

A Translation of ‘Ethics regarding endangered non-human beings: A philosophical review’^a

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Abstract^b: *In recent years, there have been a remarkable number of views and opinions which have reignited the discussions on environmental ethics in regarding the issue of animal rights but notable among them are- the moral value of human beings and animals, and the moral relationship between them. In terms of this relationship, the discourse of environmental ethics is divided into two streams- anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric. The first one discusses about human superiority and the use of several elements of environment in human needs, whereas the other one deals with the matter of moral consideration of non-human beings. However, there’s a debate as to whether the animals exist in the environment have moral value or morality cannot be imposed on them. So, this article will address the point of moral value of non-human beings from the perspective of philosophy.*

Introduction

The discussion of environmental ethics has become increasingly complex in recent years. Because of the various topics discussed, we are often confronted with a variety of moral dilemmas. The question of human moral consideration for non-human animals is one of them. For a long time, this topic has been discussed in various philosophical circles. The first stirrings of discussion occurred in the 1970s of the twentieth century, which later developed into a movement. A number of prominent philosophers have argued that non-human animals have moral value in discussions of ethical behaviour, including Jeremy Bentham, Tom Regan, Peter Singer, Stephen Clark, Mary Midgley, Holmes Rolston, Martin Benjamin, and James Sterba. Conversely, philosophers such as Descartes, Hume, Kant, Donald Davidson, and Carl Cohen reject the notion that non-human animals possess moral value.

If we examine the question of moral dignity and rights in the light of value, we find two forms of value - intrinsic value and instrumental value. Intrinsic value is something that is valuable in itself and does not depend on another entity for its value. Instrumental value is useful as an aid to other entities, and its beneficiaries are unable to make their own judgments. All anthropocentric philosophers, i.e. those who place humans at a higher level, accept the concept of intrinsic value only for human beings. As humans have the power of self-governance or judgment, meaning self-consciousness. Humans are considered members of a moral society due to their intrinsic value. However, they speak of the instrumental value of non-human animals. Because non-human animals cannot distinguish between good and bad, they are not self-aware or capable of making independent decisions. They therefore believe they are not eligible to become members of a moral community. In spite of this, many policy philosophers, such as Jeremy Bentham and Peter Singer, adhere to the policy of equality, which implies that all creatures are equally valuable. In their view, non-human animals are intrinsically valuable and should be considered as claimants to moral considerations, just as humans are.

Now the question arises, what is meant by sentient beings and what are their rights? Besides humans, there are countless other life forms on this planet. Although most of these creatures possess consciousness, they are not capable of understanding good or evil. We refer to them as sentient beings. The human species exploits all of these creatures for their own needs or acts unethically towards them, which is very undesirable. Similarly, to humans, animals have rights and values. The right to live without harm is a claim that allows them to live in peace. Those who advocate for animal rights believe that animals are also morally valuable.

The moral value of sentient beings requires us to act in a morally appropriate manner towards them. A utilitarian philosopher from the 18th century, Jeremy Bentham, expressed opinions in this regard. In the seventeenth chapter of his book *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789), Bentham discusses sentient beings, which raises the concern that they are being neglected. As he points out, ‘Other animals, who are subject to rights, are neglected due to the insensibility of the legal system, deteriorating their status because of classification’^c [1]. As he points out, sentiment does not carry the same meaning in the legal process as it does for humans and animals with a lesser level of rationality. He considered sentient beings as morally valuable as humans and advocated equal consideration of interests, which implies that humans and animals are equally valuable from a moral perspective. This policy was regarded as a fundamental one by him. The sensation of suffering is the same for all creatures regardless of their nature, according to him. Whether human or non-human, the sensation of suffering is manifested through behaviour. Furthermore, if an entity experiences suffering, then, like other entities, moral justice must be accorded to that entity as well. According to his prediction, ‘there may come a day when the rest of the sentient beings will be able to acquire those rights that no one can take away from them except their own rulers’^d. [2]

We cannot deny the capacity for empathy in animals in any way. The feeling of suffering can be experienced by them even though they do not possess the same expressive abilities as humans. We are mostly aware of the royalty of dogs, and it is unlikely that they would exist without the ability to empathize. The sense of smell is possessed by tigers, cats, and even elephants, which means we cannot ignore the emotions that animals experience. It is therefore important to consider the suffering of animals and to provide them with ethical justice, just as we consider the suffering of humans.

