Title: The Retirement Paradox: Examining the Disconnect Between Financial Incentives, Scientific Productivity, and Systemic Corruption in Uganda
Authors: Dr. Arinaitwe Julius, Ahumuza Audrey
Volume: 10
Issue: 1
Pages: 276-283
Publication Date: 2026/01/28
Abstract:
Background: Uganda's public academic and research institutions face a critical paradox where retirement financial incentives appear fundamentally misaligned with scientific productivity goals, potentially exacerbated by systemic corruption that distorts resource allocation and institutional priorities. Objective: This study examined the relationship between retirement financial incentives, scientific productivity, and systemic corruption in Uganda's public academic and research institutions to provide evidence-based recommendations for policy reform. Methods: A mixed-methods convergent parallel design was employed from March to October 2024, recruiting 384 participants (200 currently employed academics, 120 recently retired researchers, and 64 institutional administrators) from five public universities and three research institutions using stratified random sampling with 80% statistical power. Quantitative data were collected through structured questionnaires measuring retirement incentive perceptions, scientific productivity metrics, and corruption perceptions, while qualitative data were gathered through 32 in-depth interviews and four focus group discussions. Statistical analyses included t-tests, ANOVA, correlation analyses, multiple linear regression, logistic regression, mediation analysis using Baron and Kenny approach with Sobel tests, and structural equation modeling, while qualitative data were analyzed thematically using NVivo 12 software. Results: Researchers planning early retirement demonstrated significantly lower scientific productivity across all metrics: 53% fewer publications (3.2 vs 6.8, t=-11.24, p<0.001, d=1.26), 57% less research funding ($12,450 vs $28,900, t=-11.86, p<0.001, d=1.30), and 61% fewer PhD students supervised (1.4 vs 3.6, t=-10.92, p<0.001, d=1.18) compared to those without early retirement intentions. Multiple regression analysis revealed that perceived retirement incentive value was the strongest predictor of productivity (?=-0.512, p<0.001), followed by corruption perception scores (?=-0.298, p<0.001), with the model explaining 68.4% of productivity variance (Rē=0.684, F(9,374)=89.42, p<0.001). Logistic regression predicting early retirement intention achieved 86.7% classification accuracy (Nagelkerke Rē=0.742), with witnessing corruption in retirement administration increasing early retirement odds by 3.4 times (OR=3.446, p=0.001). Conclusion: Uganda's retirement incentive structure created perverse incentives that simultaneously discouraged scientific productivity and fostered corrupt institutional environments, operating through both direct demotivation mechanisms and indirect corruption-mediated pathways. The system encouraged premature exit of experienced researchers while suppressing productivity among those who remained, creating adverse selection where the most valuable scientists left earliest. Comprehensive policy reform is urgently needed to realign financial incentives with productivity goals, restructure retirement benefits to reward continued contribution, and strengthen anti-corruption mechanisms in retirement administration to restore institutional integrity and enhance Uganda's scientific capacity for national development.