator items related to the paper objectives.

The Pearson product correlation Co-efficient analysis was used to test the relationship among the variables and regression coefficient models to determine the extent to which the independent variables impacts on the dependent variable. The results were presented in form of tables then discussed in relation to existing literature. Conclusion and recommendations were drawn in relation to the set objectives of the paper.

Data Processing

The data obtained from the questionnaire was double checked to make sure that the information provided was complete, consistent, reliable, and accurate. Data processing involved scrutiny of the responses given on the questionnaires by different respondents. Data was sorted, edited, and interpreted. The coding and tabulation of the data was obtained from the paper then was followed. To achieve data quality management, the questionnaires were tested on 10 respondents. This was done to test consistency and to ensure that instruments remain consistent over time.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

The respondents were given questionnaires and their responses were captured as seen in the table below.

Table 4. 1: Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

Gender	Frequency	Percent (%)
Male	55	64.0
Female	31	36.0

Total	86	100.0
Age		
20-29	13	15.1
30-39	19	22.1
40-49	54	62.8
Total	86	100.0
Education Level		
Masters	10	11.6
Bachelor's degree	51	59.3
Diploma	20	23.3
Certificate	5	5.8
Others	0	0.0
Total	86	100.0

Source: Primary Data (2020)

The results illustrated in the Table 4.1 indicate that male was 55(64%) and remaining 31(36%) were female. This implies that majority of the respondents were men. This is believed to have been due to the societal attitude that men are more hardworking and committed than their female counterparts at work

It is evident that Table 4.1 indicate that 13(15.1%) were 19-25 years, 19(22.1%) were 26-30 years and 54(62.8%) were 31-45 years. This implies that majority of the respondents were aged adults between 31-45 years of age. This furthermore indicates that most of people in this age bracket have a mature approach and understanding of issues.

It was also revealed in the Table 4.1 above that 10(11.6%) were master's degree holders, 51(59.3%) were bachelor's degree holders, 20(23.3%) were diploma holders, 5(5.8%) were certificate holders and none were in others category. This implies that majority of the respondents were at bachelor's degree level who were believed to informed about foreign interests and armed conflict in Yemen and thus had a proper understanding of the paper topic.

Descriptive Statistics for Foreign Interests

This section presents the results on the major findings of the paper constructs mainly foreign interests in terms of Government Forces backed by Saudi-led coalition, Southern Separates backed by U.A.E and Houthi Armed Groups backed by Iran. On a range of 5-1, the following abbreviations were adopted: Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Don't Know (DN), Disagree (D), and Strongly Disagree (SD). The findings are presented in table 4.2 below.

Table 4. 2: Foreign interests

Foreign interests	SD (%)	D (%)	DN (%)	A (%)	SA (%)	Mean	Std. Dev
Government Forces backed by Saudi-led coalition							
K.S.A sees conflict in Yemen as its struggle with IRAN and aims to blunt Iranian power and reduce its dominance in the region	9(10.5%)	11(12.8%)	20(23.3%)	30(34.9%)	16(18.6%)	4.02	0.922
Saudi Arabia is interested in Yemen cause the access to Arab Sea, Bab el-Mandeb strait, as main gateway for exporting oil.	8(9.3%)	3(3.5%)	17(19.8%)	38(44.2%)	20(23.3%)	3.91	1.072
Saudi Arabia's interest in Yemen is to control Yemen's wealth of Oil & Gaz and secure its outer borders.	3(3.5%)	5(5.8%)	20(23.3%)	38(44.2%)	20(23.3%)	3.86	1.029
Saudi-led coalition failed to achieve objectives in Yemen	3(3.5%)	1(1.2%)	20(23.3%)	35(40.7%)	27(31.4%)	3.77	1.076

