The Role of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy

Dekontee Drapper

Pan African university, Yaoundé, Cameroon

Abstract: *This article explores how, amid its internal challenges, ECOWAS has been developing legal, operational, and political frameworks an area in which it has been solid. This paper illustrates how systems of conflict prevention and early warning can serve as an underpinning approach around which regional cooperation and integration can be fostered on the continent of Africa. That is how ECOWAS, through the ECOWAS Commission and Early Warning Response Network (ECOWARN), developed legal, operational, and political frameworks to improve peace and security in West Africa. Established in 2003, ECOWARN utilizes a decentralized structure that involves observation centers, zonal bureaus, national situation rooms, and civil society networks to collect data, analyze risks, and issue early warnings over potential triggers of violent conflict. In the process, this proactive disposition has further enabled ECOWAS to conduct preventive diplomacy through good offices, shuttle diplomacy, and the deployment of stabilization forces before crisis precipitation, as demonstrated in The Gambia, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali, among others. Nevertheless, they are currently being challenged by scant resources, capacity gaps, lack of political will, problems in regional cooperation, and complex transnational threats. It needs more funding, capacity-building, regional cooperation, and better compliance mechanisms to lift it to its full potential. For the growing security threats in West Africa, there is a greater expectation that ECOWAS should be the body of early warnings and preventive diplomacy through regional integration, economic development, and human security.*

Keywords: ECOWAS, Early Warning, Preventive Diplomacy

Introduction

In fostering cooperation and regional integration, conflict prevention and early warning systems play a pivotal role. According to Cutillo (2013), tragic loss of human life and suffering are not the only result of conflicts and violence, also political costs and high economic which can threaten regional stability and reverberate across borders. According to World Bank research, in the 1990s, civil wars cost emerging nations $64 billion a year, hindering economic integration and progress 2003.

Hence, identifying of potential conflicts at the early stage is essential. A regional early warning system that is efficient can track escalating tensions and make available timely alerts to government and regional bodies, providing preventive diplomatic interventions before violence intensify (AU EWS, 2015). In Africa and other parts of the world, regional economic communities (RECs) established early warning and response mechanisms to observe conflict risk factors and prevent conflict from escalating through a proactive intervention (Olonisakin, 2013).

The African Union's Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) for example, utilizes data collection tools and analysis to identify structural exposure and monitor rising menace across the continent (AU EWS, 2015). RECs can mitigate conflicts that may escalate across borders and hinder integration initiatives by fostering information exchange and early response. As stated by Marc-Leva et al. (2013), that conflicts prevention aligns with the mandates of many RECs to uphold peace, security and stability in their regions. Therefore, promoting early warning and preventive diplomacy is essential for sustainable regional integration.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional organization established in 1975 on the 28 of may in Lagos, Nigeria by 15 heads of state to promote economic integration and development in West Africa (ECOWAS, 2021). Notwithstanding, ECOWAS has enlarged its mandate with the inclusion of promoting peace and security within the region. This is preserved in the ECOWAS revised Treaty of 1993 which delineate mechanisms on how to prevent, manage, and resolve regional disputes (Adetula et al. 2016). In the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) operationalization, ECOWAS has been described as a "peace setter" playing an influential role in conflict mediation, peacekeeping, and humanitarian intervention in West Africa (Jaye, 2017).

ECOWAS has developed legal, operational and political frameworks to improve peace and security through bodies like the ECOWAS Commission, Community parliament, and Court of Justice (ECOWAS, 2021). For instance, the Protocol Relating to the mechanism for the prevention of conflicts, management and resolution which is the 1999 protocol established formal procedures for

conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. During the Liberia and Sierra Leone civil wars in 1990s and 2000s, ECOWAS played a crucial role in restoring peace and stability in both countries (Aning and Salihu, 2013). As noted by Onuoha (2012), Of late ECOWAS has been involved in preventive diplomacy and post-electoral mediation in countries such as Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, and Togo. As Jaye (2017) stated, ECOWAS continues to provide "sub-regional leadership" to address security challenges in the region.

