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Corporate Governance and Timeliness of Financial Reports of Selected Listed Nigerian Firms: A Quantile Regression Method

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Abstract: *The focused of this is corporate governance (CG) and timeliness of financial reporting (TFR) of selected listed Nigerian firms. The study observed that timely financial reporting frequently serves managers' interests when they perform managerial obligations, it does not necessarily serve the benefits of those who use financial statements. The longitudinal study design was used for the research, while the sample studied comprises of 31 non-financial listed Nigerian firms on NEG within the period 2016-2022. The simple random sampling method was utilized to select the firms. The OLS data analysis method was used for the study. However, in generating the dispersion dynamics for TFR, the quantile regression estimating method was utilized in the study. The results for both the OLS estimation and the quantile estimation. The OLS estimation results being basically a mean-based estimation technique indicates that BSIZE has a negative value of (-2.5361) though not significant (p=0.17481) effect on TFR. BDIL has a positive (0.3977) and significant at (p = 0.046) effect on TFR. BDFEX also indicates a negative values of (-0.0761) effect on TFR which is significant (0.00) and lastly there is positive value BDIND of (0.85262) with a significant p-value of (p=0.0342) effect on TFR at 5%. The model parameters shows that the* R^2 *for the model raised at 56% with a significant f-stat (4.1898, p=0.000). The 2.131 statistic value of Durbin Watson indicates absence of potential stochastic dependence of the first order in the model. It was recommended in the research that firms make sure that TFR does not come at the expense of the BDIND and vice versa.*

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Timeliness, Financial Reports, Firms and Nigeria.

Introduction

Financial reporting's timeliness (FRT) is having an adverse influence on the confidence of stakeholders in firms. The main cause of this anxiety is the chance that the impact of FRT lag will have on the caliber of financial reporting (FR). A variety of steps have been made to protect stakeholders from the global financial crisis and business failures (such insider trading and information asymmetry) including corporate governance procedures, (Adedeji, Soyinka, Sunday, Adegoroye, & Gbore, 2020). Management exercises its stewardship through financial reporting through creating and disseminating audited yearly accounts and reports. The crucial qualities sought of any reliable accounting information is the promptness of the published audited annual accounts and reports. The accounting information timely nature denotes both its accessibility when required and its level of up-to-datedness at the time of receipt and use, (Ukarin, Dankwambo, & Izodonmi, 2020). Financial reporting quality (FRQ) became a problem for the linking between corporate entities and stakeholders as a consequence of the consideration given to it.

In view of the growing concern about financial reporting (FR) and timeliness by stakeholders, corporate entities are looking for ways to reduce the time lag of FR to the barest minimum to prompt present their yearly audited financial report. Consequent, this thought as further increase research studies into financial reporting, (Okaiwele, 2018). According to Uwuigbe, Felix, Uwuigbe, Teddy & Irene, (2018) they argued that timely financial reporting frequently serves managers' comforts when they perform managerial obligations, it does not necessarily serve the benefits of those who use financial statements. Consequently, there is a progress in reporting timeliness. Consequently, factors relating to corporate governance, such as board independence, board size, audit committee independence, and other corporate governance traits, largely define whether timely financial statement is presented or not.

According to Oraka, Okoye, and Ezeejiofor, (2019) they agreed that CG affects how speedily organization presents their FR. Therefore, TFR can be regarded as a financial statement's features and is fundamental to the caliber of financial reports of firms. According to Adedeji, Soyinka, Sunday, Adegoroye, and Gbore, (2020), to achieve FRQ, CG principles and procedures must boost FRT. This suggests a connection between effective company governance performance and TFR.

Basically, the days amid the end of the company's fiscal year and the date of the audit report (AR) are utilized to ascertain how timely financial reports are, and the important factor in determining how well stock market is receiving audit information (McGee & Yuan, 2011). CG importance, and specifically the board structure, has recently come to light. These elements are addressed at the policy level as well, with CG codes paying particular attention to board-related concerns.

