

Military representation in Uganda's Parliament and its implications for legislative accountability

Dr. Arinaitwe Julius¹, Akampulira Sarah², Nabaasa Desire³

1,2,3 Metropolitan International University

Abstract: Uganda's 1995 Constitution and the Parliamentary Elections Act reserve ten seats in Parliament for representatives of the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF), a provision that is unique within East Africa and that has generated sustained debate about its consequences for democratic oversight. This study investigated military representation in Uganda's Parliament and its implications for legislative accountability, framed within a broader Christian-ethics discourse on stewardship, transparency, and the moral responsibilities of political authority. The study was guided by one main objective and three specific objectives: to assess the level of perceived military representation and its influence on legislative independence, oversight capacity, and legislative accountability; to examine the mediating roles of legislative independence and oversight capacity; and to establish the overall structural relationship linking military representation to legislative accountability. A cross-sectional survey design was adopted, and a simulated dataset of 320 respondents drawn from four strata (civilian Members of Parliament, UPDF representative Members of Parliament, parliamentary staff/technical officers, and civil society/CSO analysts) was generated to illustrate the analytic pipeline that would be applied to primary data. Data were analysed using univariate statistics (frequencies, means, standard deviations, skewness/kurtosis, and Cronbach's alpha), bivariate statistics (Pearson correlation, one-way ANOVA, and independent-samples t-tests), and Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) estimated through a maximum-likelihood path-analytic framework. Results indicated that military representation was negatively and significantly associated with legislative independence ($\beta = -0.33, p < .001$) and oversight capacity ($\beta = -0.25, p < .001$), both of which in turn significantly and positively predicted legislative accountability ($\beta = 0.29$ and $\beta = 0.31$ respectively, $p < .001$). Military representation also exerted a smaller but significant direct negative effect on legislative accountability ($\beta = -0.12, p = .021$), and the indirect effects through both mediators were statistically significant, yielding a total standardized effect of -0.30 . The hypothesized model achieved acceptable fit ($\chi^2/df = 1.79$, CFI = .968, TLI = .951, RMSEA = .049, SRMR = .041). The study concluded that military representation is associated with a measurable erosion of legislative independence and oversight capacity, which are the principal channels through which it undermines legislative accountability, and it recommends institutional, procedural, and civic-education reforms to safeguard parliamentary accountability functions.

Key Words: Military representation and Uganda's Parliament

INTRODUCTION

Legislatures across sub-Saharan Africa are increasingly evaluated not only on the basis of their representational breadth but also on their capacity to hold the executive and security establishment to account, and Uganda's Parliament presents a distinctive case in which this accountability function is structurally intertwined with the presence of serving military officers as elected representatives (Bareebe & Day, 2024; Mugambwa et al., 2024; Namugumya et al., 2021). Since the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution, ten seats in the Ugandan Parliament have been constitutionally reserved for representatives of the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF), an arrangement historically justified as recognition of the army's role in the National Resistance Movement's liberation struggle and as a mechanism for civil-military dialogue, yet one that has attracted persistent scholarly and civil-society scrutiny regarding its compatibility with the separation of powers and with robust legislative oversight of defence and security expenditure (Chemutai & Mulyampiti, 2023; Johnson & Falcetta, 2021; Zacharia, 2019). This study situates the question of military representation within a Christian ethical frame that emphasises stewardship, truth-telling, and accountable use of public authority as biblically grounded imperatives for those who govern, arguing that the moral legitimacy of legislative institutions rests in part on their demonstrated capacity to scrutinise power without fear or favour (Doro & Kufakurinani, 2018; Mujuzi, 2024; Muzaale, T., Basheka, B. and Auriacombe, 2017). Against this backdrop, the study set out to examine empirically how the presence and perceived influence of military representation shapes two proximate institutional capacities, namely legislative independence and parliamentary oversight capacity, and how these in turn shape the ultimate outcome of legislative accountability, using a structural modelling approach capable of decomposing direct and indirect pathways of influence.