ECOWAS and Conflict Prevention

As stated by Jaye (2017), ECOWAS has progressively focus on resolving, and preventing conflicts to promote stability and prosperity in West Africa since its founding. The organization has developed a unified peace and security architecture to address cross-border challenges such as terrorism, electoral violence, civil conflicts, organized crime, and maritime piracy. This comprises of the 1999 protocol on Mechanisms for Conflict prevention, management and resolution that provides a recognized framework for ECOWAS interventions (Jaye, 2017).

ECOWAS takes a multi-dimensional approach through mediation, preventative diplomacy, peacekeeping operations, and post conflicts reconstruction activities (ECOWAS, 2021). For instance, ECOWAS carried out preventive diplomacy mission in Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Togo to facilitate democratic norms and diffuse tensions around elections (Mehler, 2009). According to Hartmann (2010), after the death of long-ruling president Gnassibgbé Eyadéma, in the lead up to the 2005 presidential election in Togo, there were concerns over political repression and the possibility of violence.

ECOWAS deployed an electoral assistance mission headed by former Nigerian president Abdulsalami Abubaker to encourage dialogue and monitor the polls. Okereke (2018) contends that while the election was controversial, ECOWAS in preventive diplomacy to discourage post-elections violence and eventually negotiated a political agree engagement between the government opposition. In Guinea, ECOWAS intervened following a military coup in 2008 and appointed president Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso as a mediator They facilitated the 2010 presidential election (ICG, 2010).

The mission helped facilitate the electoral process, which international observers deemed legitimate despite some irregularities (BBC, 2010). ECOWAS mediation in 2014, led by Senegalese president Macky Sall prevented civil war in Burkina Faso, by negotiating president Blaise Compaoré's resignation after he attempted to extend his 27 years rule. And this established a transitional roadmap to elections (Crisis Group, 2015). As mentioned by Anying & Salihu (2013), the ECOWAS Standby Force, founded in 2003, has deployed peacekeeping troops to stabilize conflicts in countries such as Liberia, Mali, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau.

In enhancing cooperation on early warning systems, sanctions, and transnational security strategy, ECOWAS also partners with the UN and AU on initiatives like the African Peace and Security Architecture (Adetula et al. 2016). In addition, ECOWAS facilitates rehabilitation and reconciliation in post-conflict situations. Its efforts were important in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of over 100, 000 ex-combatants after the Liberian civil wars (Olonisakin, 2013).

ECOWAS through this mechanism, continues to be an important driver of conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the region of West Africa. As maintain by Olonisakin (2013) for the purpose of enhancing ECOWAS's capacity in conflict prevention, the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) was established in 2003. Jaye (2017) also noted that the ECOWARN was created under the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security adopted by ECOWAS in 1999.

ECOWARN represents a shift by ECOWAS from an "ECOMONG-centric approach", focused heavily on military peacekeeping, to a more preventive posture using early warning and response (Howe, 2021). Part of the African Union's Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) initiated in 2002 is the development of ECOWARN (AU, 2021). It aims to promote information collection and analysis on a sub-regional level to identify potential conflicts early (ECOWAS, 2021). Providing critical human security information to ECOWAS decision-makers, developing standard early warning indicators, and networking with civil society organizations (CSOs) are all specific objectives of ECOWARN (Olonisakin, 2013).

Jaye (2017) asserted that a pilot phase was launched in Mali 2006 to test ECOWARN mechanisms before expanding it to the rest of Africa. The department responsible for coordinating ECOWARN are the Early Warning Directorate in the ECOWAS Commission's political Affairs, Peace and Security Department. It operates through four zonal bureaus covering West, Central, Coastal and Sahel areas of West Africa to monitor countries and local conditions (ECOWAS, 2021). The decentralized structure facilitates timely gathering of political, economic, and social data to feed into early warning reports.

ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN)

According to ECOWAS (2021), ECOWARN has a structure that composed of several interconnected decentralized units operating at different levels: The Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) located in Abuja, Nigeria is the central hub that coordinates the

overall early warning system. The OMC is responsible for receiving and analyzing data from other components. The Zonal Bureaus Covering the different sub- regions of West Africa. There are four zonal bureaus: Monrovia for the Central zone, Cotonou for the Coastal zone, Ouagadougou for the Sahel zone, and Banjul for the Western zone. All of these bureaus monitor local developments and report to the OMC (ECOWAS, 2021).

The National Situation Rooms are located within ECOWAS member states. These situation rooms monitor and report on conditions within their respective countries to the zonal bureaus. And lastly ECOWARN is cooperating with the Civil Society organization, community base groups media, and research institutes that are providing grassroots data and information (Aning & Atuobi, 2011). Tools like situation reports, geographic information systems mapping, risk analysis models, and field monitoring to gather data on potential spark of violent conflict (Charlesraj et al., 2020).

Human rights violations, arms proliferation, displacement of populations, and challenges to democratic governance. Specific indicators tracked include human rights violations, displacement of populations, arms proliferation, and challenges to democratic governance. With this decentralized yet integrated structure ECOWARN is able to gather, analyze, and communicate conflict risk information effectively across the different national and local levels to the centralized OMC (Aning & Lecoutre, 2008). To provide timely early warning to ECOWAS leadership so as to enable preventive response is the goal of ECOWARN.

key functions of ECOWARN includes: Collection of data – Which is gathering information from various sources such as the national situation room within member states, the four zonal bureaus across West Africa, Civil society organizations, the media, research institutes, and field monitoring and observation missions (Aning & Atuobi, 2011). As stated by Charlesraj et al. (2020), ECOWARN in gathering data, utilized tools like Situation reports, Risk analysis models, and geographic information systems (GIS) mapping. Analyzing data – Under the Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) in Abuja, Nigeria ECOWARN has the central hub for analyzing data from various sources.

The OMC is there to identify potential triggers of violent conflict within the region, also the assessment of human rights, governance, and security trends (ECOWAS, 2021). According to Aning and Lecoutre (2008), specific indicators such as human right violations, displacement of populations, arms proliferation, and challenges to democratic governance are being monitored. Dissemination of information – ECOWARN make early warning report to ECOWAS decision-makers by providing timely alerts on uprising conflicts that have the potential to escalate to violence, and offering policy advice and response options.

In addition, communications are channel through ECOWAS mediation and security council, ECOWAS Commission and specialized agencies, member states and other stakeholders (Aning, 2007). ECOWARN aims to enhance ECOWAS's capacity for conflict prevention and enable more proactive responses to emerging threats in the region by collecting data systematically, conducting analysis, and disseminating early warning information. Through ECOWARN multi-layered architecture, it tracks a wide range of dangerous factors and triggers that could destabilize the region. ECOWARN plays an important role in monitoring and analyzing factors that could intensify into violent conflict across the West African region (Oudraat, 2021). ECOWARN depend on its National Situation Room and collaborative network with civil society organizations, media outlets, and research institutions to collect real-time information from local communities through the grassroot level (Charlesraj et al., 2020).

This approach enables ECOWARN to discover early signs of tensions, human rights abuses, and others potential violence that may not be immediately visible at the national or regional level. The data generated is then fed into ECOWARN'S zonal bureaus, which conduct more detailed analysis and monitoring of specific sub-regions (ECOWAS, 2021). The zonal bureaus utilize tools such as risk assessment model, geographic information systems (GIS) mapping, and field monitoring missions to identify and track the dynamics of emerging crises (Aning & Lecoutre, 2008). Analysts integrate and evaluate the information from various sources to produce comprehensive early warning reports at the central Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) in Abuja (Olonisakin, 2013).

According to Aning (2007), These report not only point out imminent threats but also examine the underlying structural factors such as governance deficiency, socio- economic grievances, or resources competition that could fuel future conflicts. ECOWARN's early warning analysis covers a wide range of indicators including human rights violations, displacement of populations, challenges to democratic processes, arms proliferation, and transnational security threat like terrorism or maritime piracy (Oudraat, 2021). ECOWARN can provide timely alerts to ECOWAS decision-makers about imminent crises and recommend preventive measures or response options by continuously monitoring these indicators.

