

# Assessment on the Current State-Local Government Relations in Nigeria and the Quandary Of Ineffectiveness: A Review

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**Abstract:** *The effectiveness of state-local government relations can indeed play a crucial role in addressing or exacerbating issues such as poverty in a country like Nigeria. This review re-echoes the ineffectiveness of state-local government relations in Nigeria, propagating poverty and suffering at the grass-root level. This study uses qualitative method of research using secondary data for analysis. Qualitative research allows for a deeper understanding of the nuances, contextual factors, and dynamics at play in the relationship between the state and local governments. Addressing the ineffectiveness of state-local government relations requires a comprehensive approach that involves strengthening governance structures, improving transparency and accountability, enhancing local capacity, and fostering collaboration between different levels of government. Additionally, fostering community participation and engagement can help ensure that poverty alleviation strategies are responsive to the unique challenges faced by local populations in Nigeria.*

**Keywords:** Capacity building, quandary, Nigeria, ineffectiveness, state-local government

## 1.1 Introduction

State-local government relations is an aspect of intergovernmental relations which is very significant because its effects are mostly received by people that reside in the rural areas. The constitution has not only made local government a tier of government with relative autonomy to operate but also vests in the state government the power to ensure its creation, functions and finance. The bottom line of this arrangement is to make state and local governments responsive to the peculiar and local needs of the people in their areas of jurisdiction. Unfortunately, what is seen in most states of the federation is the subordination of local governments to the superior powers of state governments. On the part of federal allocation to the local governments, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 162(6) provided for the establishment of state joint local government account. This account is believed to serve as a mechanism that could encourage fiscal federalism at the local government level. Ahmad (2016), revealed that majority of state governments made some unnecessary deductions and more often diverted the funds to other areas of personal interest instead of development of local government areas. He went further to argue that this situation has contributed significantly to the abysmal performance of local government in initiating and implementing rural development programmes. Similarly, Oke (2017) noted that state governments have used the state joint local government account to hold local governments' hostage and make them appendages of the state. In practice, the operation of the joint account has denied local governments their financial autonomy. The diversion of funds belonging to local government has therefore deprived them of their rightful allocations that are very critical to embarking on infrastructural projects to address the infrastructural deficits in the rural areas. This may have explained the poor condition of rural infrastructures in most of the rural areas in Nigeria. Feeder roads are still deplorable, rural electricity appears to be non-existent and where it exists, it is always in bad shape, portable water supply has remained a scarce commodity, etc in most rural areas. It is noteworthy that state governments have taken over viable tax bases while leaving the unviable ones to the local governments to exploit.

The control and supervision of local governments by state governments through the Ministry of Local Government and State local government service commission have been anything but desirable. These state organs have continued to trample on what is left with the relative autonomy bestowed to the councils by the constitution. They have been in the vanguard of encouraging and ensuring that local governments identify with uniform state government policies and programmes with flagrant neglect of peculiar needs and aspirations of rural dwellers. This situation may have been responsible for imposition of projects and programmes on the people, which oftentimes run counter to their pressing needs of the people. The above situation may have been possible due to flagrant abuse of constitutional provisions by state governments in their interactions with local governments.

## 1.2 State-Local Government Relations in Nigeria

The general perception on state-local government relationship in Nigeria is that constitutional provisions are clearly not complied with (Adeyemo, 2005; Awotokun, 2005; Ikeanyibe, 2016). For the benefit of hindsight, it is necessary to reiterate that the objective of realizing a freestanding, autonomous local government through the constitutional process began with the 1979 constitution that anchored the second republic (1979-1983). But in the period, the place of local governments in IGR were shown to have been most neglected, abused, politicized and marginalized in the scheme of things (Obikeze & Obi, 2004). There were all kinds of patron-client

relations that could be seen to show that local government was part of the state administrative structure rather than a separate, autonomous tier of government. States created new local governments unilaterally, appointed caretaker committees, sole administrators or other forms of undemocratic councils contrary to the constitutional provisions on these processes. They also interfered with local government financial allocations (Ibietan & Ikeanyibe, 2017). Ukiwo (2006) describes the nature of state-local relationship during the second republic thus:

The worst violations of the autonomy of local councils however stemmed from political machinations. The politicians realised they could trade local councils for votes as there were agitations across the country for more LGAs as local elites eyed local councils which now had guaranteed funding. Politicians also realised they could balkanise local governments for electoral purposes. As elections approached most state governments dissolved local councils and appointed loyal party members who were expected to deliver votes in the locality. Little wonder, the local government councils were deeply involved in the large-scale electoral fraud of 1983.