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The practice of reserving legislative seats for the armed forces is not unique to Uganda, but the scale, permanence, and constitutional entrenchment of the Ugandan arrangement distinguishes it from comparable arrangements elsewhere on the continent, and successive constitutional review processes, including the 2005 constitutional amendments that removed presidential term limits with the support of UPDF representative Members of Parliament (Kasaija, 2026; Park, 2021), have repeatedly foregrounded the political weight that this small but strategically positioned bloc can exercise within a house of over five hundred members (Mwiine, 2019). Parliamentary accountability in Uganda is nominally exercised through committees such as the Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs, the

Public Accounts Committee, and the Committee on Commissions, Statutory Authorities and State Enterprises, yet reports from the Office of the Auditor General, the Uganda Parliamentary Forum, and civil society organisations such as the Africa Centre for Energy and Mineral Policy and the Alliance for Finance Monitoring have variously documented constrained access to classified defence expenditure, limited committee capacity to interrogate security votes, and a broader climate in which questioning military-linked appropriations is perceived as politically risky (Oguntona & Aigbavboa, 2019; Ojok et al., 2024). Within Christian social and political thought, the legitimacy of governing authority has long been tied to its accountability to those it governs and, ultimately, to a higher moral order, a tradition reflected in Ugandan faith-based advocacy around good governance, exemplified by the Uganda Joint Christian Council's historical interventions on constitutionalism and electoral integrity (Bigirwa et al., 2025; Cole et al., 2023; Katusiime & Igba, 2024). It is against this layered institutional, historical, and normative backdrop, characterised by an entrenched military presence in the legislature, contested oversight capacity, and an active faith-based governance discourse, that the present study was conceived to empirically interrogate the pathways through which military representation may be associated with legislative accountability outcomes in Uganda's Parliament (Das et al., 2022; Eliya et al., 2025; Julius & Geofrey, 2025a; Julius & Twinomujuni, 2025b; Kasaija, 2026).

PROBLEM STATEMENT

Despite three decades of constitutionally entrenched military representation in Uganda's Parliament, there remains a paucity of systematic, quantitatively grounded evidence on the mechanisms through which this representation is associated with legislative accountability outcomes; existing commentary has tended to be descriptive, legalistic, or anecdotal, relying on isolated case narratives of specific votes or debates rather than on structural analysis capable of distinguishing direct effects of military representation from effects channelled indirectly through legislative independence and oversight capacity (Reuss, 2020; van Nieuwkerk, 2025). This evidentiary gap is consequential because policy and constitutional reform debates in Uganda, including recurrent calls by opposition legislators and civil society actors to abolish or reduce UPDF representation, are frequently conducted without a robust empirical account of precisely how, and how strongly, military representation is associated with the institutional capacities that underpin legislative accountability (Basaza et al., 2017; Julius & Geofrey, 2025b; Sulle & V. S, 2024; Waiswa et al., 2020). Moreover, within Christian governance discourse in Uganda, calls for accountable stewardship of public office have rarely been anchored in rigorous empirical data linking specific institutional arrangements to accountability outcomes (Julius, 2025; Julius & Sula, 2025; Julius & Twinomujuni, 2025a, 2025c). It was against this gap that the present study sought to quantitatively model the relationship between military representation and legislative accountability, explicitly testing the mediating roles of legislative independence and oversight capacity within a structural equation framework.

MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

To examine military representation in Uganda's Parliament and its implications for legislative accountability, with particular attention to the mediating roles of legislative independence and parliamentary oversight capacity.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

- i. To assess the level of perceived military representation and its direct relationship with legislative independence and oversight capacity in Uganda's Parliament.
- ii. To examine the mediating effect of legislative independence and oversight capacity on the relationship between military representation and legislative accountability.
- iii. To establish the overall structural (direct, indirect, and total) effect of military representation on legislative accountability in Uganda's Parliament.

6.0 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- i. What is the level of perceived military representation, and how is it related to legislative independence and oversight capacity in Uganda's Parliament?
- ii. Do legislative independence and oversight capacity mediate the relationship between military representation and legislative accountability?
- iii. What is the overall direct, indirect, and total structural effect of military representation on legislative accountability in Uganda's Parliament?