The British philosopher Mary Midgley expresses her views on the preservation of self-interest and moral respect for both human and non-human animals in her books, *Beast and Man* (1978) and *Animals and Why They Matter* (1983). According to her, humans and non-human animals share a number of characteristics that are closely related. According to her, animal behaviour science (qualitative methods of ethology) and comparative psychology can be used to better understand the relationship between humans and non-human animals. She makes it clear that 'It is never true that to know how to behave towards an individual one must first look for his species... When it comes to animals, it is absolutely essential to know their species'^e. [3] She believes that animals' lives are not as chaotic as humans sometimes believe; there is a degree of orderliness in their lives. Comparing them to humans, they appear to have fewer differences in their characteristics (though there are different kinds of differences). Humans, however, satisfy themselves by perceiving order in a sea of chaos. Konrad Lorenz, an Austrian animal ethicist, also believes that such differences are not determined by what is right or wrong, but rather by what they fear and desire. In the case of a predator, we always imagine that the predator will present itself to the shepherd when the shepherd is there. In addition, the predator will be caught in a sheepfold. Such a notion is nurtured by our interaction with the sheepfold. However, animal behaviour research has found that predators are trustworthy and affectionate toward their mates and offspring. Their group is trustworthy and, when threatened, displays bravery, respects each other's territories, and maintains a clean living environment.[4] Accordingly, Mary Midgley has stressed the importance of protecting animal interests by pointing out that humans and non-human animals have a substantial amount in common. We know that preserving the interests of animals is not only a moral responsibility for humans that should be maintained due to its close resemblance to our own traits. Rather animals deserve moral respect.

On the other hand, in his book *Respect for Nature* (1986), Paul Taylor has described all elements of the environment, including animals, as intrinsically valuable. He believes that humans have self-awareness, animals have consciousness, and other elements of the environment possess awareness as well. [5] We must direct our attention towards not causing any harm to nature for our own selfish interests. According to Taylor, not only humans and animals but also mountains, rivers, and other natural elements have intrinsic value. It is unethical to exploit one species for the benefit of another if all elements of nature have intrinsic or inherent value. Our ultimate moral obligation towards nature should be to maintain a deep ethical perspective and that perspective should be respect for nature. Considering wild nature as intrinsically valuable is considered a moral duty of humans, according to Taylor.

Tom Regan, an American philosopher and a representative of the animal rights movement, emphasizes ethical considerations towards non-human animals. Regan believes that non-human animals have the right to inherent value and having rights means having the capacity to be a subject-of-a-life, which enables them to have moral consideration. It is not about instrumental or utilitarian value, but the presence of inherent value leads to the emergence of moral rights. In addition to humans, animals also have a life similar to humans, with birth, development, and death. Therefore, they have the natural right to live, just as the value of their lives is valuable to humans. In his book *The Case for Animal Right* (1983) [6], Regan emphasizes several points for the conservation of the interests of non-human animals:

- (a) The use of animals in research, where various forms of suffering are inflicted, should be eliminated.
- (b) Animal farming for economic purposes should be completely abolished.
- (c) Activities such as hunting and trapping should be entirely prohibited.

Regan believes that using non-human animals for medical research, experimentation, or entertainment purposes is completely unethical. Because non-human animals also have inherent value just like human beings, their rights to live without being harmed should be recognized. Regan believes that non-human animals also possess the subject-of-a-life, similar to human beings, which includes belief, desire, memory, perception, and consciousness, and their experiences are similar to ours. The subject-of-a-life recognizes ethical rights, but it is not a legal right. This ethical right falls under the umbrella of the subject-of-a-life and is not contingent upon race, species, gender, or any other classification. When humans talk about the rights of animals, they do not mean the right of a cow to vote, the right of a pig to a fair trial, or the right of a cat to religious freedom. Instead, they affirm that as independent entities, animals possess intrinsic value and our actions should respect this value. According to Regan,