The reports from the ECOWARN early warning system for instance, were instrumental in facilitating ECOWAS preventive diplomacy initiatives during the 2010 post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire and the 2012 coup d'état in Mali (Olonisakin, 2013). In each instance, ECOWARN's forecasting analysis has informed mediation efforts by ECOWAS and the deployment of stabilization forces. Despite the challenges left requiring, including difficulties with coordination, building capacity and resource limitation, ECOWARN has greatly improved readiness of early conflict detection and early response mechanism in place for countries

belonging to ECOWAS signaling a change from response/crisis management based on reactivity to more proactive strategy in dealing regional security issues (Okereke, 2018).

ECOWAS Preventive Diplomacy Mechanisms

ECOWAS employs several instruments of preventive diplomacy in order to lower tensions, improve dialogue, and also accord conflicts from reaching a certain height of escalation within the region. The mechanisms are outlined in the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security.

ECOWAS engage in Shuttle Diplomacy: Involves such activities as carrying proposals, moving from one party to another, the party in conflict, and conducting separate consultations, among other means of work that they do (Kacungira, 2021). This way, back-and-forth processes are built, trust is built, a common ground is identified, and differences are incrementally leveled. A case in point is when ECOWAS, in 2017, during The Gambia's political impasse, appointed former President of Ghana, John Dramani Mahama, as its Special Envoy. The latter shuttled between an incumbent President, Yahya Jammeh, and President-Elect Adama Barrow. He finally convinces Jammeh to gulp the bitter pill, accept the election results, and step down (Hartmann, 2017).

Good Offices

The good offices of ECOWAS are used often to open up diplomatic engagement and create the atmosphere for dialogue between disagreeing parties. Special Envoys or Representatives are appointed to facilitate communication, develop trust, and instigate negotiation. This includes logistic support, technical assistance, and a neutral venue for negotiations (Obi, 2021). For example, ECOWAS facilitated the Inter-Malian Dialogue in 2019, which brought to the peace and reconciliation table all relevant stakeholders, to wit: government, armed groups, and civil society (ECOWAS, 2019). Which in 2020, ECOWAS appointed former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan as Special Envoy to Mali, mediated the political crisis in the country after a military coup earlier in the month (Africa News 2020).

Mediation and Brokering Agreements

ECOWAS envoys and mediation teams come in strongly when tensions rise or negotiations stall, applying political weight and negotiation skills to mediate between parties and broker agreements. They provide compromises, incentive packages, and, in some cases, pressure through threats of sanctions or intervention (Kacungira, 2021). The most recent one relates to the failed coup attempt in Guinea-Bissau in February 2022. It also came after the place pushed sanctions on the coup leaders & set a mediator, former Guinean Prime Minister Ibrahima Kassory Fofana, to assist in negotiations (Africa News, 2022). And through these endeavors, with the insertion of a stabilization force, the crisis led to a non-violent end and the selection of a new civilian Prime Minister (AP News, 2022).

Co-ordination and Co-operation

The ECOWAS envoys work with the ECOWAS Commission to bring coherence to preventive diplomacy. They will also coordinate with other international actors like the UN, African Union, and development partners with pooling of resources, expertise, and leverage. This ensures that such requirements provide a comprehensive and effective response to emerging crises (Obi, 2021). These are complemented by other measures, such as fact-finding, confidence building initiatives, and electoral observation missions, among others, that serve to contribute to the prevention of conflict by ECOWAS (Kacungira, 2021). In addition, the effectiveness of ECOWAS Special Representatives and Envoys in preventing the escalation of conflict and crisis resolution in West Africa cannot be overemphasized, even in cases that remain challenging to date regarding ensuring impartiality, securing buy-in from all parties, and resource constraints.

ECOWAS's Achievements in Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy

Below are detailed highlights of accomplishments in the field of early warning and preventive diplomacy by ECOWAS, demonstrated through typical examples where conflicts have been either prevented, controlled, or de-escalated.