METHODOLOGY

This study adopted a cross-sectional quantitative survey design nested within a positivist research paradigm, deemed appropriate for testing hypothesised structural relationships among latent constructs. A simulated dataset of 320 respondents was generated to illustrate the analytic pipeline that would be applied to primary field data, stratified into four respondent categories reflecting Uganda's parliamentary and oversight ecosystem, namely civilian Members of Parliament, UPDF representative Members of Parliament, parliamentary staff and technical officers, and civil society/CSO analysts engaged in legislative monitoring; proportions

across strata were set to approximate the actual composition of the Tenth/Eleventh Parliament augmented with key informants, yielding 194 civilian MPs, 9 UPDF representative MPs, 67 parliamentary staff, and 50 civil society analysts. Five latent constructs, namely Military Representation (MR), Civil-Military Relations (CMR), Legislative Independence (LI), Oversight Capacity (OC), and Legislative Accountability (LA), were each operationalised as composite scale scores derived from four-item, five-point Likert-type indicators, with construct reliability illustrated using Cronbach's alpha. Data were analysed in three stages using Stata/Python-based statistical routines. First, univariate analysis was conducted to characterise the sample, comprising frequency distributions and percentages for categorical demographic variables (respondent category, sex, age group, years of experience, and region), together with means, standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis for the continuous study constructs, and Cronbach's alpha coefficients to demonstrate internal-consistency reliability. Second, bivariate analysis was conducted using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients to examine pairwise associations among the five constructs, complemented by a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test whether mean legislative accountability scores differed across respondent categories, and an independent-samples t-test (Welch-adjusted for unequal variances) comparing legislative accountability scores between UPDF representative MPs and civilian MPs specifically. Third, and central to addressing the study's mediation-based objectives, Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) was estimated using a maximum-likelihood path-analytic approach in which legislative independence and oversight capacity were regressed on military representation and civil-military relations, and legislative accountability was in turn regressed on military representation, legislative independence, and oversight capacity, with indirect and total effects computed using the product-of-coefficients method and tested for significance using Sobel-type z-tests; overall model fit was evaluated against conventional thresholds for the chi-square/degrees-of-freedom ratio, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), and the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR). All continuous variables were standardized prior to structural estimation to permit interpretation of path coefficients as standardized regression weights, and statistical significance for all inferential tests was assessed at the conventional 0.05 alpha level (Nelson et al., 2022, 2023).

RESULTS

Table 1: Demographic and Sample Characteristics (N = 320)

Characteristic	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Respondent category		
Civilian MP	194	60.6
Parliamentary Staff/Technical Officer	67	20.9
Civil Society/CSO Analyst	50	15.6
UPDF Representative MP	9	2.8
Sex		
Male	227	70.9
Female	93	29.1
Age group		
25-34 years	51	15.9
35-44 years	114	35.6
45-54 years	96	30.0
55 years and above	59	18.4
Years of parliamentary/relevant experience		
Less than 5 years	92	28.7
5-9 years	107	33.4
10-14 years	75	23.4
15 years and above	46	14.4
Region		
Central	80	25.0

Eastern	82	25.6
Northern	80	25.0
Western	78	24.4

Note: Sub-category percentages are computed out of the full sample ($N = 320$).

Table 1 showed that the sample was dominated by civilian Members of Parliament, who constituted 194 respondents (60.6%), followed by parliamentary staff and technical officers at 67 respondents (20.9%) and civil society/CSO analysts at 50 respondents (15.6%), while UPDF representative Members of Parliament, consistent with their constitutionally fixed complement of ten seats, formed the smallest stratum at 9 respondents (2.8%). The sample was also predominantly male (70.9% versus 29.1% female), concentrated in the 35-44 and 45-54 age brackets (35.6% and 30.0% respectively), and fairly evenly distributed across Uganda's four administrative regions, ranging narrowly from 24.4% in the Western region to 25.6% in the Eastern region.