and caused the worst humanitarian crisis in the world							
Saudi Arabia seems reluctant to put their full energies into the war on terrorism in Yemen	6(7.0%)	10(11.6%)	13(15.1%)	34(39.5%)	23(26.7%)	3.26	1.173
Average Mean						3.76	1.054
Southern Separates backed by U.A. E							
UAE is scaling back Iranian influence and cutting off Iran's access to the Arab world	3(3%)	9(10.5%)	19(22.1%)	30(34.9%)	25(29.1%)	4.00	1.013
UAE is interested to control over south of Yemen in particularly Aden and Belhaf Ports, Socotra Island for securing its own trade networks	5(5.8%)	5(5.8%)	14(16.3%)	40(46.5%)	22(25.6%)	3.97	1.031
UAE aims to divide Yemen by support southern separatists	8(9.3%)	3(3.5%)	14(16.3%)	36(41.9%)	25(29.1%)	3.90	0.976
UAE claims that they are fighting against terrorist in Yemen	5(5.8%)	5(5.8%)	17(19.8%)	25(29.1%)	34(39.5%)	3.82	1.148
UAE conduct its own interest out of Saudi led coalition's objectives	3(3.5%)	5(5.8%)	26(30.2%)	30(34.9%)	22(25.6%)	3.69	0.740
Average Mean						3.92	0.972
Houthi Armed Groups backed by Iran							
Iran provides weapons to the Houthis in violation of U.N. arms embargo	6(7.0%)	5(5.8%)	23(26.7%)	31(36.0%)	21(24.4%)	3.66	0.837
Iran looks at Yemen as a key point of interest to strengthen its status in the region and face its rival regional and international powers	9(10.5%)	6(7.0%)	15(17.4%)	29(33.7%)	27(31.4%)	3.65	0.816
Iran strives to play an active role in Yemen, relying hard power represented by pragmatic, sectarian, and ideological considerations	4(4.7%)	8(9.3%)	12(14.0%)	36(41.9%)	26(30.2%)	3.47	0.871
Iran aims through its activities in Yemen to accomplish more influence in Yemen because of its distinct strategic location and natural resources.	11(12.8%)	8(9.3%)	15(17.4%)	23(26.7%)	29(33.7%)	3.44	0.968
Iran believes that through its alliance with the Houthis in Yemen, it can greatly increase its influence and dominance in the region	2(2.3%)	5(5.8%)	31(36.0%)	24(27.9%)	24(27.9%)	3.42	0.952
Average Mean						3.47	0.941

Source: Primary Data (2020)

Table 4.2 revealed that the practice of foreign interests in Yemen was assessed by the respondents as satisfactory (overall average mean=3.71, Std=0.989). This was attributed to the fact that all the measures of foreign interests such as Government Forces backed by Saudi-led coalition, Southern Separates backed by U.A. E, and Houthi Armed Groups backed by Iran were all assessed as

satisfactory. For instance, Government Forces backed by Saudi-led coalition was assessed by the respondents as satisfactory (average mean=3.76, Std=1.054). This was attributed to the fact that majority of the respondents agreed that K.S.A sees conflict in Yemen as its struggle with IRAN and aims to blunt Iranian power and reduce its dominance in the region (mean=4.02, Std=0.922). In addition, respondents agreed that Saudi Arabia is interested in Yemen cause the access to Arab Sea, Bab el-Mandeb strait, as main gateway for exporting oil (mean=3.91, Std=1.072). Similarly, respondents agreed that Saudi Arabia's interest in Yemen is to control Yemen's wealth of Oil & Gaz and secure its outer borders. (mean=3.86, Std=1.029). Likewise, respondents agreed that Saudi-led coalition failed to achieve objectives in Yemen and caused the worst humanitarian crisis in the world (mean=3.77, Std=1.076). However, respondents were doubtful that Saudi Arabia seems reluctant to put their full energies into the war on terrorism in Yemen (mean=3.26, Std=1.173). The above responses imply that the causes of Yemen war are due to the lack of reforms after the Yemeni Arab Spring in 2011. She states that it is the political and economic systems that are at the center of the crisis and that this should not be forgotten.

Furthermore, table 4.2 revealed that Southern Separates backed by U.A. E was assessed by the respondents as satisfactory (average mean=3.92, Std=0.973). This was attributed to the fact that majority of the respondents agreed that UAE is scaling back Iranian influence and cutting off Iran's access to the Arab world (mean =4.00, Std= 1.013), UAE is interested to control over south of Yemen in particularly Aden and Belhaf Ports, Socotra Island for securing its own trade networks (Mean=3.97, Std=1.031), UAE aims to divide Yemen by support southern separatists (Mean=3.90, Std=0.976), UAE claims that they are fighting against terrorist in Yemen (Mean=3.82, Std= 1.148), UAE conduct its own interest out of Saudi led coalition's objectives (Mean=3.69, Std=0.740). This implies that the UAE concentrates its efforts on southern and central Yemen. A combination of ground troops and UAE-trained forces, such as the Security Belt in Aden and the surroundings and the Special Forces in Hadramawt, have allowed the Emirates to exert indirect control over territories in the South (some observers refer to this development as a new form of colonialism).