The Gambia (2016-2017)

According to Hartmann (2017), The tense political situation in The Gambia following the presidential elections 2016 was being very closely monitored by ECOWAS early warning mechanisms. When incumbent President Yahya Jammeh refused to accept defeat, ECOWARN alerted ECOWAS to the risks of violence and constitutional crisis. The situation provoked swift efforts of preventive diplomacy, including the appointment of former Ghanaian President John Dramani Mahama as mediator. Indeed, it required shuttle diplomacy by the ECOWAS chair, represented by Mahama, and the threat posed by ECOWAS forces to give Jammeh no option but to exit in January 2017 without much bloodshed (Hartmann, 2017).

Guinea-Bissau (2022)

After the coup in Guinea-Bissau in February 2022, ECOWARN early warnings were sent about the fragile situation in the country and the risk of further instability. These warnings helped ECOWAS to act immediately by imposing sanctions on the coup leaders and appointing the former Guinean Prime Minister, Ibrahima Kassory Fofana, as a mediator. With preventive diplomacy efforts from Fofana, a new civilian Prime Minister was appointed in May 2022 and was paving the way for dialogue under the umbrella of a stabilization force from ECOWAS, with the ultimate goal of restoring the constitutional order (AP News, 2022).

Burkina Faso (2014-2015)

ECOWARN heavily monitored the political instability in Burkina Faso in 2014, when President Blaise Compaore tried to change the constitution to allow him to seek another term after 27 years in power. On this score, ECOWARN raised the alarm with early warnings that emphasized the increased tension and risks of violence that informed the efforts of ECCOWAS mediation led by President Macky Sall of Senegal Sall's preventive diplomacy made a significant contribution to the softening of Compaore's resignation and to the setting up of the transitional roadmap and democratic polls in 2015, rescuing the country from slipping into an ethnic civil war (Crisis Group, 2015).

Guinea (2020-2021)

As was mentioned by Naku (2021), combined with alerts from ECOWARN on the imminent outbreak of violence and instability after the disputed presidential elections in Guinea in October 2020, ECOWAS acted quickly to launch preventive diplomacy activities, with the leadership of Ghana's President Nana Akufo-Addo, who initiated mediation dialogues between the government and opposition parties with the support of several ECOWAS technical teams on the ground. Notably, guided by the perspectives distilled by the ECOWARN system, this preventive diplomacy work culminated at the beginning of 2021 in an agreement focused on a mechanism for new elections and a transition government, which halted further escalation of tensions (VOA, 2021).

Examples of this are how ECOWARN, working in harmony with the preventive diplomacy mechanisms of ECOWAS, including mediation, good offices, and the deployment of stabilization forces, has enabled the organization to defuse crises, promote a dialogue that leads to peaceful conflict resolution across West Africa.

Challenges Faced by ECOWAS and ECOWARN in Conflict Prevention

Both ECOWARN and ECOWAS suffer from limitations imposed by issues such as limited resources, lack of political will, and regional cooperation in conflict prevention. Now, there are some key challenges faces ECOWARN and ECOWAS in the prevention of conflict:

Limited Resources

Most system weaknesses are limited financial and human resources. As stated by Aning and Birikorang (2009), ECOWARN essentially comprises resource-intensive activities, such as data collection analysis and forecasting early warning systems, that are highly resource-intensive in nature and technology. However, most of the time, ECOWAS has budget constraints and mainly relies heavily on donor support; thus, its initiatives may not be very sustainable and independent most of the time (Charlesraj et al., 2020).

Capacity Gaps

Intertwined with the resource constraints are capacity gaps in both structures. In this regard, ECOWARN indeed needs to increase the number of its trained personnel, advanced tools for analysis, and an appropriate and functioning communication network for overall improved early warning and preventive diplomacy (Obi, 2021). Other coordination difficulties exist between the various components of both ECOWARN and ECOWAS structures, for instance, the OMC and zonal bureaus, limiting effective information sharing and responsiveness (Aning & Atuobi, 2011).