Many of us understand that all animals have a subject-of-a-life meaning and possess intrinsic value if we evaluate in such terms. Subsequently, with the intention of incorporating this into the ultimate principle of duty to others, we as individuals must indeed accept our equal intrinsic value. It is not sentiment or emotion, but reason that obliges us to acknowledge the equal intrinsic value of these creatures and to consider their equal rights with respect at the same time.^f [7]

Regan believes that all beings have equal intrinsic value, and this value is not acquired through moral actions, nor is it lost through immoral ones. Both Florence Nightingale and Adolf Hitler possessed intrinsic value of life equally. Intrinsic value is not

something that increases or decreases with fashion, popularity, or special privilege. They believe that no particular class, be it human or non-human animals, should have a special moral status. Because, such special status would become threatening for other classes. Therefore, everyone should have equal dignity. Hence, in the light of intrinsic value, they argue that all beings should be considered in moral considerations.

Peter Singer, the Australian contemporary philosopher and leading figure of the animal rights movement, speaks of the policy of equality like Bentham. He has shed light on the moral value of non-human animals in his works *Animal Rights and Human Obligations* (edited, 1975), *Animal Liberation* (1975), and *Practical Ethics* (1979). He asserts that animals, like humans, have intrinsic value. Singer's advocacy for the intrinsic and moral value of non-human animals is grounded in his principle of equality. He bases this on 'the principle of equal consideration of interests'^g. The essence of this principle is that, in our moral deliberations, we should give equal importance to everyone's interests, just as we do to our own; that is, we should give equal, unbiased importance to the interests of all. Singer does not advocate for the application of this policy of equality only within human society or the human species, but rather believes it should be equally applicable to all animals. He sees this policy as the ethical foundation for establishing relationships between humans and non-human animals. In terms of interests, everyone's interests are equally worthy of consideration, meaning all animals are equal, so it would be unethical to limit this policy only to humans. According to Singer, 'When we accept the principle of equality for humans, the burden of adopting it for some non-human animals is also imposed'^h.^[8] Interest is interest, whether it is human or non-human animal. Therefore, Singer has focused sharply on ensuring that the interests of lower animals are not compromised for our own interests. He has expressed opposition to the use of non-human animals in farm practices, drug production, and primary testing in laboratories, as well as for pleasure. This is because various harmful tests are performed on animals, where half of the animals often end up facing death. Many renowned institutions conduct tests on different animals for the production of new items, even though it is possible to continue work with the products already produced. Therefore, the production of new items is nothing but extravagance. He considers these actions unethical because, although non-human animals may lack independent thinking, they share the experience of pain with humans. They have feelings of pleasure, pain, and suffering. Singer believes that animals express the same type of pain as humans do, even if they cannot communicate it through language. Singer considers,

If a being suffers, there is no ethical justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. It does not matter what the nature of the being is, but according to the principle of equality, the suffering of this being should be considered just like the suffering of any other being, and in this case, any unequal comparison with any other being can also be madeⁱ.

[9]

Therefore, no matter what the nature of the being is, their pain must be considered equally. By considering similar characteristics, i.e., pain and suffering, instead of dissimilar ones, it is possible to reduce discrimination between species and maintain equality. In this way, he advocates for the policy of equality and against speciesism^[10]. He follows a utilitarian policy^[11], stating that we should consider minimizing the harm to the interests of the most number of members, meaning not maximizing happiness, but minimizing pain and suffering. While this is sometimes construed as negative or inverse utilitarianism, Singer accepts it as consistent utilitarianism. Considering all these factors, he believes that sentient non-human animals, like humans, are equally valuable in terms of ethical worth.