Along with the expanding demand for excellent FR, CG traits and the promptness of FR have received much of the attention in research. For emerging nations, notably Nigeria, the same cannot be true, where the most of studies have concentrated only on CG and have not given attention to CG characteristics (Mohamad-Nor, Shafie, & Wan-Hussin, 2010; McGee & Yuan, 2011; Omar &

Ahmed, 2016). However, various studies have been conducted in industrialized and other developing nations to determine whether there exist a meaningful connection amongst corporate governance traits and the TFR and also a diverse bag of results that are inconsistent were found out by most researchers such as Uwuigbe, Felix, Uwuigbe, Teddy, & Irene, 2018; Akogo, Mgbame, & Ogaide, 2015; Turel, 2010; Appah & Emeh, 2013; Asuquo, Imobhio, & Izedonmi, 2015.

It is worthy to emphasize that a gap exist in CG as a results lack of CG instruments, because most literature in Nigeria has not yet focused on some specific CG characteristics, such as (board diligence, board financial expertise, board independence, board size) influencing the FRT that are of significant to developing and developed countries (Joseph & Ahamed, 2017; Okaiwele, 2018; Oraka Okoye, & Ezejiofor, 2019). Due to these gaps, corporate governance mechanisms is the main focus of this study in other to determine statistically if there is significant effect between CG traits and the TFR of selected listed Nigerian firm.

Although several research has been conducted on the features influencing TFR in Nigeria (Ibadin, Izedonmi & Ibadin, 2012; Oladipupo & Ilaboya, 2013; Ilaboya & Iyafekhe, 2014; Modugu, Eragbhe & Ikhatua, 2012; Yadirichukwu & Ebimobowei, 2013), which have utilized the procedure of ordinary least squares (OLS) and panel regression (PG) which does not indicate the CG impact on different level of audit timeliness, the quartile regression parameter estimates the variation in a stated quartile of the response variable.

The whole distribution in CG are traced using conditional quantile regression (QR), conditioned on a series of timeliness audit categories. The relationship existing between corporate boards and timely reporting will become clearer and more rigorous as an outcome. In keeping with this, this study's methodology differs from the earliest investigation of CG and TFR done in Nigeria. The main stream of this research, examines CG effects and the TFR delivery of Nigerian firms audited reports in. Also to ascertain the effect of BDIL, BDIND, BSIZE, and BDFEX on the timely delivery of FR as an exclusive goals amongst others.

Literature Review and Hypotheses Development

Conceptual Framework

Timeliness of Financial Reports

Amongst the qualitative attributes of FR is timeliness, since it defines the expediency of the information and how it impacts the choices that readers of FR makes. Thus, financial reports information are essential if made accessible and reachable in the most shortest period of time; or otherwise, it loses some of its commercial value, (Ashibuogwu, 2022). TFR was defined by McGee (2007) as the interval between a companies' year-end and the day the FR was made available for public inspection. Accordingly, the amount of days between the balance sheet date and the date the external auditor's report was signed is the audit delay (Karim, Ahmed, and Islam, 2006). The amount of days between the balance sheet date and also the date the annual general meeting (AGM) notice was declared is known as the financial statements delay. The amount of days between the financial year's conclusion and the AGM is known as the AGM delay. The promptness of financial reports in Nigeria varies by industry, nevertheless. Iyoha (2012) said that 13 in Nigeria, the petroleum sector required 137 days, businesses in the banking sector needed roughly 82 days, businesses in the food, beverage, and tobacco industries needed 144 days, businesses in the health and insurance industries needed 153 days, businesses in agriculture needed 96 days, and conglomerates needed 119 days. Firms must report their corporate activities on time because of the variance in FR deadlines from sector to sector.

Concept of Corporate Governance (CG) traits

CG, is described by Liu, Harris, and Omar (2013), as internal controls aimed at promoting shareholders' interests and enabling managers to be transparent and accountable on matters pertaining to corporate operations and decision making. Corporate governance, according to Shuker and MdAminul (2012), is a system formulated by a business on which they have directed and controlled to promote the organization's perpetuity that is the board of directors' and management exclusive concern. According to Adedeji, Soyinka, Sunday, Adegoroye, and Gbore, (2020), CG refers to any financial or nonfinancial controls that guarantee the organization is being run properly in an appropriate direction. According to Okaiwele's (2018) study, CG is a conventional regulations that affect how customers perceive how a firm exercises control over its resources.