Moreover, table 4.2 revealed that Houthi Armed Groups backed by Iran was assessed by the respondents as satisfactory (average mean=3.45, Std=0.941). This was attributed to the fact that majority of the respondents agreed that Iran provides weapons to the Houthis in violation of U.N. arms embargo (mean=3.66, Std=0.837), Iran looks at Yemen as a key point of interest to strengthen its status in the region and face its rival regional and international powers (mean=3.65, Std=0.816), Iran strives to play an active role in Yemen, relying hard power represented by pragmatic, sectarian, and ideological considerations (mean=3.47, Std=0.871), Iran aims through its activities in Yemen to accomplish more influence in Yemen because of its distinct strategic location and natural resources (mean=3.44, Std=0.968), and Iran believes that through its alliance with the Houthis in Yemen, it can greatly increase its influence and dominance in the region (mean=3.12, Std=1.305). he above responses imply that Houthis who refer to themselves as Ansar Allah [partisans of God], are a Zaydi armed group originating from the rural northern highlands of Sa'da, bordering Saudi-Arabia, and named after the al-Huthi family, which leads the group politically and spiritually. The group has its roots in the increasing religious tensions of the 1980s and 1990s, when the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood originating from central Yemen, Salafi groups supported by Saudi Arabia, and the central government began promoting Sunni Islam in the Zaydi Yemeni highlands.

Descriptive Statistics for Yemen Armed Conflict

This section presents results on the major findings of the paper constructs mainly Yemen armed conflict. On a range of 5-1, the following abbreviations were adopted: Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Don't Know (DN), Disagree (D), and Strongly Disagree (SD). The findings are presented in table 4.3 below.

Table 4. 1: Yemen Armed Conflict

Yemen Armed Conflict	SD (%)	D (%)	DN (%)	A (%)	SA (%)	Mean	St.Dev
The armed conflict in Yemen destroyed completely education and medical infrastructural basic systems	3(3%)	9(10.5%)	19(22.1%)	30(34.9%)	25(29.1%)	4.05	0.865
Weakness of Yemeni legitimate government and its forces is the main reason of the armed conflict where it could not defend the country against armed group such Houthi and Southern Separates	5(5.8%)	5(5.8%)	14(16.3%)	40(46.5%)	22(25.6%)	4.01	0.79
Saudi-UAE's regimes involved in armed conflict to accomplish their own interest not restore stability and peace in Yemen	8(9.3%)	3(3.5%)	14(16.3%)	36(41.9%)	25(29.1%)	3.85	0.812

The dissolution of the ongoing armed conflict in Yemen should divide the country and cause instability in the region	5(5.8%)	5(5.8%)	17(19.8%)	25(29.1%)	34(39.5%)	2.84	0.892
International and regional involved states have no intention to end the armed conflict in Yemen in order to gain their own benefits	3(3.5%)	5(5.8%)	26(30.2%)	30(34.9%)	22(25.6%)	2.03	0.863
Average						3.36	0.844

Source: primary data (2020)

The results presented in table 4.3 shows that Yemen Armed Conflict was assessed by the respondents as a fairly common practice in Yemen (average mean=3.17). This was attributed to the fact that cases of Yemen Armed Conflict. The armed conflict in Yemen destroyed completely education and medical infrastructural basic systems (Mean=4.05, Std= 0.865), Weakness of Yemeni legitimate government and its forces is the main reason of the armed conflict where it could not defend the country against armed group such Houthi and Southern Separates (Mean=4.01, Std=0.79), Saudi-UAE's regimes involved in armed conflict to accomplish their own interest not restore stability and peace in Yemen (Mean=3.85, Std=0.812), the dissolution of the ongoing armed conflict in Yemen should divide the country and cause instability in the region (Mean=2.84, Std= 0.892), International and regional involved states have no intention to end the armed conflict in Yemen in order to gain their own benefits (Mean=2.03, Std= 0.863). This implies that after years of conflict Yemen is on the verge of absolute collapse. Institutions across the country are falling apart, while a plethora of armed groups have taken advantage of the power vacuum to claim leadership over key territories, leading to even greater fragmentation of the country (Hatem, 2012). The conflict, and the accompanying Saudi-led intervention, has caused the worst humanitarian crisis in the globe, Yemen is facing a lost generation as millions of Yemeni children grow up without an education or food.

Table 4. 2: shows the correlation between Government Forces backed by Saudi-led coalition and Yemen Armed Conflict

Correlations			
		Government Forces backed by Saudi-led coalition	Yemen Armed Conflict
Government Forces backed by Saudi-led coalition	Pearson Correlation	1	.724**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	86	86
Yemen Armed Conflict	Pearson Correlation	.724**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	86	86

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Findings in the table 4.5 shown above suggest that strong and positive significant relationship with a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.724 and its significance stood at 0.000. This shows that it rejects hypothesis and thus indicating a strong and positive significant relationship between Government Forces backed by Saudi-led coalition and Yemen Armed Conflict. With regards to the hypothesis it was accepted since reliable evidence point to the fact that the there was a strong and positive significant relationship between the two variables. This further illustrates that Government Forces backed by Saudi-led coalition is a good indicator for Yemen Armed Conflict.