In the above discussions of Tom Regan and Peter Singer, it is evident that they oppose the use of sentient animals in scientific research or medical treatments. This is because these areas often inflict various forms of physical suffering on animals. One might question, who then will we use as test subjects in the creation of drugs for various complex diseases? If such research were conducted on humans instead of sentient animals, it would pose similar risks to human lives as it does to animal lives. That would also be considered unethical and a violation of human rights. If we were to skip testing altogether and apply those products or drugs directly, it would put those on whom they are applied at risk of death. In that case, we should refrain from inventing or applying drugs, which would significantly increase the risk of death for both humans and sentient animals due to various complex diseases. Another point to consider is that humans even invent drugs for their own needs and the needs of sentient animals (veterinary medicine), something that is not feasible for sentient animals to do for themselves or for their own kind. Therefore, it is ethically justifiable to use animals in research for the invention of drugs for the disease-free life of humans and sentient animals, but it should not be done carelessly. Furthermore, the extent of pain inflicted on animals should be minimized. Thus, we must work to ensure that animals are not harmed or distressed, i.e., in pharmaceutical research for the wellbeing of humans and sentient animals, it is essential to avoid inflicting unnecessary pain and prevent the risk of death when using animals as test subjects. What they mean by the right to life is the right to live without harm, or the right to avoid injury. Jeremy Bentham, too, considered the suffering of animals equally and advocated for equal moral justice for humans.

In the aforementioned discussion, all the philosophers who were mentioned have, in some way or another expressed their views in favour of the moral rights and dignity of animals. In other words, they were biased towards ethical consideration for animals. However, some philosophers who initially did not want to accept the moral value of non-human animals, but later changed their views after considering various matters and spoke in favour of the rights and dignity of non-human animals. Notable among them

are Canadian philosopher Michael Fox and American philosopher R. G. Frey. Initially, Fox believed, 'Animals are not members of the moral community, so humans have no moral obligations to them'.^j [12] According to him, the only ones who can claim moral dignity are those capable of thinking morally or nurturing moral concepts, who are aware of the value of their life, of their rights, meaning those who are self-conscious and capable of living independently are the claimants for moral consideration. He also stated, those who understand higher language, capable of planning various things alongside solving complex problems, and those who are capable of taking responsibility for any task; only they are eligible to be members of the moral community. However, since animals lack these abilities, if considered from this perspective, non-human animals cannot have any moral value. However, Michael Fox changed his view radically later on. Even before a year of publishing his book, Fox renounced the main thesis of his book. He stated, our fundamental moral responsibility is to not be a cause of pain and suffering or inflict harm on non-human animals, as we would not on humans. In fact, there is no opportunity to justify causing harm to non-human animals. [13]

In his book *Interests and Rights* (1980), R. G. Frey states that an entity cannot be conscious or think until it understands the language of others. According to this view, language is associated with expectation, belief, and desire, without which no entity can be excited or disheartened. Therefore, animals are not considered moral agents because they are not capable of independent decision-making or discerning between good and bad. For example, it would be foolish to hold a lion morally responsible for hunting a deer. Therefore, non-human animals do not qualify to be members of the moral community or claim moral consideration. [14]

R.G. Frey also later admitted that humans and those who are in marginal or peripheral levels (children, the elderly, disabled, unconscious, including those with memory impairment) of humanity expect ethical consideration. Animals are not only used at will by members of the moral community, but even those who are in marginal conditions are also exploited. However, it is not appropriate to treat them with cruelty because they also experience pleasure and suffering. Even pleasure-seekers like them are eligible to be members of the moral community. [15]

Therefore, it can be seen that Michael Fox and R.G. Frey's initial view was such that humans, being conscious, capable of understanding their rights or values, and capable of complex problem solving through higher language, are eligible for moral consideration. In this case, the question arises as to whether humans are truly conscious of their own rights or values. If that were the case, then indiscriminate killing of animals would not be the cause of the destruction of their existence. In many civilized countries like China and Japan, animals such as dogs, cats, monkeys, bears (which are also used as food in various regions of Bangladesh), pigs, snakes, and others have been transformed into food sources, causing countless damages and even posing threats to human existence through deadly viruses and bacteria (such as Ebola, Nipah virus, avian influenza, swine influenza, novel coronavirus, etc.). Therefore, in the realm of ethical consideration, not only for the sake of preserving human existence but also for the preservation of non-human animals, it is necessary to stop the indiscriminate killing and consumption of animals.