Beyond this, Akinsanya (2005) observes that a federal-state-local relation in Nigeria at this period was characterized by increasing dependence of states and local governments on the federal government. Apparently, the consequences of the inclusion of LGCs in the federal structure in 1976 and the constitutionalisation in 1979 were the weakening of the powers of the states, and the reduction of their territorial authority, functions and revenue base. Consequently, states needed to recover lost grounds in terms of authority, political power and resources. Since 1999, despite agitations to amend the constitution to strengthen the position of local governments and the criticisms that follow state interference in local government affairs, the situation has not changed, showing that the problem is fundamental as some of the incidents in many states would portray. Like what happened in the second republic, some states have indulged in the creation of new local government councils through manipulation of the state laws without compliance to the constitutional provisions. Section 7(1) of the 1999 Constitution like the 1979, provides that

*The system of local government by democratically elected local government councils is under this Constitution guaranteed; and accordingly, the Government of every state shall subject to section 8 of this Constitution ensure their existence under a law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such councils.*

Section 8 contains various provisions concerning the roles of various levels of governments, including the local and federal (National Assembly) governments in the creation of new local governments and adjustment of the boundaries of constitutionally recognized ones.

*Section 8(3)(a) i-ii, states that:*

A bill for a law of a House of Assembly for the purpose of creating a new local government area shall only be passed if: (a) a request supported by at least two-thirds majority of members (representing the area demanding the creation of the new local government area) in each of the following, namely:-(i) the House of the Assembly in respect of the area, and, (ii) the local government councils in respect of the area, is received by the House of Assembly.”

*Section 8(4)(a)(ii) provides:*

A bill for a law of a House of Assembly for the purpose of boundary adjustment of any existing local government area shall only be passed if: (a) a request for the boundary adjustment is supported by two-third majority of members in the local government council in respect of the area, is received by the House of Assembly.

*vii. Section 8(5) provides that:*

An Act of the National Assembly passed in accordance with this section shall make consequential provisions with respect to the names and headquarters of states or local government areas as provided in section 3 of this constitution and in parts 1&2 of the first schedule to this constitution.

*vii. While Section 8(6) states:*

For the purpose of enabling the Nation Assembly to exercise the powers conferred upon it by sub-section 5 of this section, each House of Assembly shall, after the creation of more local government areas pursuant to sub-section 3 of this section, make adequate returns to each House of the National Assembly.

These stated procedures are essentially rigid and makes it almost impossible for states' House of Assemblies to create local government councils alone. Ideally, the provisions serve to make the local government system a constitutional matter that would require the cooperation of the federal government (National Assembly), the state (House of Assembly) and the local government councils in critical issues of LG creation and boundary adjustment. But in practice, states find ways to manipulate these provisions to create local governments unilaterally or the so called Development Centres. Some states in the country have made attempts in this regard since 1999. Seven states, namely, Bayelsa, Lagos, Ebonyi, Enugu, Kastina, Niger and Nasarawa started the local government creation exercise after democratic transition in 1999. Others including Oyo, Enugu, Anambra, Imo, Edo, Ekiti, Ondo, Rivers, Bayelsa either dissolved democratically elected councils when their tenure has not elapsed or appointed one form of undemocratically elected LGC or another at one time or the other since 1999 (See Obamwonyi & Aibieyi, 2015). Ebonyi state for instance, created additional local governments without involving the local governments and the National Assembly as provided in Section 8, 5 of the 1999 constitution. The Ebonyi state House of Assembly enacted the Ebonyi State Local Government Area Law No 7 of 2001 (Ebonyi State Local Government Area Creation and Transitions law of 2001), which created additional 21 new local government councils

that were later changed to Development Centres (DCs). Similarly, Enugu state created additional 39 local governments, which also were converted to Development Centres, and later abandoned. Creating new local government councils without bothering to complete the constitutional requirements for the exercise became a norm in the early period of the 4th republic that President Obasanjo in 2006 threatened to stop remitting federal allocations of the local government councils to the states involved. Some of the states heeded the threat and rescinded their actions, while others decided to covert the structures to 'developments centres' (DCs) or abandon the project entirely. Till date, only Lagos state and Ebonyi state are still operating their DCs. Thus, seven states attempted to create new local government structures since 1999. Some of them abandoned the structures with the threat of President Obasanjo in 2006, but two states still operate the new structures as DCs.