CG is seen from a business viewpoint according to Momoh and Ukpong, (2013) is a collection of procedures designed to help corporate managers carry out their responsibilities in a foremost interests of the organization and her stakeholders. The term "corporate governance traits" refers to the quantity of matters involving the management or firms' board. Thus, board diligence, board independence, board financial expertise, and board size are a few examples.

Review of Empirical Studies and Hypotheses Development

This subsection presents a serious review of several studies carried out on the "corporate governance traits and TFR". This study reviews related studies based on specific variables. These variables were independently discussed below include BSIZE, BDIL, BDFEX and BIND.

Board Size (BSIZE) and Timeliness of Financial Reporting (TFR)

FRT has been found to have influenced by a firm's size. There are many arguments in favour of the correlation between timeliness and corporate size. First, major businesses can afford ongoing audits and have more possessions to enforce and implement robust organizational internal control systems (Oraka, Okoye, & Ezejiofor, 2019). All of these should make it simpler to quickly audit an extensive transactions. Second, because they are more widely known, large corporations are under greater pressure from media analysts to provide timely financial information (Owusu-Ansah, 2005; Ahmed, 2003). Therefore, the duration of the FR period should be shortened, the larger the firm. Again, the study by Mohammed and Che-Ahmed (2017) looks at how CG traits affect ARL of listed Nigerian banks. In the investigation, 14 banks were used. The research spans five years, from 2008 to 2012. Board size shows significant positive connections with audit report lag, according to study findings founded on a strong ordinary least squares model. Ibadin, Izedonmi, and Ibadin, (2012) in their study establish that the BSIZE had no significant relationship with audit delay. With the above, the study hypothesis is specified below;

Ho_1: BSIZE has no significant effect on the TFR of selected listed Nigerian firms.

Board Diligence (BDIL) and TFR

Board diligence activities is proxy on the frequent meetings held by board members which is a significant aspect is of firms board variables in the research. Most researchers as argued that board diligence increases the FRT thereby reducing the audit time lag. The efficiency of the directors of the board is linked to the regularity of board meetings (Greco, 2012), while Hashim and Rahman (2010), asserted that boards of directors who are more diligent are more anxious with FR components of the company.

In assessing the correlation between board diligence and audit delay, Yoke, Jiaying, Ann, Yan, and Yi's (2017) study looks at the impact of CG variables on the lag of audit reports of 250 publicly traded corporations in Malaysia. Multiple linear regressions were utilized for the data analysis. The results demonstrated a significant relationship (SR) between board diligences and delayed in audit report. Appah, and Emeh (2013) studied the impact of CG and the TFR of quoted firms in Nigeria; and in another study by Baatwah, Salleh, and Ahmed (2017) examined the relationship between board meeting and AR timeliness; their results showed no SR between TFR and board meetings; this was also supported by Hashim and Rahman (2010) as they establish no SR between the two. Consequent upon the above, the study hypothesis as specified below;

Ho_2: BDIL has no significant effect on the TFR of selected listed Nigerian firms.

Board Financial Expertise (BDFEX) and TFR

According to Agrawal and Chadha's (2005) they studied on board expertise, they opine that there exist a sufficient amount of members of the board who are knowledgeable about financial information as it applies to the firm. This is to enable understand how CG influences the timely compliance of financial statements by listed corporations in Nigeria. Appah and Emeh (2013) investigated the correlation between the financial knowledge of boards and audit delay. The researchers noted the importance for firm to have in their board those who have financial expertise. In addition, the enquiry showed in the findings a strong correlation between board expertise and timely financial report. Consequently, CG factors has several effect on firm-specific features and corporate reporting and timeliness of UK corporations as examined by Abdelsalam & Street (2007), the study exposed board expertise and corporate TFR have meaningful relationship.