On the other hand, Holmes Rolston believes that humans are the representatives of ethics. Therefore, just as humans have responsibilities towards other human beings, they also have responsibilities towards other sentient beings. That is, where protection is necessary for the weak from the powerful, there the subject of ethical consideration arises. [16]

Callicott also believes that the rights and moral dignity of non-human animals are highly significant but have long been neglected. Therefore, he embraces the issue of animal equality from an environmentalist perspective. This is because in the environment, various life forms exist in relation to each other. This relationship ensures the well-being and protection of non-human animals alongside various co-existing creatures. [17]

In the above discussion, although there are differences in the perspectives of the philosophers who have come, they have spoken in various ways about the ethical value of animals. However, some philosophers support speciesism and do not want to bring the subject of animal equality into ethical consideration. In this case, the names of Descartes, Kant, Donald Davidson, and Cohen can be mentioned.

René Descartes, the father of modern philosophy and a French philosopher, considered humans to be the only conscious beings because humans have both a body and a mind. According to him, animals are not conscious beings because they do not possess a mind. Therefore, animals cannot have moral rights, and humans do not have any moral obligations towards them. We use language or various symbols to express our thoughts, which animals cannot do. Therefore, he referred to animals as automata or automatic mechanical beings. Just like humans create machines for various tasks, animals are also machines, but they are creations of God. He further mentions that we often see animals performing various skills in exhibitions and sometimes they do not perform these skills in front of many people, or sometimes they show more skills than humans do. However, this does not prove that animals have a mind. It is a natural tendency of an animal's body, much like a clock keeping time, as per Descartes' view. He believes that humans are not only conscious beings but also possess intellectual abilities because humans do not show their physical actions in front of someone who will judge their actions. Furthermore, a human body is not an automatic moving machine; humans have a mind and the ability to think. According to Descartes, 'It is not that where there is a complex of organs, there is a power of thought; yet we keep searching for it among animals. But it claims much more wonder that the mind is always found in the human body and is absent in every animal body'.^k [18]

Nevertheless, we know that animals possess the ability to understand the language of their own species, through which they communicate and maintain contact with other members of the same species. This can be achieved through various combinations of signals that humans may not be able to comprehend, but can be partially understood through the behaviour of social animals. In an article published by the BBC on this subject, it is stated that animals can sometimes communicate among themselves through their actions, even if humans are not able to fully understand it. [19] Additionally, inflicting harm on animals can also provoke similar behaviour in humans. Furthermore, since animals are sentient beings, violent behaviour is not desirable, but rather maintaining ethical behaviour towards both humans and animals is emphasized.

German philosopher Immanuel Kant also placed humans at a higher position. He believes that human dignity applies to everyone and therefore all types of rights are applicable to humans. The significance of good or bad does not depend on the evaluation, but rather on the fact that humans have a higher position in the world than all other creatures. The position of humans in the world is above all other animals. Non-human animals cannot have the same independent will as humans because they lack self-consciousness. Their actions are also necessarily determined by the impulses of their senses. According to Kant, intrinsic value, intellectual capacity, the power of consciousness, the capacity for moral judgment and benevolence are present in humans but not in animals. According to him, 'every creature exists as a means to an end and that end must be its own good, this is why those creatures do not possess any self-consciousness and where humans are considered, they are aimed at'. [20] He further states that the duty towards animals is indirectly a duty towards the human species and this duty teaches others to fulfil their duties as well. Considering this perspective, Kant views animals as holders of intrinsic value in terms of means. He perceives humans not as an objective but as a means to an end. Because human dignity applies to everyone, humans have the sole ethical value, according to him.