### **1.3 Relationship between state and local government**

Having been recognized as a third tier of government by the 1999 Constitution, with distinct functions to accelerate development at the grassroots, one should expect that Local Government Councils would enjoy a relationship with the state government to such an extent necessary for the councils to be in a position to perform those functions which are earmarked for them. However, the nature of intergovernmental relations between state and local government does not reflect from the constitution. It's more or less Master-Servant relations in which the local government subsists at the mercy of the state governments. Constitutionally, local government is not a servant. It is government like others with functions constitutionally set aside for it to perform. It has however been turned into the status of a servant of the state government through abuse of supervisory powers. As observed by Yakubu in Okechukwu et al., (2018), the most appropriate description of the present local government-state relationship is that of servant and master... a lot of supervisory powers are given to the States over local governments. The present position of the local government councils is hopeless. They take directives from their State governments, in relation to social and economic matters. With the resuscitation of the Local Government Service Commission, the administration of the local government councils is now directed by the States. Directives and circulars come in daily to the local government Chairman. The local governments are no longer sure of how much comes to them either from the Federation Account or from the States Allocation, less to talk of how the fund will be utilized.

### **1.4 The crisis of intergovernmental relations bedeviling the local government effectiveness**

Much of the crisis of intergovernmental relations bedeviling the local government effectiveness is the aftermath of the inherent loopholes in the 1999 Constitution and the attendant actions of state Governors in interpreting the ambiguous provisions of the constitution. A critical analysis of some of the constitutional loopholes and actions of State Governors since May 29, 1999 will shade light on the challenges to public service delivery at the local government level in Nigeria. These are:

#### **1.4.1 State Government's almost absolute control over Local Government**

Section 7(1) of the 1999 Constitution guaranteed a system of local government by democratically elected Local Government Council. Accordingly, the government of every state is required to ensure the existence, composition, finance and functions of Local Government Councils (Abia, 2015). A simple interpretation of this provision is that the 1999 Constitution has invariably made Local Government a creature of the State Government, for the fact that it has to a large extent, established and subsumed the Local Government under the control and supervision of State Government. The ambiguous nature of this provision, which gives State Government almost absolute control over Local Government has severally been misinterpreted and abused by State Government. Consequently, Local Government Councils have in many instances been dissolved and replaced with caretaker committees by State Governors. Though the Governors have the power to dissolve Local Government Councils, under Section 7(1) of the 1999 Constitution, such power is required to be conferred on them by the Houses of Assembly. Since the return to democracy in 1999, there has been incidents where state Governors don't wait for the necessary constitutional empowerment by the State Houses of Assembly before dissolving councils. On June 16, 2006, the then Governor of Abia State, Orji Uzo Kalu, for reasons best known to him dissolved the local governments and sacked the 148 Local Government Chairmen and Councilors elected by the people. This action led to a long legal battle which brought about the Supreme Court judgment of Friday, July 11, 2014, eight years after. Former Governor of Oyo State, Adebayo Alao-Akala as part of his first official assignment on assumption of office in 2008, sacked the local government Chairmen, claiming that he had filed a suit against the election that brought them into office. Governor Rochas Okorochoa of Imo State had in 2011 sacked elected Local Council officials immediately he was sworn into office as Governor of the state in June 2011. He later appointed Transition Committee Chairmen to run the affairs of the 27 local councils. This led to court action instituted by the aggrieved officials. The court reinstated them but the Governor refused to obey the court order, saying that he had appealed the judgment (Abia, 2015). Former Governor of Rivers State, Rotimi Amaechi, in 2012 suspended 11 local council Chairmen indefinitely. Amaechi's action was predicated on the suspicion that the affected Local Government Chairmen rather than attend a meeting he called, chose to have a secret parley with the then Minister of State for Education and now Governor of the state, Barrister Nyesom Wike (Abia, 2015). In Delta State, former Governor Emmanuel Uduaghan had in December, 2014, sacked the Chairman of Burutu Local Government, barely five months to the end of his first term in office. In Ekiti and Bayelsa States 16 and five Local Government chairmen, in 2010 and in 2013 respectively, were sacked by their State Governors on excuses which were

obviously political. Attempts by Local Government Councils to challenge arbitrariness of the State Governors in this regard have failed to yield significant results due to constitutional inhibitions and lack of cooperation from State Houses of Assembly.