Mohammed and Che-Ahmed's (2017) the outcomes of the researchers on the impacts in CG traits on ARL of listed Nigerian banks from 2008 to 2012 did not, however, reveal any statistically significant relationship between ARL and BDFEX, for a time spanning 2008 - 2012. While Hashim and Rahman, (2010) looked at the relationship amongst CG practices and ARL amongst 288 businesses listed in Bursa Malaysia. This study's findings showed that there exist no conclusive association amongst audit reports lag and board expertise. The empirical correlations between timeliness of audit reporting and board expertise, were studied by Mohamad-Nor, Shafie, and Wan-Hussin (2010). The data shows that audit delays and board expertise have the anticipated inverse relationship. Upon the above, it was therefore hypothesis as shown below:

Ho_3: BDFEX has no significant effect on the TFR of selected listed Nigerian firms.

Board Independence (BDIND) and TFR

Board independence is termed among the most crucial aspects of effective CG. Non-executive directors' presence in a difficult scenario at an agency aided in keeping an eye on and leading in management's self-serving interests (Adedeji, Soyinka, Sunday, Adegoroye, & Gbore, 2020). As asserted by Stefanescu (2013) board independence could be a strategy for assisting with and resolving issues that managers and owners face as a consequence of the meeting of proprietorship from control, which is ascribed to an informational imbalance. Large numbers of nonexecutive directors in the firm's board can aid in monitoring management actions, particularly in areas of opportunistic behavior. Nonexecutive outside directors who exhibit a lesser degree of allegiance to management can play a key role in pushing companies to provide more crucial information to dispersed investors. This is, with regard to the situation that they are not employee of the firm but are independent firm that represents the benefits of the owners and stakeholders and to also keep their reputation intact.

Among the most imperative components of efficient CG is the BDIND. In a challenging situation at an agency, non-executive directors' presence benefit in checking and guiding management's self-serving interests (Adedeji, Soyinka, Sunday, Adegoroye, & Gbore, 2020). According to Stefanescu (2013), an approach for aiding with and addressing problems that managers and owners encounter as a concern of the division of ownership from control and that are attributed to an informational imbalance is board independence. In regions where opportunistic behavior is present, having a great amount of board directors who are non-executive of the firm can help in monitoring management actions. Nonexecutive outside directors who are less loyal to management can be crucial in pressuring firms to give dispersed investors more essential information. The result is, factor that influences TFR is whether or not the BDIND. Based on the review, it was therefore hypothesis that:

Ho_4: BDIND has no significant relationship between TFR of selected listed Nigerian firms.

Methodology

This research employs a longitudinal research design. The sample comprises of 31 non-financial firms listed in Nigerian Exchange Group (NEG), within the period 2016-2022. The selection of the firms are chosen using a simple random sampling method. The data are taken from the firm's corporate annual reports. While the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method of data analysis was utilized in this investigation. Quantile regression (QR) estimation was utilized to construct distributional dynamics for TFR. While the quantile regression can produce estimates for all conditional quantiles of the distribution of respondents' variable, the OLS regression only estimates the conditional mean effects of respondents' variable. Furthermore, QR is better able to handle violations of the standard assumptions of normality, homoskedasticity and absence of outliers. The study's model investigated how CG affects the TFR of some selected listed Nigerian firms. The model builds on studies of Adedeji, Soyinka, Sunday, Adegoroye, and Gbore, (2020); Yoke, Jiaying, Ann, Yan and Yi (2017); Ibadin, Izedonmi and Ibadin (2012). The models for the study are specified below;

The functional model is presented below;
TFR= *f (Corporate Governance)*………………………………………………………………. (i)
The econometric model with the control variable (LEV) is then specified below;
$TFR = B_{0t} + B_{1t}BSIZE + B_{2t}BDIL + B_{3t}BDFEX + B_{4t}BDIND + \mu_{it}$ ……………………………(ii)
Where;
TFR = Timeliness of financial reporting
BSIZE = Board size
BDIL = Board diligence
BDFEX = Board financial expertise
BDIND = Board independence,
μ_{it} = random error