In the discussions of Descartes and Kant, it is assumed that those entities without self-awareness, the power of self-control, the ability to reason, or the ability to understand another's language, cannot be ascribed inherent value. These attributes draw the moral line between humans and non-human animals. However, the question arises that many infants, elderly, and mentally unstable people who lack self-awareness and are even less conscious than many animals. If inherent value can be ascribed to them or if they are worthy of moral consideration, then why not non-human animals? We know that many chimpanzees are transparent in the use of symbolic language and self-aware. Even gorillas exhibit intelligence in various ways that makes them more conscious than some of our human species (those with mental disabilities). If these particular qualities draw the line between humans and non-human animals, then not only certain humans but also certain non-human animals would be eligible for moral consideration. The same logic could be used to justify killing or using these humans as experimental subjects in labs. In fact, any specific skill, i.e., self-awareness, self-control, or intelligence, cannot draw the line for imposing moral boundaries. Then the issue of inherent value or moral consideration would also be questionable in the case of humans. [21] Therefore, intellectual ability is not our requirement, but non-human animals are valuable in terms of moral value as independent entities. Even if they do not have self-awareness, they have consciousness, and sometimes they can demonstrate the ability to self-preserve. They also have inherent value, which is not dependent on human use, but has its own value as a creature of nature like humans. Having inherent value means, that moral value can be ascribed and hence we should be compassionate towards non-human animals. If we do not act morally or compassionately towards non-human animals, we will not be able to act kindly or morally towards mentally undeveloped individuals due to habituation.

Again, in his book *Inquires into Truth and Interpretation* (1984), Davidson supports the first part of R.G. Frege's statement, saying that language is the medium through which we understand others' thoughts and consciousness. Through language, we express the thoughts or feelings of our minds. Without language, we would not be able to exchange our thoughts or distinguish between good and bad. Just as a child cannot be held responsible for breaking a statue, similarly, a monkey cannot be condemned for harming its sibling. Animals are not moral agents; they have no moral preferences or are capable of making moral decisions. Therefore, non-human animals do not have moral value. [22]

However, the point is, through language, we cannot understand all the thoughts of people around the world, because different nations and tribes have different cultures and languages. Besides, there are regional differences in meaning for the same words or sentences, so it is not possible for everyone to understand everyone's thoughts. In addition, just because we can distinguish between good and bad through language, it does not mean we always do the right thing. If that were the case, there would be no birth of terrorism or incidents like extortion, murder, injuries. Therefore, it is not logical to draw a line of moral difference between humans and animals through language.

The American philosopher Carl Cohen believes that animals have no rights because they lack the capacity for moral judgment. Humans have the ability to make moral judgments and can even consider their own judgments. Humans are members of the moral community and are guided by moral rules. Therefore, humans have moral rights, which animals lack. Hence, animals are not members of the moral community. So, if animals are used in research work, it does not infringe on their rights because there is nothing to infringe upon in the case of animals. Cohen believes that we have duties towards animals, such as a doctor towards their patient, a shepherd towards their sheep, or a herdsman towards their cow. He says, my dog has no right to regular check-ups or veterinary treatment, but it is my duty to provide them. This duty arises from various situations; it could be from feelings of affection

or compassion, certainly not from rights. Moreover, for this reason, I cannot restrict the use of animals as test subjects in research work. Humans can voluntarily involve themselves in such tasks, but it is impossible for animals. According to Cohen, '*Animals... lack the capacity to make free moral judgment. They are not the kind of beings who can discuss moral rights or react accordingly. Therefore, animals have no rights or cannot have any*'^m. [23]

The British journalist Polly Toynbee, writing about animal rights in the *Independent* newspaper, said:

Firstly, on the question of rights, we must keep our intellect sharp, and animals lack this. Rights apply only to humans, because rights are strongly connected to responsibilities. Rights originate from a human contract, a social contract. Rights come with moral obligation.....ⁿ [24]

Therefore, according to Toynbee, morality is a social contract. He believes that every intelligent being seeks its own ultimate interest and accepts morality if it proves beneficial for the individual. In this way, an intelligent being intellectually accepts being committed to another intelligent being, which is necessarily done through moral rules. They will work at their best for each other. However, animals are not capable of understanding the basis of this social contract, nor are they able to show respect for the rights of others, which intelligent creatures can do. Responsibility is associated with a social contract and humans are also conscious of the rights of others. Animals do not fall under this purview because they are not capable of upholding responsibilities like humans, nor are they self-aware. The condition for having rights is to respect the rights of others, a consideration that animals do not have. Therefore, he believes that animals cannot have any rights. [25]

The question is, are humans only conscious or committed to the rights of others when they are safeguarded all the time? If so, then society would not witness so much violence or conflict, and there would not be such rampant division or outcry. It is not true that humans always act ethically if they have the capacity for ethical judgement. If that were the case, words like bribery and corruption would not exist. We know that most people's primary goal is to protect their self-interest. If people fulfilled their responsibilities properly, there would not be so many retirement homes or orphanages. Therefore, drawing a line between humans and other animals by appealing for respect for social responsibility, commitments, and the rights of others, it is not at all appropriate to violate the moral rights of other animals or deprive them of those rights as a moral agent.