Political Will and Commitment

According to Kacungira (2021), the experience of ECOWAS has shown that success in regard to the prevention of conflict is more often than not based on the political will and commitment of member states. Despite the protocols and mandates of the organization, some members may resist the intervention or shy away from ceding the sovereignty mandate, especially in internal conflicts. Such a lack of consensus can undermine the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and early response mechanisms.

Regional Cooperation Challenges

Effective conflict prevention, in particular, will require cooperation and coordination among ECOWAS member states, regional organizations, and other international organizations. Aning and Lecoutre (2008) asserted that efforts to attain regional cooperation can however, be undermined by diverging national interests, mistrust, and competing loyalties. In addition to the diverging national interests, there is a high possibility that the many regional and sub-regional organizations working in West Africa might pose a challenge due to the overlapping of mandates and duplication of a few efforts.

Complex and Transnational Threats

Currently, ECOWAS and ECOWARN are the first-line alert mechanisms in dealing with a wide range of complex transnational threats, including terrorism, organized crime, maritime piracy, and irregular migration. These are multifarious challenges that have registered the call for comprehensive and well-resourced responses, thereby stretching the capacity of ECOWAS and its member states.

Yet, despite these challenges, ECOWAS and its early warning mechanism have continued to play a critical role in conflict prevention in West Africa. Through better funding, building up of capacities, increasing political commitment, and regional cooperation, the capability of the organization through preventive diplomacy will be fully embraced to attain this aim.

Conclusion

The cases highlighted within this article underline how crucial ECOWAS has come to be in promoting peace and security throughout the West African region through its early warning and preventive diplomacy mechanisms. Conflicts and political instability do not only bring about tragic human suffering; they hold back economic development, efforts at integration, and the general prosperity of the region.

ECOWARN, as an early warning system for the ECOWAS, is a principal tool for the timely detection of possible flashpoints and emerging threats. It provides vital analysis of information by capturing data from diverse sources, including Civil Society Organizations and local communities, which informs ECOWAS' preventive diplomacy. This proactive approach enables ECOWAS to mediate, facilitate, or deploy a stabilization force or other forms of intervention before conflicts escalate into full-blown crises.

For example, successes by ECOWAS in averting or mitigating conflicts in countries like The Gambia, Burkina Faso, and Guinea show that the preventive diplomacy mechanisms are effective. Again, it has facilitated dialogue and conciliation agreements, and smooth transitions toward democratic governance, thereby stopping most of the wide-scale violence in the sub-region.

However, there exist severe limitations about resource constraints, capacity gaps, political will, and weaknesses in regional cooperation, which would require alleviation of these issues through increased funding, capacity-building, strengthening regional cooperation, and improving compliance and accountability measures if ECOWAS is to realize its potential in preventive diplomacy fully.

Against a background of growing complex threats to security, from terrorism and organized crime to political instability and environmental challenges in West Africa, the role of ECOWAS in early warning and preventive diplomacy has become more significant. An ECOWAS that is more proactive having orchestrated the deepening of its conflict prevention mechanisms and the fostering of a culture of peace and stability, could use its good offices in the service of regional integration, economic development, and human security across West Africa.

References

Adetula, V. et al. (2016). Introduction to the ECOWAS peace and security architecture. WAPPA Report 1.

Africa News (2020, August 22). ECOWAS appoints Goodluck Jonathan as its special envoy for Mali crisis. https://www.africanews.com/

African Union (AU). (2021). Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). https://au.int/

African Union. (2015). African Peace and Security Architecture: A 2010 assessment. AU EWS.

Aning, K. & Atuobi, S. (2011). Responsibility to Prevent in Mass Atrocity Situations: West Africa's Case for Implementing a Regional Concept. Routledge Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect.

Aning, K. & Lecoutre, D. (2008). Security Guide for Policy Makers: Why it is Needed and How It Can Be Used. Policy Brief #2. ASSN Resource Center.