#### **1.4.2 Lack of transparency in the management of local government allocations by the state government**

While it is a fact that sources of revenue earmarked for Local Government Councils in the 1999 Constitution are not effectively tapped to the advantage of the system, the situation is compounded by the actions of the state governments who have taken over most of the juicy sources of internally generated revenue including large markets, naming of street, and tenement rate among others (Alao *et al.*, 2015). There is also lack of transparency in the management of local government allocations by the state government. Section 149(4-5) provides for revenue allocation and disbursement to the local government in Nigeria. Within the context of the constitution, the National Assembly is required to make provision for statutory allocations of public revenue to Local Government Councils in the federation from the Federation Account (20%). The Houses of Assembly of the states are also required to make provisions for allocation of public revenue to Local Government Councils in the state from internally generated revenue (10%). Events over the years have shown that the 10 per cent of the internally generated revenue of the state government are seldom remitted to Local Government. These actions no doubt, dwarf the capacity of Local Government Councils to deliver effective service at the grassroots (Ojugbeli and Ojoh, 2014). Meanwhile, Section 162(4-6) of the 1999 Constitution provides that the amount standing to the credit of Local Government Councils in the Federation Account shall be allocated to the state for the benefit of their Local Government Councils on such terms and in such a manner as may be prescribed by the Houses of Assembly of the state whose constitutional duty is to establish "State Joint Local Government Account" into which these allocations are paid. The implication of this constitutional provision is that after allocating the amount due Local Government Councils from the Federation Account what happens to the funds in the Joint Account is not the business of the constitution. This has been the basis for the arbitrariness associated with the management of Joint Account in Nigeria. In 2009, Mr. Igberi the then Chairman of the Association of Local Government of Nigeria (ALGON) in Ebonyi State, called for the amendment of the constitutional provision that legalizes the State Local Government Joint Account Committee (JAC) arguing that the structure hinders proper funding and autonomy for councils in the country. He maintained further that "the issue of Joint Account had facilitated all manner of deductions from councils allocation" (Sobechei, 2009). Acba (2008) while capturing the feelings of council executives in Abia State contended that "nothing seem to be working at the councils because they are either starved of funds or shortchanged by state governments through the Joint Account Allocation Committees. Most of the Council Chief Executives in the state decried deductions from their allocation by state government and described such an act as illegal". In 2009, the Edo State Chapter of the Nigerian Union of Local Government Employees (NULGE) had backed the 18 council Chairmen's decision to reject May, 2009 allocation from the Federation Account to protest an alleged over-deduction by the state government (Otabor, 2009). Other problems associated with the Joint Account include delay in the release of statutory allocation of the local government by the state government; and diversion of statutory allocations of the local government. In 2008, the Ondo State Commissioner for finance, Accountant General, Commissioner for Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs were invited by the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related offences Commission (ICPC) in connection the alleged Diversion of 1.2billion Naira belonging to the 18 Local Government Councils in the state (Ojo, 2008). The petition had alleged that statutory allocations to the 18 Local Government Councils in the state for between six and nine months since 2005 were diverted to private pockets (Ojugbeli and Ojoh, 2014). Hiding under Section 7 (1) and (6) of the 1999 Constitution, various systems are cynically developed by State Government to rub the Local Government of the benefit of appropriating its funds. In some states the Local Government operatives are cajoled to author and sign letters in support of this arrangement in order to remove the fear of litigation (Babatope and Egunjobi, 2016). To reflect that Local Government operatives participate in the process, they are requested to submit the list of projects intended for execution while the state government award the contracts. Added to this is the unrestrained demand for fund and overambitious expectations of the populace particularly the local political juggernauts by expecting the council official to meet their personal needs at the expense of developmental needs (Alao *et al.*, 2015). Such situations constitute distractions for the Local Government administration in balancing the Governor's demands and community's expectation. In effect, disproportionate fund are usually released by the state government to meet the needs of Local Governments which often fall short to pay staff salaries and for efficient administrative management Consequently, salaries have remained unpaid for upward of 5 to 10 months to Local Government staff in most states of the federation necessitating a bail out from the federal government.