The above discussion shows that many philosophers have placed human beings at a higher level in the hierarchy and have been dissatisfied with the moral value of non-human animals. Killing non-human animals is indeed a heinous crime and must be refrained from. Cruel behaviour towards animals is in no way desirable. We need to behave morally towards non-human animals, otherwise the balance of the environment will be destroyed and the world will become unsuitable for human habitation. We know that every creature on Earth, from non-human animals to the smallest organisms, contributes to human welfare. For example, bats play a significant role in agricultural economics by controlling the number of various insects by eating them. Bats also eat mosquito larvae that carry diseases like dengue and chikungunya, which is a blessing for humanity. In this way, every non-human animal is playing an important role in human welfare. All of these are interconnected in the ecosystem. If non-human animals are killed indiscriminately, biodiversity will be lost, and the loss of bio-control will bring catastrophic changes to the environment. Therefore, even under the pressure to keep the ecosystem intact for the needs of non-human animals, we must behave morally towards animals as moral actors. The question may arise, how will the need for meat for a healthy life be met if non-human animals are removed from the food list? In this case, nutrition science says, plant-based meat can replace animal meat. Advocates for animal rights also believe that if we can guarantee a normal life without harming non-human animals, then that is what should be done as a moral actor. In this way, not only will the interests of non-human animals be preserved, but it will also be possible to fulfil responsibilities as a moral actor.

We know that humans and animals are interdependent beings. They need each other to sustain their existence. Moreover, we will refrain from cruel or brutal behaviour towards animals because they have moral value. However, we will not adopt such an extreme stance that puts all of civilization at risk. For example, we can consider the Eskimo community. Primarily residing in the Arctic regions of North America and Eastern Siberia, they live in a natural environment covered in snow where, without animals for food, they would starve. This could jeopardize their existence. Hence, the morality of consuming animals can be justified in such cases. However, this does not mean it is also justified in industrial societies, because in industrial societies a significant proportion of food comes from plants, so the wanton killing of animals is nothing more than an extravagance. In these situations, indiscriminate animal killing would be considered unethical. [26]

Another significant issue is that many times, many sick animals pose a threat to life, such as mad dogs or various virus-carrying animals. In such cases, if their life is not terminated, it may lead to fatal disasters for countless humans and even other animals. In such circumstances, the process of ending their life should also be as natural as possible, or the focus should be on causing them the least pain. However, this does not mean that indiscriminate killing of animals or hunting is being endorsed. Hunting, using animals for sport or for commercial purposes should be completely stopped. Animals often suffer extreme pain for the sake of sports or commercial usage, such as cutting horse hooves to fit iron wheels for pulling carts or inflicting various forms of pain for circus performances. All of these must be completely halted. In addition, instead of letting animals roam freely, confining them for

the sake of luxury items or hobby materials is considered a violation of animal rights. Animals also have the right to roam in their own environment without fear as sentient beings.

In conclusion, the ethical consideration of non-human animals is not only for preserving environmental balance or for maintaining biodiversity; non-human animals have a rightful claim not to be used unethically for luxury goods, entertainment, or even economic growth. However, in cases where there is a potential risk to civilization, those aspects must be considered.

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This work was conducted independently. As a translator, my role has been to accurately and faithfully convert the text from Bengali into English. The views and opinions expressed in the article are those of the original author and do not necessarily reflect my personal views.

I am responsible for any errors in the translation, and I have made my best effort to accurately convey the meaning and intent of the original article in this translation. I affirm that every effort has been made to preserve the meaning and spirit of the original article in this translation. While sentence structures and punctuations may have been altered for the sake of clarity and readability in the target language, careful attention was given to ensure the original message and tone were maintained.