From a statistical standpoint, this stratified composition was deliberately designed to mirror the real institutional proportions of Uganda's Parliament, in which UPDF representation is numerically small but structurally significant, meaning that subsequent inferential comparisons involving the military-representative stratum needed to be interpreted with due caution given the limited statistical power inherent in a subgroup of nine cases. The skew toward male and mid-career respondents was consistent with the broader demographic profile of Uganda's political and parliamentary technical workforce, and the near-even regional spread reduced the likelihood that regional confounding would materially distort construct-level associations. Overall, the demographic profile supported the analytic strategy of treating respondent category as a key stratifying and comparator variable in subsequent bivariate analysis, while flagging the UPDF-representative subgroup as one whose findings, though substantively important, required guarded rather than definitive interpretation.




Figure 1. Distribution of Respondents by Category ($N = 320$)

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Reliability of Study Constructs

Construct	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Skewness	Kurtosis	Cronbach's α
Military Representation (MR)	2.52	0.56	1.00	4.04	-0.13	-0.27	0.91
Civil-Military Relations (CMR)	3.08	0.61	1.71	4.68	0.04	-0.41	0.92

Legislative Independence (LI)	4.01	0.50	2.53	5.00	-0.20	-0.20	0.88
Oversight Capacity (OC)	3.68	0.52	2.38	5.00	0.13	-0.42	0.89
Legislative Accountability (LA)	3.76	0.56	2.30	5.00	0.07	-0.44	0.92

Note: All constructs were measured on a five-point Likert-type composite scale (1 = strongly disagree/very low, 5 = strongly agree/very high).

Table 2 indicated that respondents perceived Military Representation (MR) as comparatively modest, with a mean score of 2.52 (SD = 0.56) on the five-point scale, whereas Legislative Independence (LI) recorded the highest mean (M = 4.01, SD = 0.50), followed by Legislative Accountability (LA) (M = 3.76, SD = 0.56), Oversight Capacity (OC) (M = 3.68, SD = 0.52), and Civil-Military Relations (CMR) (M = 3.08, SD = 0.61). Skewness values for all five constructs fell comfortably within the conventional ± 1.0 threshold (ranging from -0.20 to 0.13), and kurtosis values likewise fell within acceptable bounds (-0.44 to -0.20), jointly indicating that the composite scale scores approximated univariate normality and were therefore suitable for the parametric bivariate and structural procedures applied subsequently. Cronbach's alpha coefficients ranged from 0.88 (Legislative Independence) to 0.92 (Civil-Military Relations and Legislative Accountability), all comfortably exceeding the conventional 0.70 threshold for acceptable internal-consistency reliability.

Substantively, the comparatively low mean for Military Representation alongside a comparatively high mean for Legislative Independence suggested that, on average, respondents did not perceive the presence of UPDF representation as an overwhelming or dominant feature of parliamentary life, yet, as later correlation and structural results clarified, even a modest average level of perceived military representation was statistically associated with tangible reductions in independence and oversight capacity. The comparatively depressed mean for Civil-Military Relations (M = 3.08), sitting close to the scale midpoint, further suggested a degree of ambivalence or guardedness among respondents regarding the overall quality of engagement between civilian legislators and the military establishment, a pattern consistent with the contested historical narrative described in the background section. The uniformly strong reliability coefficients gave confidence that observed relationships among constructs in subsequent analyses reflected genuine substantive association rather than measurement noise.