Aning, K. (2007). Unravelling the Ecology of the New Landscape of Conflicts: The Case of West Africa. GGI Analysis Paper 1/2007.

Aning, K. and Salihu, N. (2013). Accounting for the role of ECOWAS in conflict management in West Africa. doi:10.1080/10246029.2013.816114

Aning, K., & Birikorang, E. (2009). Responsibility to Protect in Africa: An Analysis of the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture. Global Responsibility to Protect, 1(1), 90-113.s

Aning, K., Osei, A., & Naab, P. (2019). Re-emerging national security concerns in West Africa. Peace Studies Journal, 12(1).

AP News (2022, May 19). Guinea-Bissau appoints new prime minister after coup attempt. https://apnews.com/article/0f5d9e7e7b94bc2e8d2d9bc7d27d6f24

VOA News (2010, December 3). Guinea election declared "credible" despite irregularities.

Charlesraj, E. B. C., et al. (2020). The Architecture of ECOWAS Early Warning and Response System. Peace Studies Journal, 13(2), 21-39.

Crisis Group (2015). The Central Sahel: A Perfect Sandstorm. Africa Report N°227.

Cutillo, A. (2013). Early warning and conflict prevention by Regional Economic Communities. Instituto Affari Internazionali.

ECOWAS (1999). Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. https://www.ecowas.int/

ECOWAS (2019, December 19). Final Report of the Inclusive Dialogue for Mali. https://www.ecowas.int/

ECOWAS (2021). ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN). https://www.ecowas.int/ecowarn/

ECOWAS (2022). Press Release: 61st Ordinary Session of ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government. https://www.ecowas.int/

ECOWAS. (2021). ECOWAS vision 2020: Towards a democratic and prosperous community. https://www.ecowas.int/

ECOWAS. (2021). Maintaining peace, security, and stability in the region. https://www.ecowas.int/

Hartmann, C. (2010). Governance Transfer by the Economic Community of West African States. SWP Research Paper.

Hartmann, C. (2017). ECOWAS and the Restoration of Democracy in The Gambia. SWP Comment 2017/C 01.

Howe, K. M. (2021). ECOWAS and the subregional peacekeeping in Liberia. International Peacekeeping, 28(3), 433-461. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2020.1733201

International Crisis Group (ICG). (2010). Guinea: Reforming the Army. Africa Report N°164.

Jaye, T. (2017). ECOWAS and the restoration of peace and security in West Africa. doi:10.5040/9781526139376.ch-002

Kacungira, N. (2021). The African Union and ECOWAS' preventive diplomacy and mediation efforts. Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).

Mac-Leva, F. et al. (2013). Regional economic communities and peacebuilding in Africa – the experiences of ECOWAS and SADC. NOREF.

Mehler, A. (2009). Peace and power sharing in Africa: A not so obvious relationship. African Affairs, 108(432), 453–473. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adp039

Naku, E. (2021, September 18). ECOWAS lauds return of constitutional order in Guinea. The Guardian Nigeria. https://guardian.ng/

Obi, C.I. (2021). Regional Organizations and Preventive Diplomacy in Africa. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies.

Okereke, N. (2018). Leveraging democratic transition for conflict transformation. Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 40(1), 168–186.

Olonisakin, F. (2013). ECOWAS: from economic integration to peace building. doi:10.5040/9781472553614.ch-004

Onuoha, F. C. (2012). A "rising Africa" in a fractured world: A human security perspective on contemporary Africa. African Security, 5(2), 91-109.

Oudraat, C.J. (2021). Peacekeeping Operations in Africa. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/peacekeeping-operations-africa

Ouédraogo, E. (2019). Advancing an Integrated Approach to Prevention in West Africa. KAIPTC Policy Brief 1/2019.

VOA (2021, September 27). Guinea Transition Government Agreed After ECOWAS Mediation. https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_guinea-transition-government-agreed-after-ecowas-mediation/6255253.html

VOA. (2015, November 29). ECOWAS Observers Declare Burkina Faso Poll Credible.

World Bank. (2003). Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy. World Bank.