Table 1.1. Measurement of Variables

Variable	Definition	Measurement	Source	Aprori sign
Timeliness TFR	Timeliness of financial reporting	Period from year-end date to AGM date.	Oladipupo and Izedonmi (2009)	
BSIZE	Board size	Number of individuals on the board.	Ilaboya and Iyafekhe (2014)	-
BDIL	Board Diligence	Frequency of meeting of board.	Habib and Hossain (2012)	+
BDFEX	Board financial expertise	Number of directors with	Agrawal and Chadha (2005),	

		accounting/finance background.		
BDIND	Board Independence	Number of nonexecutive directors on the board.	Matoussi&Chakroun, (2007).	+

Source: Researchers Composition (2023)

RESULTS

Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics

	Mean	Max	Min	Std. Dev.	Jacque-Bera	Prob.
Timeliness TFR	203	224	90	88.76594	769010.1	0.000
BSIZE	9.207229	17	4	2.616456	14.41091	0.000
BDIL	11	12	6	18.60055	990.6882	0.000
BDFEX	4	7	1	0.092881	68.14398	0.000
BDIND	0.632024	1	0.17	0.157786	6.289204	0.043

Source: Researchers Computation (2023)

Table 2.1 above shows the data's descriptive statistics. According to the data, TFR has a mean value of 203 days and max and min values of 224 days and 90 days, respectively. The max and min values for the board size are 17 and 4, respectively, with nine (9) being the average. At 2.616, the standard deviation, shows how the data are dispersed around the mean, is fairly low. The average value of BDIND is 0.63, with max and min values of 1, and 0.17, respectively, indicating that around 63% of the members of the board are independent. Since the standard deviation is so low (0.15), there is low significant clustering around the distribution mean. A mean of four (4) directors indicate that 4 directors are financial experience, with max and min values of seven (7) and one (1), respectively. With a Std. Dev. of 18.600, the average BDIL as determined by the frequency of board meetings is approximately 11 while the max and min values are 12 and 6, respectively. Since of the Jacque-Bera values are less than 0.05, the Jacque-Bera statistics for all the variables show that the series are normally distributed. This suggests that the data are free of notable outliers.

Table 3.1: Pearson Correlation Matrix

	TFR	BSIZE	BDIL	BDFEX	BDIND
TFR	1				
BSIZE	0.187	1			
BDIL	0.102	0.0345	1		
BDFEX	0.022	0.0384	-0.006	1	
BDIND	-0.1	0.1736	0.0445	-0.085	1

Source: Researchers Computation (2023)

Table 3.1 shows, the correlation coefficients of the variables under investigation. Nevertheless, the particular interest is to investigate the correlation between the TFR, and the independent variables. The observation indicated, a positive correlation exists between TFR, and the following variables; BSIZE (r=0.187). TFR is also positively correlated (PC) with BDIL (r=0.102), and BDFEX(r=0.022) and is negatively correlated (NC) with BDIND (r=-0.1). However providing some level of perception into the degree and trend of relationship between the variables, the correlation analysis is narrow in its inferential ability generally because it does not imply functional dependence and hence causality in a strict sense. The Regression analysis is well suitable for this purpose.

Table 4.1: Multicollinearity Test

Variable	VIF
C	NA
BSIZE	1.634559
BDIL	1.046876
BDFEX	2.070027
BDIND	1.116511

Source: Researchers Computation (2023)

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The variance inflation factor (VIF) describes by what means the variance of the coefficient estimate of a regressor has been inflated, as a consequence of collinearity with the other regressors. Basically, VIFs above 10 are seen as a source of worry as observed, none of the variables have VIF's values more than 10 and therefore this does not give serious indication of multicollinearity.

Table 5.1: Quantile regression process estimates.

