Title: The Anatomy of Betrayal: Self-Interest, Elite Capture, and the Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Africa
Authors: Dr. Arinaitwe Julius, Ahumuza Audrey
Volume: 10
Issue: 1
Pages: 295-303
Publication Date: 2026/01/28
Abstract:
This mixed-methods study examined the mechanisms through which elite capture and self-interested behavior drive Africa's persistent underdevelopment, conceptualizing this phenomenon as a systematic betrayal of developmental promises by political and economic elites. Conducted across six purposively selected African countries Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Ghana, Uganda, and Zambia the research integrated qualitative data from 87 key informant interviews, 12 focus group discussions, and extensive document analysis with quantitative survey data from 1,847 respondents to comprehensively analyze the anatomy of elite capture and its developmental consequences. The study employed univariate, bivariate, structural equation modeling, and mixed-effects approaches to examine relationships between elite capture indicators (corruption, patronage networks, policy capture, elite accountability, and institutional trust) and development outcomes (poverty, infrastructure quality, service delivery, economic opportunity, and human development). Univariate results revealed alarmingly high levels of corruption perception (mean = 68.42/100), patronage network density (mean = 7.25/10), and policy capture (mean = 6.89/10) alongside critically low elite accountability (mean = 32.15/100) and institutional trust (mean = 3.42/10). Bivariate analyses demonstrated strong, statistically significant correlations between all elite capture indicators and development outcomes (r = 0.589 to r = 0.768, all p < 0.001), with policy capture showing particularly powerful associations with service delivery (r = 0.745) and elite accountability showing the strongest inverse relationship with poverty (r = -0.723). The structural equation model, which demonstrated excellent fit (CFI = 0.972, RMSEA = 0.038), revealed that elite capture exerted substantial direct effects (? = -0.428, p < 0.001) and even stronger indirect effects (? = -0.505, p < 0.001) on development outcomes through institutional degradation, with approximately 54% of the total effect (? = -0.933) operating through the mediation pathway of compromised institutional quality. Mixed-effects modeling accounting for hierarchical data structures identified significant variance at country (ICC = 0.287), community (ICC = 0.136), and individual levels (ICC = 0.577), revealing that while elite capture operated systemically, substantial heterogeneity existed in both its severity and effects across contexts. These findings challenged conventional development paradigms emphasizing technical solutions and demonstrated that sustainable development in Africa requires fundamental political economy transformation addressing elite incentive structures, strengthening multi-scalar accountability mechanisms, and empowering civil society as countervailing forces capable of challenging entrenched power relations. The study's theoretical contribution lay in moving beyond abstract assertions about governance failures to provide granular empirical evidence of how elite self-interest translates into systemic underdevelopment, while its practical contribution offered evidence-based recommendations for political rather than purely technical interventions. By anatomizing the mechanisms of elite betrayal across multiple analytical scales and through complementary methodological approaches, this research advanced scholarly understanding of African underdevelopment while providing actionable insights for policymakers, civil society organizations, and international development partners committed to transforming the continent's developmental trajectory through confronting rather than accommodating elite capture.