I declare that while every effort has been made to accurately translate the content and intent of the original article, the reference style has been kept same as the original to readability for the target audience. The content and message of the references have been meticulously preserved to reflect the original work as closely as possible. Any discrepancies or inconsistencies in the translation, including the references, are the sole responsibility of the translator.

I have translated all quotations from the Bengali version of the article into English. I have not examined in the original sources any references, quotations, or phrases used by the original researcher (i.e. **Ghosh, 2021**).

References and notes^p

- [1] Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 'A new edition, corrected by the author', 1823), p. 310.
- [2] *Ibid.*, p. 311.
- [3] Mary Midgley, *Animals and Why They Matter* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, (1983), p. 98.
- [4] Mary Midgley, *Beast And Man: The Roots of Human Nature*, ed. 1995 (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 25-27.
- [5] Paul W. Taylor, *Respect for Nature*, 25th Anniversary edition (London: Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 70-80.
- [6] Tom Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights* (Berkeley: University of California Press, (1983), passim.
- [7] Tom Regan, 'The Case for Animal Rights', In *Defence of Animals*, edited by Peter Singer (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 23-24.
- [8] Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics*, 3rd edition (Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 48.
- [9] *Ibid.*, p. 50.

[10] The term was first used in 1970 by Richard Ryder. In speciesism, the existence, rights, and dignity of species other than one's own are denied, and one's own species is given the highest respect. Even harm to other species is not morally evaluated.

[11] Ensuring the greatest happiness of the majority of people and sentient beings in society and minimizing pain as much as possible is the ethical ideal of human life.

[12] Peter Singer (ed.), *A Companion to Ethics* (UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1991), p. 343.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 345.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 344.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 345.

[16] Rolston, H., III, Duties to Endangered Species, Elliot, R., (ed.), *Environmental Ethics*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995, passim.

[17] Callicott, J. B., 'Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair', in LaFollette, H., (ed.), *Ethics in Practice: An Anthology*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1997, p. 671.

[18] Rene Descartes, 'Animals are machine', in Tom Regan and Peter Singer (eds.), *Animal Rights and Human Obligations*, 2nd edition (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1989), pp. 13-19.

[19] Shreya Dasgupta, 'Can any animals talk and use language like humans?', *BBC, Earth story* (16 February, 2015).

[20] Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, edited by Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind, translated by Peter Heath (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 212.

[21] Peter Singer (2011), op. cit., passim, Chap. 3,5.

[22] Peter Singer (1991), op. cit., p. 344.

[23] Carl Cohen, 'The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research', *The New England Journal of Medicine*, Vol. 315, No.14 (October, 1986), p. 866.

[24] Anne Thomson, *Critical Reasoning in Ethics: A practical Introduction* (London and Newyork: Routledge, 2002), p. 113.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 191.

[26] Dr. Pradip Kumar Roy (Translated), *Practical Ethics*, Third Edition (Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 2012), p. 48.

Endnotes

^a Original Article: **Ghosh, M. (2021)**. Manobetor pranir noitik mulyo: Ekti darshanik poryalochona [Ethics regarding endangered non-human beings: A philosophical review]. *Jagannath University Journal of Arts*, 11(1), 135-148.

^b The abstract remains unchanged from the original article since it was published in English, the target translation language.

^c Translated quotation from the Bengali version of the article to English [translator's note]

^d Translated quotation from the Bengali version of the article to English [translator's note]

^e Translated quotation from the Bengali version of the article to English [translator's note]

^f Translated quotation from the Bengali version of the article to English [translator's note]

^g Translated quotation from the Bengali version of the article to English [translator's note]

^h Translated quotation from the Bengali version of the article to English [translator's note]

ⁱ Translated quotation from the Bengali version of the article to English [translator's note]

^j Translated quotation from the Bengali version of the article to English [translator's note]

^k Translated quotation from the Bengali version of the article to English [translator's note]

^l Translated quotation from the Bengali version of the article to English [translator's note]

^m Translated quotation from the Bengali version of the article to English [translator's note]

ⁿ Translated quotation from the Bengali version of the article to English [translator's note]

^o As in June 2023

^p Followed the style of the original article (i.e. Ghosh, 2021).