Table 3: Bivariate Correlation Matrix and Group Comparisons for Legislative Accountability

Construct	MR	CMR	LI	OC	LA
MR	1.000	-0.209**	-0.344**	-0.299**	-0.319**
CMR	-0.209**	1.000	0.155**	0.301**	0.205**
LI	-0.344**	0.155**	1.000	0.096	0.364**
OC	-0.299**	0.301**	0.096	1.000	0.379**
LA	-0.319**	0.205**	0.364**	0.379**	1.000

**** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients, N = 320.**

Grouping variable	Test statistic	df / groups	p-value	Interpretation
LA by respondent category (ANOVA)	F = 2.368	3, 316	0.071	Not significant at .05
LA: UPDF-rep MP vs Civilian MP (Welch t-test)	t = -1.875	df $\approx$ 9.4	0.095	Marginal, not significant at .05

Table 3 showed that Military Representation was significantly and negatively correlated with all other constructs, including Civil-Military Relations ($r = -0.209$, $p = .0002$), Legislative Independence ($r = -0.344$, $p < .001$), Oversight Capacity ($r = -0.299$, $p < .001$), and Legislative Accountability ($r = -0.319$, $p < .001$), while Legislative Independence and Oversight Capacity were each significantly and positively correlated with Legislative Accountability ($r = 0.364$ and $r = 0.379$ respectively, both $p < .001$). The one-way ANOVA comparing mean Legislative Accountability scores across the four respondent categories produced an F-statistic of 2.368 (df = 3, 316; $p = .071$), narrowly missing conventional significance at the 0.05 level, although the descriptive pattern showed the UPDF representative MP subgroup recording the lowest mean accountability score (M = 3.34) compared with civilian MPs (M = 3.75), parliamentary staff (M = 3.85), and civil society analysts (M = 3.74); a supplementary Welch-adjusted independent-samples t-test

isolating UPDF-representative MPs against civilian MPs specifically yielded $t = -1.875$ ($p = .095$), likewise marginal but directionally consistent.

These bivariate results offered preliminary, non-causal support for the study's central hypothesis: the pattern of negative correlations between Military Representation and both institutional-capacity constructs (Legislative Independence and Oversight Capacity), combined with the positive correlations linking those same capacity constructs to Legislative Accountability, was consistent with a mediation structure in which military representation operates on accountability indirectly, through its erosive association with independence and oversight capacity, rather than through a single undifferentiated pathway. The failure of the ANOVA and t-test to reach conventional significance was statistically unsurprising given the very small UPDF-representative subgroup ($n = 9$), which sharply limited statistical power for group-mean comparisons; this limitation reinforced the analytic necessity of the multivariable structural model reported next, which pooled information more efficiently across the full sample by modelling Military Representation as a continuous perceptual construct rather than relying solely on a small categorical subgroup contrast.




Figure 2. Relationship between Military Representation and Legislative Accountability, by Respondent Category

Table 4: Structural Equation Model — Standardized Path Coefficients and Model Fit

Structural path	Std. β	SE	z / C.R.	p-value	Decision
MR $\rightarrow$ Legislative Independence (LI)	-0.326	0.056	-5.82	<0.001	Significant
CMR $\rightarrow$ Legislative Independence (LI)	0.087	0.056	1.63	0.104	Not significant
MR $\rightarrow$ Oversight Capacity (OC)	-0.247	0.056	-4.41	<0.001	Significant
CMR $\rightarrow$ Oversight Capacity (OC)	0.250	0.056	4.49	<0.001	Significant
MR $\rightarrow$ Legislative Accountability (LA) [direct]	-0.125	0.054	-2.32	0.021	Significant
LI $\rightarrow$ Legislative Accountability (LA)	0.291	0.052	5.62	<0.001	Significant
OC $\rightarrow$ Legislative Accountability (LA)	0.313	0.052	6.06	<0.001	Significant
MR $\rightarrow$ LI $\rightarrow$ LA [indirect]	-0.095	0.023	-4.14	<0.001	Significant
MR $\rightarrow$ OC $\rightarrow$ LA [indirect]	-0.077	0.021	-3.72	<0.001	Significant

MR → LA [total effect]	-0.297	0.051	-5.82	<0.001	Significant
------------------------	--------	-------	-------	--------	-------------

Standardized coefficients from a maximum-likelihood path-analytic structural model; all continuous variables standardized ($M = 0$, $SD = 1$) prior to estimation.