#### **1.4.3 Participatory Democracy**

The 1999 Constitution is unequivocal to the fact that no Local Government Council can said to be fully in existence except when it is democratically constituted as envisaged in Section 7(1) of the Constitution. However, since the return to democracy in 1999, Governors have continued to use the Local Government Councils as machinery for rewarding party stooges, who have supported them at one time or the other to come to power (Alao *et al.*, 2015). In some states, Local Government Council elections have not been conducted since the return to constitutional governance in Nigeria in 1999. In situations where elections are held, they are mostly charades, stage managed by ruling parties to ensure that only candidates of their choice emerged victorious and returned "elected" with unbelievable Margins (Ahmed, 2016). In Lagos State for example, the Action Congress (AC) which metamorphosed

into the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) swept all the Chairmanship and Councillorship positions in the elections that was conducted in the state's 20 Local Government Councils and 37 Local Council Development Areas (LCDA) in 2007 and 2011. In Oyo State the then ruling party, People's Democratic Party (PDP) won the 33 Chairmanship seats in the elections conducted by Oyo State Independent Electoral Commission (OYSIEC) on December 15, 2007. In Enugu State, the ruling PDP won 15 out of 17 council Chairmanship seats and 245 of the 254 Councillorship seats leaving the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) with 9 seats in 2007 Local Government election. In 2014, the Local Government Council elections conducted in Kano State saw the ruling party All Progressive Congress (APC) swept 98 percent of seats. The same was true in crisis ridden Yobe State when the APC won all the Chairmanship and Councillorship seats. It was the same story in Katsina State, where the ruling party, PDP won all the 34 Chairmanship and 361 Councillorship seats in the Local Government Council elections held on 11th April, 2014, despite been the very first time since 2008 that Local Government elections were held in Katsina. Yet majority of the opposition parties in the state boycotted the polls. Barely six days to leaving office, the then Governor of Rivers State Rotimi Chibike Amaechi stunned everyone when he announced his government's willingness to conduct local government elections in the state. Despite agitations from the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and other political parties who complained that such exercise would be marred with irregularities in favour of the ruling party, the All Progressives Congress (APC), the election was conducted on May 23, 2015, as scheduled; and APC won Chairmanship seats in 22 out the 23 Local Government Areas (Abia, 2015). In the Local Government Council elections conducted in Ondo State on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of April, 2015, the candidates of the PDP won all the eighteen Chairmanship seats (Radio Nigeria, 2015). It was the same in Sokoto State where the APC made a clean sweep of the Chairmanship and Councillorship seats in the Local Government elections conducted on March 13, 2016 (Rimaye, 2016). The foregoing analysis clearly shows that adherence to Section 7(1) of the 1999 Constitution by State Government since 29th May, 1999 has been held only in breach. Every attempt to ensure strict adherence to the provisions of the Constitution on democratic composition of Local Governments across the states of the federation has continued to suffer as Governors and sometimes in collaboration with state Houses of Assembly violate the basis of Local Government. Chief among which is to ensure that Local Government enhances local participation of the people of the grassroots in determining through their own elected representatives solutions to problems of development peculiar to their locality within resources available to them whether internally generated or externally sourced (Abia, 2015). In his comments on the pattern of Local Government Council elections in Nigeria, a former Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Alhaji Mahmud Yayale Ahmed had advocated the abolition of Local Government elections across the federation because "they have failed to produce the desired political leadership at that level of government (Ahmed, 2016)". It has since become a rule rather than exception for opposition parties in most of the states to boycott Local Government elections or go to court to challenge the outcome of such election. This is a clear indication of the undemocratic process of constituting Local Government Councils in Nigeria in flagrant violation of Section 7(1) of the 1999 Constitution (amended 2011) and a negation of the envisaged purpose of local government by which the framers of the 1976 Local Government Reforms had in mind.

### **1.5 Implication of State-Local Relations on Local Government Service Delivery**

Currently, local governments in Nigeria has drastically failed in the aspects of service delivery and the primary reason for the failure of local government in area of service delivery is the role of the State Governors in the affairs of local government (Vambe, 2018).

