

MS Windows Misconfiguration and Vulnerabilities Remedial For an APT Detection

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Abstracts: Risks start from a computer OS misconfiguration, then a vulnerability which system users want to trespass the risks towards their private data. It is required to scan as much code as possible in order to approximate the perfect control flow graph. It is then necessary to overcome on the one hand the incompleteness of a recursive route due to the presence of dynamic jumps and on the other hand the lack of precision of a linear route. One of the challenges is code overlap obfuscation. In this research we start by providing a state of the art of some static analysis techniques and their approach to code overlap, then we will propose a characterization of binaries using this technique. and this research considers only non-self-modifying programs.

Keywords: Data at rest, APT, Malware, hybrid analysis, obfuscation, code overlap.

I- INTRODUCTION

Although the code overlap problem is not a recent obfuscation technique and is well documented [1], the disassembly literature often assumes that a byte at a specific address can only be present in only one instruction [19]. This constraint prevents detection of any overlap but allows more precise disassembly on a binary that does not use this protection technique.

From the other side, and in order to analyze self-modifying programs, we propose to divide any execution into a trace and a series of execution snapshots: each snapshot represents a non-self-modifying part of the program. Such implemented solution of this slicing might be an emulation with the Binary Analysis Platform (BAP) and by instrumentation with Pin. The main concern of this research is devoted to the static analysis of the code overlap problem. Besides, and as a perspective, there will be a focus on the analysis of a self-modifying program: we will focus and stress on the concepts discussed, in order to reconstruct the waves corresponding to each level of execution as well as a global control flow graph for the binary studied.

Speculative route: Since the recursive path is less sensitive to very simple obscurations such as the injection of dead code, it is often taken as a starting point in research on static disassembly. After an initial code search with a recursive scan is performed, the remaining bytes can undergo a linear scan that will seek to determine whether they are code or data using heuristics. One of these approaches assesses the likelihood that a string of bytes is actually code by first learning about strings of bytes actually encoding instructions issued during program execution [2, 13].

This sequence of the two routes is called a speculative route.

From the famous proven theories, discussing the speculative routes, and after a first recursive disassembly [3], and when to try to identify the starting addresses of assembler functions using the *push* then *mov* instruction suite, characteristic of compiled functions: they start by stacking the pointer of base stack with *push ebp* to replace it with stack pointer with *mov ebp, esp*. Also, all the addresses are being identified where a valid instruction is encoded. From these addresses they recursively walk again to an unconditional jump instruction (*ret out jmp*), believing that the identified code sequence stops on that jump. The risk being great that the paths traversed in this way are not valid, they then eliminate the paths which lead to invalid code or to addresses known to be data.

Code overlap

In tElock disassembler: The code in figure 1 is taken from a program protected by tElock and disassembled using a recursive scan from address 0x01006e7a. There is a *jmp +1* instruction at the address 0x01006e7d and encoded on the two *eb ff* bytes, which jumps to the address 0x01006e7d+1 where the *dec ecx* instruction is present, encoded on *ff c9* and which therefore shares the byte *ff* at address 0x01006e7d+1 with the *jmp* instruction.

Bytes to disassemble: fe 04 0b eb ff c9 7f e6 8b c1

01006e7a	fe 04 0b	inc byte [ebx+ecx]
01006e7d	eb ff	jmp +1
01006e7e	ff c9	dec ecx
01006e80	7f e6	jg 01006e68
01006e82	8b c1	mov eax , ecx

Figure 1 - Recursive disassembly of tElock

Disassemblers available: Existing disassemblers, whether using a linear or recursive path, assume that the code cannot overlap and fail to show consistent disassembly otherwise. The recursive disassembly of the example of tElock (figure 1) with IDA Pro (version 6.3) [4] is as follows:

```
01006E7A inc byte ptr [ ebx+ecx ]
01006E7D jmp short near ptr loc_1006E7D+1
; The following bytes have not been disassembled
01006E7F db 0C9h
01006E80 db 7Fh
01006E81 db 0E6h
01006E82 db 8Bh
01006E83 db 0C1h
```

Radare [5] performs the following linear disassembly:

```
01006 e7a f e 04 0b inc byte [ ebx+ecx ]
01006 e7d eb f f jmp 6 e7e
01006 e 7f c9 leave
01006 e80 7 f e6 jg 6 e68
01006 e82 8b c1 mov eax , ecx
```

Neither is able to follow the jump from the jmp instruction: the target of the jump has already been counted as part of another instruction.

Approaches taking into account overlap: The authors of the overlap technique detailed, allowing to encode a hidden code sequence in a sequence [6], propose to detect the protection they expose. The idea is that a long sequence of bytes is unlikely to represent a valid sequence of code. If such a sequence exists, it must be code. So if two long valid strings of code overlap, it is a deliberate obfuscation and one of the two strings contains hidden code. This approach works for the protection they expose but is not applicable to cases of UPX for example because the byte sequences on which instructions overlap are very short and it is plausible that the overlap is accidental and that the overlapping code is not reachable.

II- STATICALY ANALYSED OVERLAPPED CODE

We propose a formalization of the code overlap problem. From a disassembly perspective, a program that has a single instruction that overlaps another can be seen as consisting of a primary disassembly path and a secondary path in which the overlapping instruction fits. Let's take the example of tElock: the segment of bytes eb ff c9 7f e6 can be seen as composed of the two layers of code given in figure 2: there are two layers, the first contains the instructions jmp+1, leave and jg 0x1006e68 and the second contains the instruction dec ecx, overlapping jmp+1. In fact, the eb ff c9 7f e6 byte segment contains exactly the four preceding instructions: there is at most one valid instruction at each address and the last potential instruction, coded on e6, is not valid.

Adresses	0x01006e7d	0x01006e7e	0x01006e7f	0x01006e80	0x01006e81
Bytes	eb	ff	c9	7f	e6
Layer 1	Jmp +1		leave	jg 0x1006e68	
Layer 2			dec ecx		

Figure 2 - Consistent cutting into layers of tElock extract

For an instruction I we denote the interval of memory addresses on which it is coded C[I]. Formally we define a layer as a set of instructions that do not overlap. Consequently, during disassembly, an attempt is made to perform a coherent division of the instructions included in the control flow graph into different layers. The previous example for tLock is a consistent segregation [7, 8].

III- CONCLUSION

Due to its continuous update and change, the code overlap is rarely discussed in the literature and, when it is, it is not analyzed as a full-fledged [9, 10, 11] obfuscation technique but rather bypassed by ignoring the range of addresses on which are coded disassembled instructions. We have proposed a notion of code layer, allowing to observe and quantify the use of code overlap by a binary. We propose an algorithm to count these overlaps during recursive disassembly of a binary.

This approach will be taken up and implemented in a related research, in continuation of the current research, to assess the use of overlap by malware.

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