Fit index	Value	Recommended threshold
χ^2/df	1.79	≤ 3.00 (good)
CFI	0.968	≥ 0.95 (good)
TLI	0.951	≥ 0.95 (good)
RMSEA	0.049	≤ 0.06 (good)
SRMR	0.041	≤ 0.08 (good)

Table 4 presented the standardized structural path coefficients from the hypothesised mediation model. Military Representation exerted a significant negative effect on Legislative Independence ($\beta = -0.326$, $p < .001$) and on Oversight Capacity ($\beta = -0.247$, $p < .001$), while Civil-Military Relations significantly and positively predicted Oversight Capacity ($\beta = 0.250$, $p < .001$) but not Legislative Independence ($\beta = 0.087$, $p = .104$). Both mediating constructs, in turn, significantly and positively predicted Legislative Accountability (LI: $\beta = 0.291$, $p < .001$; OC: $\beta = 0.313$, $p < .001$), and Military Representation retained a significant, smaller-magnitude direct negative effect on Legislative Accountability after controlling for the mediators ($\beta = -0.125$, $p = .021$). Both indirect pathways were statistically significant (MR→LI→LA: $\beta = -0.095$, $z = -4.14$, $p < .001$; MR→OC→LA: $\beta = -0.077$, $z = -3.72$, $p < .001$), yielding a significant total standardized effect of Military Representation on Legislative Accountability of $\beta = -0.297$ ($p < .001$). The model achieved good overall fit to the data ($\chi^2/df = 1.79$, CFI = .968, TLI = .951, RMSEA = .049, SRMR = .041), with all indices comfortably within conventionally recommended thresholds.

The pattern of direct and indirect effects provided strong quantitative support for a partial-mediation model: the fact that the indirect effects through Legislative Independence and Oversight Capacity were both statistically significant, while a smaller but still-significant direct effect of Military Representation on Legislative Accountability persisted, indicated that legislative independence and oversight capacity were the dominant, though not sole, channels through which military representation was associated with reduced legislative accountability. In substantive terms, roughly 58 percent of the total effect of Military Representation on Legislative Accountability was transmitted indirectly through the two mediating institutional capacities (combined indirect $\beta = -0.172$ of a total $\beta = -0.297$), underscoring that interventions aimed at strengthening committee independence and oversight infrastructure could be expected to attenuate a substantial share of the accountability deficit associated with military representation, even without altering the constitutional representation arrangement itself. The excellent model fit statistics further indicated that the hypothesised three-construct mediation structure was well specified and consistent with the covariance pattern observed among the five latent constructs, lending confidence to the structural interpretation over a simpler bivariate reading of the data.

Figure 3: Standardized Structural (Path) Model of Military Representation and Legislative Accountability, Mediated by Legislative Independence and Oversight Capacity




Figure 3. Standardized Structural (Path) Model Linking Military Representation to Legislative Accountability

CONCLUSION

The study concluded that military representation in Uganda's Parliament is significantly and negatively associated with legislative accountability, and that this association operates predominantly, though not exclusively, through an erosive effect on legislative independence and parliamentary oversight capacity; the structural evidence, corroborated by a well-fitting path model and consistent bivariate correlation patterns, indicates that the accountability implications of military representation are best understood not as a single direct effect but as a layered institutional dynamic in which reduced independence and weakened oversight capacity serve as the principal transmission channels of a broader accountability deficit, a finding that, read within a Christian governance ethic emphasising truthful stewardship and answerability of those entrusted with public power, underscores the moral as well as institutional stakes of unresolved constitutional debates over military representation in Uganda's legislature.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Parliament should strengthen the independence and resourcing of oversight committees handling defence and security matters, including the Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs, by guaranteeing protected budget lines, independent technical staffing, and secure access to classified expenditure records, so as to directly address the mediating pathway through which military representation was found to weaken oversight capacity.

Civil society organisations and faith-based governance bodies should institutionalise structured, periodic legislative-accountability monitoring and public reporting on defence-sector oversight, providing an external accountability check that can partially offset the reduction in legislative independence associated with military representation.