OLS Result			Quantile Result		
Coefficient		Prob		Coefficient	Prob
C	0.5381	0.000*			
BSIZE	-2.5361	0.17481	0.1	-0.00386	0.6528
			0.2	-0.00538	0.4153
			0.3	-0.00494	0.3215
			0.4	-0.00222	0.5615
			0.5	-0.00076	0.8114
			0.6	-0.0028	0.3146
			0.7	-0.00442	0.082
			0.8	-0.00543	0.0382*
			0.9	-0.00851	0.0032*
BDIL	0.3977	0.0463*	0.1	0.01556	0.0135*
			0.2	0.00913	0.3232
			0.3	0.01823	0.0026*
			0.4	0.01967	0.0017*
			0.5	0.01556	0.0135*
			0.6	0.002498	0.8759
			0.7	0.01323	0.0656
			0.8	0.00496	0.5153
			0.9	0.00816	0.2818
BDFEX	-0.0761	0.000*	0.1	-0.33279	0.3752
			0.2	-0.50063	0.2764
			0.3	-0.59565	0.2763
			0.4	-0.85304	0.1727
			0.5	-1.07518	0.108
			0.6	-1.73718	0.009*
			0.7	-2.01042	0.001*
			0.8	-2.18138	0.000*
			0.9	-1.77593	0.002*
BDIND	0.85262	0.0342*	0.1	-0.05124	0.6999
			0.2	0.047899	0.5301
			0.3	0.150034	0.005*
			0.4	0.095761	0.0784
			0.5	0.091938	0.0734
			0.6	0.128186	0.0141*
			0.7	0.185568	0.0004*
			0.8	0.185966	0.001*
			0.9	0.127269	0.0353*
R^2	0.5602				
Adj R^2	0.4265				
F-Stat	4.1898				
P(f-stat)	0.000				
D.W	2.131				

Source: *Researchers computation (2023), ( ) are standard errors; { } are p-values, * sig at 5%*

Table 5.1 above indicates the estimation results for both the OLS estimation and the quantile estimation. The OLS estimation results being basically a mean-based estimation technique indicates that BSIZE has a negative value of (-2.5361) though not significant (p=0.17481) effect on TFR. Board diligence (BDIL) has a positive (0.3977) and significant at (p = 0.046) effect on TFR. BDFEX also indicates a negative values of (-0.0761) effect on TFR which is significant (0.00) and lastly BDIND has a positive values of

(0.85262) which is significant at (p=0.0342) effect on TFR at 5%. The model parameters shows that the R^2 for the model raised at 56% with a significant f-stat (4.1898, p=0.000). The Durbin Watson statistic of 2.131 indicates the absence of potential stochastic dependence of the first order in the model. The QR estimates, also examined more informative insights shielded from the normal OLS regression. The quantile progression estimates for BSIZE retained a negative sign and was not significant in most of the quantile firms (QT) QT1 – QT1. Consequently, for both firms in the low, middle and slightly high levels of TFR, the study did not find evidence that the BSIZE plays any significant role except for firms in the highest levels of TFR where the negative sign is still maintained nevertheless turned out significant. Though, the statistical insignificance of BSIZE across QT1-QT7 which is also supported by the OLS regression result where BSIZE was found to be insignificant, the null hypothesis (Ho_1) that BSIZE has no significant effect on TFR is rejected at 5%. The negative effect of BSIZE is most felt for firms in the highest TFR group and the quantile results indicating the BSIZE has a negative effect on TFR. The arguments concerning the value of both larger or smaller boards is still on going as there is yet no agreement concerning what an optimum BSIZE should be. There are opinions favoring the presence of a smaller BSIZE going from timely decision making benefits and more comprehensive board communication that may perform interestingly given a large board. The study is in contrast with Appah and Emeh (2013), Ilaboya and Iyafekhe (2014), Mohammed and Che-Ahmed (2017) nonetheless is supported by Baatwah, Salleh and Ahmed (2017) and Yoke, Jiaying, Ann, Yan and Yi (2017).