The Governors are found of taking over their financial allocation, taxes, counterpart funding and refuse to conduct Local Government elections, but instead ruling local governments with appointed administrators, most of whom are party loyalist and their friends and relations turning the entire process of local governments into irrelevant schemes of things.

The implication of this according to Ajibulu (2012) is that local government is now considered as an extension of state's ministry. The inherent nature of this problem has caused subservience, a situation where local government waits for the next directives from states government before embarking on any developmental projects. This has made local government an object of control and directives. There is no room for discretion. This does not augur well for effective public service delivery at the local level; hence Local Government Councils await directives from the State government instead of using initiatives and striving hard to improve the local communities. Unless State government allows the local government's mandate as contained in the 1976 Local Government Reform and the spirit of 1999 Constitution to be implemented to the letter without unnecessary intervention there can be no development at the grassroots.

### **1.6 Local-State Dependency on Federation Account and Development Problems**

The fact that nearly all the states and local governments in Nigeria depend solely on revenue allocation from the federation account is undisputable. For this reason, governmental functions in most local-state levels have ceased, not only this, some states and local governments are still battling with regular payment of salaries, despite the bailout fund given to them by the federal government. Although many reasons have been advanced for the introduction of the "State Joint Local Government Account" system by the state government. However, heavily reliant on monthly allocation from the federation account by the state government is perhaps one of the reasons for its introduction. The idea of "State Joint Local Government Account" is to manipulate local government monthly allocation from the federation account by the state government. Most of the state governments have insisted that the monthly

allocation of the local governments within their states must first be paid into the “State Joint Local Government Account”. The decision to use ‘joint account’ is although enshrined in the constitution but the sole operator of the joint account is the state who decides the percentage of the monthly allocation to be given to local governments in most cases. In case the local government intends to embark on any project for the development, approval must be sought first from the state government. As a consequence, most of the local governments cannot stand on their own financially. Many local governments in some states are empty financially; they could not pay the salaries of their workers not to talk of embarking on developmental projects. Thus, most of the local government in contemporary Nigeria only exist in name without performing any meaningful activity. Sole dependent on the federation account will eventually put the states and its local government counterpart in perpetual debt. The debt profiles of many states in Nigeria have shown that their debts are more than the allocation they receive. It will be difficult for them to come out of the debts, especially, that the monies borrowed including the bailout are not interest-free. There is a likelihood that the interest will be compounding and mounting up and the debts continue to rise. Another effect of relying on monthly allocation, in the long run, is that those constitutional functions in the concurrent and residual list which the states and local governments are finding difficult to perform will eventually be taken over by the federal government. For this reason, the states and local governments will be left with nothing in terms of functions and responsibilities. When this happens, it will defeat the purpose of federalism, as federalism emphasise coordination and independence of the component units of the federation (Wheare, 1963). Thus, the states and local governments who are already playing second fiddle to the federal government in Nigeria will become irrelevant levels of government and consequently be relegated to background in the nation’s governance activities.

### 1.7 Conclusion

One of the major areas where different levels of government in Nigeria relate is in the area of ‘fiscal’; commonly referred to as ‘intergovernmental fiscal relations’. Fiscal relations have been problematic as a result of non-commensuration of assigned responsibilities with tax-raising powers and resource allocation especially to the state-local levels of government. The present sharing formula gave 52.86%; 26.70% and 20.60% of the revenues to the federal, state and local governments respectively. That is, more than half of the accrued revenue is being allocated to the federal government, while the state and local government settle with the leftover. Therefore, it is now a problem for the state-local governments to carry out their constitutional responsibilities, especially in the areas of provision of social and infrastructural facilities; seeing to the welfare of the citizens and in the payment of salaries and allowances of the civil servants who are ‘the machinery of the government’. Beyond this is the huge debts incurred by the state-local which repayment covers over 20 years. Therefore, the present intergovernmental fiscal relations have not been favourable to the state-local government. Apart from the fact that it has failed to aid or enhance development at these levels of government, it is clear that, in the next quarter of a century, meaningful development may continue to elude the state-local levels of government.

### 1.8 Recommendation

A pragmatic approach must be taken to increase the monthly allocation of the state-local governments. Increment in allocation to the state-local government can be achieved if proactive steps are taken to reduce corruption among the populace; if wastage and unnecessary spending is stopped in public offices; if the cost of governance is drastically reduced and if the nation embarks on aggressive economic diversification.

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