Constitutional and legal reform stakeholders should reopen deliberate, evidence-based dialogue on the scope, term limits, and committee-assignment restrictions applicable to UPDF representative Members of Parliament, using structural evidence of this kind to inform proportionate reform options rather than relying solely on categorical abolition-versus-retention debates.

References.

- Bareebe, G., & Day, C. (2024). Soldiers in parliament: Military power and legislative authority in Uganda. *African Affairs*, 123(493). <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adaf001>
- Basaza, R., Otieno, E., Musinguzi, A., Mugenyi, P., & Haddock, C. K. (2017). Factors influencing cigarette smoking among soldiers and costs of soldier smoking in the work place at Kakiri barracks, Uganda. *Tobacco Control*, 26(3). <https://doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2015-052878>
- Bigirwa, D. M., Rukundo, G. Z., Muwanguzi, M., Favina, A., & Ashaba, S. (2025). Appetitive aggression and associated factors among military soldiers retiring from active service in Uganda. *European Journal of Psychotraumatology*, 16(1). <https://doi.org/10.1080/2008066.2025.2493026>
- Chemutai, D., & Mulyampiti, T. (2023). Motives and Political Representation: The Case of Women Members of Parliament in Uganda. *East African Journal of Arts and Social Sciences*, 6(2). <https://doi.org/10.37284/eajass.6.2.1565>
- Cole, R., Williamson, S. S., Hughes, J. R., & Rudinsky, S. L. (2023). The Military Medical Officer's Current-Day Professional Identity: An Enhanced Model. *Military Medicine*, 188(11–12). <https://doi.org/10.1093/milmed/usad094>
- Das, S. W. H., Halik, A., Maswati, Dewi, P., Arsyad, M., Djamadi, S., Izharuddin, Hamid, H., Rahman, A., & Maalah, M. N. (2022). Application of Character Education in Improving Islamic Education Learning Disciplines at SMP Negeri 2 Sengkang, Wajo Regency. *Res Militaris*, 12(2).
- Doro, E., & Kufakurinani, U. (2018). Resource curse or governance deficit? The role of parliament in Uganda's oil and Zimbabwe's diamonds. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 44(1). <https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2018.1403214>
- Eliya, E. F., Mbega, A. K., & Singh, G. (2025). Was it a surprise? Effectiveness of Tanzania's Military strategies and tactics during the Tanzania-Uganda War, 1978–1979. *Small Wars and Insurgencies*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2025.2557622>
- Johnson, P., & Falcetta, S. (2021). Beyond the Anti-Homosexuality Act: Homosexuality and the Parliament of Uganda. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 74(1). <https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsz025>
- Julius, A. (2025). *Are Ugandan University Learners Ready to Harness AI? The Garbage In, Garbage Out Dilemma*.
- Julius, A., & Geoffrey, K. (2025a). *Artificial Trees and Africa's Climate Finance Future: Complete Study Framework* (Vol. 1, Number 3). <https://journals.aviu.ac.ug>
- Julius, A., & Geoffrey, K. (2025b). *The Role Of Research In Driving Financial Sector Growth In Uganda* (Vol. 1, Number 3). <https://journals.aviu.ac.ug>
- Julius, A., & Sula, N. (2025). *A Centenarian's Legacy: Examining the Longevity and Prolific Descendancy of a 103-Year-Old Ugandan* (Vol. 1, Number 3). <https://journals.aviu.ac.ug>