Table 4. 3 shows Correlation between Southern Separates backed by U.A.E and Yemen Armed Conflict

Correlations			
		Southern Separates backed by U.A.E	Yemen Armed Conflict
Southern Separates backed by U.A.E	Pearson Correlation	1	.561**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	86	86
Yemen Armed Conflict	Pearson Correlation	.561**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	86	86

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Findings indicated that the relationship between Southern Separates backed by U.A.E and Yemen Armed Conflict was computed at a Pearson Correlation Coefficient of 0.561. The significance of the relationship was within the acceptable range as it stood at 0.00 which rejects hypothesis and this signifies that the relationship between the two variables was moderate, positive and significant. With the revelation of the findings presented and discussed above, it necessitated for the rejection of the null hypothesis that had been adopted by the paper all through. The alternative hypothesis was, thus, adopted that suggested that the Southern Separates backed by U.A.E had a moderate and positive significant relationship with Yemen Armed Conflict.

Table 4. 4: shows the correlation between Houthi Armed Groups backed by Iran and Yemen Armed Conflict

Correlations			
		Houthi Armed Groups backed by Iran	Yemen Armed Conflict
Houthi Armed Groups backed by Iran	Pearson Correlation	1	.686**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	86	86
Yemen Armed Conflict	Pearson Correlation	.686*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	86	86

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Findings in the table 4.22 shown above suggest that strong and positive significant relationship with a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.686 and its significance stood at 0.000. This shows that it rejects hypothesis and thus indicating a strong and positive significant relationship between Houthi Armed Groups backed by Iran and Yemen Armed Conflict. With regards to the hypothesis it was accepted since reliable evidence point to the fact that the there was a strong and positive significant relationship between the two variables. This further illustrates that Houthi Armed Groups backed by Iran is a good indicator for Yemen Armed Conflict.

Table 4. 5: Multiple Regression analysis

Co-efficient						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.974	.287		3.398	.001
	Government Forces backed by Saudi-led coalition	.399	.100	.437	4.005	.000
	Southern Separates backed by U.A.E	.082	.096	.081	.847	.399
	Houthi Armed Groups backed by Iran	.276	.082	.336	3.350	.001

a. Dependent Variable: Yemen Armed Conflict

The model summary in table 4.23 above indicates that the three independent variables had strong and positive significant influence on the dependent variable of Yemen Armed Conflict. These variables were Government Forces backed by Saudi-led coalition, Southern Separates backed by U.A.E and Houthi Armed Groups backed by Iran. Government Forces backed by Saudi-led coalition exert most strong and positive significant influence on the Yemen Armed Conflict as its significance value stood at 0.437 and thus the most influential variable. This indicator was followed by Houthi Armed Groups backed by Iran at 0.336 and lastly Southern Separates backed by U.A.E was least influential variable with a beta coefficient of 0.081. This suggests that the three selected variables were highly and collectively influential on the Yemen Armed Conflict.

5. Recommendations and conclusions

The path to peace in Yemen will be fraught, requiring compromise, the rebuilding of trust, the re-hashing of many painful moments in history. It will also require new leadership. Peace will not be achieved through a single isolated process, but only through a series of continuing processes — both informal and formal — on a national, regional, and local level. ‘One size fits all’ attempts to resolve Yemen’s myriad conflicts, particularly peace processes that only involve elites and are Sanaa-centric, are doomed to fail.

There should also be a focus on preserving what remains of state institutions. There are still opportunities to encourage coordination between bureaucrats and government officials from different sides of the political spectrum, in addition to bolstering local governance institutions. In some ways, this can be tied to the distribution of aid and other services. Productive coordination with institutions on the ground helps to bolster both their operational capacity and their legitimacy with their constituent.

It is crucial to recognize that ending the war and ending the violence in Yemen are two essentially separate – if interconnected – goals. While stopping the killing may provide space to resolve Yemen’s conflict(s), one is not the inevitable precursor to the other. This is, perhaps, the greatest lesson of the GCC-mediated deal in 2011, which paved the way for Yemen’s post-Arab uprising transition.

More channels of communication must be opened with newly emergent actors and those traditionally marginalized by Yemen’s political establishment. Indeed, as much effort must be devoted to building an understanding of grassroots dynamics as has been devoted to maintaining contact with the Yemeni government’s formal political leaders, most of whom remain in exile. In particular, the diversity of anti-Houthi groups must be taken into account. There have already been steps towards this, most notably with regards to increasing albeit tentative efforts by European diplomats to reach out to key figures in the Southern Movement. Europe’s comparatively cordial relations with the Houthis mean that key European diplomatic powers already have an important channel.

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