The effect of BDIL on TFR is significant nevertheless just at the high and modest levels of TFR specifically in QT1, QT2, QT3 QT4 and QT5. The results of the OLS estimation also supports that BDIL has a positive and significant effect on TFR which recommends that the null hypothesis (Ho_2) which states that BDIL has no significant effect on TFR is rejected at 5%. Nevertheless, the analysis shows that the effect of BDIL is not the same through all distribution of TFR, the effect of BDIL seems to be obvious in firms at the high and some modest levels of TFR however for firms' tin the least timely quantiles, BDIL does not appear to be liable for that. Observing the quantile estimates, it is perceived that for all observations of TFR from QT1 –QT7, the relationship between TFR and BFEX is negative which suggest that across all quantiles, increases in BDIL results in reduced TFR though, this relationship was not significant in QT1, QT2, QT3, QT4 and QT5 but significant at 5% in QT6, QT7, QT8, and QT9. This suggests that the null hypothesis (Ho_3) that BFEX has no significant effect on TFR is rejected at 5%. This suggests that BDIL variable performs responsible for least TFR however suggestion of such was not found for firms with more timely reports.

The quantile result implies that the relationship between BDIND and TFR is positive across almost all quantiles (QT1 –QT9) and significant in QT3, QT6, QT7, QT8 and QT9. This result supports the OLS outcome where BDIND was found to be significant which suggests that the null hypothesis (Ho_4) that BDIND has no significant effect on TFR is rejected at 5%. The quantile process results indicates that for firms at the highest levels of TFR (QT1-QT3), the positive effect of BDIND is supported but is only significant at QT3 and as firms move down the TFR quantile, from modest TFR levels (QT4 –QT6) it is observed that the effect of BIND is still positive and significant at 5% for QT6. For firm observations in the lowest TFR levels (QT7 –QT9), the effect of BDIND is also positive and significant all through and this suggest that positive effect of BDIND can be seen for firms in the modest and lowest quantiles but fails to explain strongly TFR for those firms with the most timeliness. The finding is in tandem with Abdelsalam, and Street, (2007), though in contrast with Ibadin, Izedonmi and Ibadin (2012) and Hashim and Rahman (2010).

Conclusion

The study examined on the effect of cg traits on TFR in selected listed Nigerian firms. The study did not find suggest that the BSIZE plays any significant role except for firms in the highest levels of TFR where the negative sign is still maintained nevertheless turned out significant. Though, the statistical insignificance of BSIZE across QT1-QT7 which is also supported by the OLS regression result where BSIZE was found to be insignificant, the null hypothesis (Ho_1) that BSIZE has no significant effect on TFR is rejected at 5%. The negative effect of BSIZE is most felt for firms in the highest TFR group and the quantile results indicating the BSIZE has a negative effect on TFR. The effect of BDIL on TFR is significant nevertheless just at the high and modest levels of TFR specifically in QT1, QT2, QT3 QT4 and QT5. BDFEX is negative which suggest that across all quantiles, increases in BDIL results in reduced TFR though, this relationship was not significant in QT1, QT2, QT3, QT4 and QT5 but significant at 5% in QT6, QT7, QT8, and QT9. This suggests that the null hypothesis (Ho_3) that BDFEX has no significant effect on TFR is rejected at 5%. The quantile process results indicates that for firms at the highest levels of TFR (QT1-QT3), the positive effect of BDIND is supported but is only significant at QT3 and as firms move down the TFR quantile, from modest TFR levels (QT4-QT6) it is observed that the effect of BDIND is still positive and significant at 5% for QT6. For firm observations in the lowest TFR levels (QT7-QT9), the effect of BDIND is also positive and significant all through and this suggest that positive effect of BDIND can be seen for firms in the modest and lowest quantiles but fails to explain strongly TFR for those firms with the most timeliness.

Recommendations

Base on the outcome of the study, it recommended as follows, that:

1. Firms make sure that timely financial reporting does not come at the expense of BDIND and vice versa.
2. Ideal BSIZE must be chosen by firms in order to minimize concerns with delayed financial reporting.
3. Firms should ensure that all direct stakeholders in the firm are sufficiently represented on the board, despite the fact that there is still disagreement regarding the ideal number for BSIZE.
4. The boards of the firms add more financial professionals to their boards.

5. The board should become more diligent by holding meetings more frequently to discuss matters pertaining to the firm.
6. The board members should be encouraged to engage fully in meetings and the prevalence of absentee board members who seem to be there merely for show should be discouraged.

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