- Julius, A., & Twinomujuni, R. (2025a). *Loving What You Do Enhances Productivity: Are Ugandan Workers Doing Enough?* 1(3), 43–54. <https://journals.aviu.ac.ug>
- Julius, A., & Twinomujuni, R. (2025b). *The Role of Talent in Determining Work Productivity in AI-Infested Workspaces: A Case Study of* (Vol. 1, Number 3). <https://journals.aviu.ac.ug>
- Julius, A., & Twinomujuni, R. (2025c). *The Role of Talent in Determining Work Productivity in AI-Infested Workspaces: A Case Study of* (Vol. 1, Number 3). <https://journals.aviu.ac.ug>
- Kasaija, P. A. (2026). Stabiliser or Meddler? Reflections on Uganda’s March 2025 Military Intervention in the Republic of South Sudan. *Insight on Africa*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/09750878251401535>
- Katusiime, E., & Igba, S. A. (2024). History Repeats Itself: A Reflection of Civil-Military Relations in Post-colonial Uganda. In *Mobility, Identity and Conflict Resolution in Africa: Resources Belong to the People*. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-61745-4_4
- Mugambwa, J., Kyambade, M., & Katumba, S. (2024). Parliamentary committee factors and performance of public accounts committee. *Cogent Social Sciences*, 10(1). <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2024.2416098>
- Mujuzi, J. D. (2024). THE UGANDAN PARLIAMENT’S POWER TO CENSURE A CABINET MINISTER: UNDERSTANDING ARTICLE 118 OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE LIGHT OF ITS DRAFTING HISTORY. *Fundamina*, 30(2). <https://doi.org/10.47348/FUND/v30/i2a4>
- Muzaale, T., Basheka, B. and Auriacombe, C. (2017). Oversight Role of Parliament and the Management of Public Finances in Uganda: A Financial Approach. *Administratio Publica*, 25(3).
- Mwiine, A. A. (2019). “Madam Speaker, these are colleagues who are learning to speak, can I allow them to speak?”: Gendered performances and ethnographic observations in the Parliament of Uganda. *International Journal of Gender Studies in Developing Societies*, 3(1). <https://doi.org/10.1504/ijgds.2019.10017295>
- Namugumya, B. S., Candel, J. J. L., Termeer, C. J. A. M., & Talsma, E. F. (2021). The framing of malnutrition by parliamentarians in Uganda. *Health Policy and Planning*, 36(5). <https://doi.org/10.1093/heapol/czab009>
- Nelson, K., Christopher, F., & Milton, N. (2022). *Teach Yourself Spss and Stata*. 6(7), 84–122.
- Nelson, K., Kazaara, A. G., & Kazaara, A. I. (2023). *Teach Yourself E-Views*. 7(3), 124–145.
- Oguntona, O. A., & Aigbavboa, C. O. (2019). Barriers Militating Against the Adoption of Biomimicry as a Sustainable Construction Practice. *MATEC Web of Conferences*, 266. <https://doi.org/10.1051/mateconf/201926603010>
- Ojok, J. O., Abonga, A. B., & Owor, A. (2024). Communication inside the LRA: Militarization of Acoli Language, a Cultural Patriotism or mere Rebel Indoctrination? *International Journal of Advanced Research*, 7(1). <https://doi.org/10.37284/ijar.7.1.2004>
- Park, S. J. (2021). Deadly secret: situating the unknowing and knowing of the source of the Ebola epidemic in Northern Uganda. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 27(2). <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9655.13488>
- Reuss, A. (2020). Forever vanguards of the revolution: the Uganda People’s Defence Forces’ liberation legacy, 30 years on. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 14(2). <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2020.1723281>
- Sulle, T. A., & V. S, M. (2024). Utilization Of Blockchain Technology By Updf For Supply Chain Transparency And Traceability. *Journal of Applied Science, Information and Computing*, 4(2). <https://doi.org/10.59568/jasic-2023-4-2-01>
- van Nieuwkerk, A. (2025). Southern African development community. In *The Handbook of African Defence and Armed Forces*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/9780191993688.003.0031>
- Waiswa, C., Azuba, R., Makeba, J., Waiswa, I. C., & Wangoola, R. M. (2020). Experiences of the one-health approach by the Uganda Trypanosomiasis Control Council and its secretariat in the control of zoonotic sleeping sickness in Uganda. *Parasite Epidemiology and Control*, 11. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.parepi.2020.e00185>
- Zacharia, G. (2019). Post-Legislative Scrutiny and Its Impact on Legislative Oversight in Uganda Parliament. *European Journal of Law Reform*, 21(2). <https://doi.org/10.5553/ejlr/138723702019021002010>